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Chapter 1 
General introduction 
 
This chapter introduces the study by presenting a general overview of what it is all about. The 
first section discusses the background of the study, followed by a description of the motiva-
tion for undertaking this study in the second section. In the third section, the research 
problem and the objective are presented. This is followed by discussion of the theoretical 
perspectives and the research questions in the fourth and fifth sections, respectively. Next, I 
define and discuss the main theoretical concepts used in this study and present the 
conceptual model that connects the theoretical perspectives and the key concepts. The 
chapter ends with an outline of the remainder of the thesis.   
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1.1 Background to the study 
This study is about the impact of decentralization reforms on service delivery in rural villages 
in Tanzania from a gender perspective. Decentralization has emerged as an important trend 
in development policy and discourse in recent years. Most countries worldwide have 
attempted decentralization of the fiscal, political and administrative responsibilities from 
central governments to lower level governments. As a World Bank (2008:5) report asserts: 
“Everyone is doing it.” Although not completely a new phenomenon, the current wave of 
decentralization focuses on enhancing service users’ participation and improving service 
delivery. The World Bank (2004:187) emphasizes that “decentralization must reach the 
clinic, the classroom and local water utilities in ways that create opportunities for strengthe-
ning accountability between citizens, politicians and policy makers.” The theory is that in a 
decentralized system, public services should be more responsive to local needs because 
citizens can directly or indirectly influence decisions about resource allocation and 
service delivery. It is argued that decentralizing responsibilities to local governments will 
result in better use of resources and deliver more appropriate services since decisions will 
reflect local needs and priorities (Jeppsson and Okuonzi, 2000; Ribot, 2002; Devas and 
Grant, 2003; World Bank, 2004, 2008; Ahmad et al., 2005; Ribot et al., 2006; Andrews and 
de Vries, 2007). Decentralization is also often regarded as an important vehicle for enhancing 
women’s participation in local decision-making processes and for addressing gender inequ-
ality (Beall, 2007). In reality, however, the evidence about these expectations is mixed.     
 In terms of development thinking and practice, decentralization reforms have 
coincided with a paradigm shift in governance theory from monocentric governance, an 
approach where the state is the centre of political power and authority, towards polycentric 
governance, the idea of multiple centres of power within a state (Termeer et al., 2010). In this 
view, decentralization is viewed as an appropriate response to the problems of state failure 
that were characteristic of many developing countries in the 1970s and 1980s and lead into 
the decline of most state provided public services (Batley, 2004; World Bank, 2004; Ahmad 
et al., 2005; Mehrotra, 2006). Thus, the recent decentralization reforms have been impleme-
nted in the context of new approaches to public management (Hope, 2001; Batley, 2004; 
Larbi, 2005). In the context of new public management, decentralization is aimed at 
replacing the “highly centralized and hierarchical government structures by decentralized 
management environments where decisions on resource allocation and service delivery are 
made closer to the point of service delivery” (Hope, 2001:120). The emphasis is on ‘bringing 
the state in’ as opposed to earlier reforms which focused on ‘rolling back the state’ (Beall, 
2007). Consequently, local government reforms have been used as a supporting strategy for 
decentralization because reforms are needed to improve governance and service delivery 
capacity of local governments required to fulfil their new responsibilities (Andrews and de 
Vries, 2007; Dubois and Fattore, 2009).  
Tanzania fits well into this global picture because of its long and ‘troubled’ history of 
implementing decentralization reforms. More recently, the country has pursued local govern-
ment reforms aimed at improving the quality, access and equitable delivery of public services 
provided through or facilitated by local government authorities (LGAs). The recent reforms 
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were initiated in 1996 following the publication of the Local Government Reform Agenda 
1996-2000 which set the vision for the reforms. The vision states that the raison d’être for 
the devolution of roles and authority will be the capacity and efficiency of the local govern-
ment in delivering services to the people (URT, 1996). In 1998, the government endorsed 
the policy of ‘decentralization by devolution’ through the Policy Paper on Local Government 
Reform as a guiding framework for local government reforms in the country. The paper 
spells out that public service provision must be brought as closely as possible to the user. It 
explains that the principle of subsidiarity involves decentralization of public service provision 
linked to devolution of political powers to lower levels as far as possible and feasible (URT, 
1998).   
The first phase of the local government reform programme (LGRP) was implemented 
between 2000 and 2008. Currently, the government of Tanzania is implementing the second 
phase of the local government reform programme (LGRP II 2009-2014) amidst other progre-
ssive and gendered policies and strategies, such as the Development Vision 2025 (URT, 
2000) and the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (URT, 2010a) that 
aim at attaining gender equity, democracy and sustainable development (URT, 2009a). The 
overall goal of LGRP II is to achieve “accelerated and equitable socio-economic development, 
public service delivery and poverty reduction across the country.” In relation to this goal, the 
overall purpose of LGRP II is “to achieve devolution of government roles and functions, and 
to that end transform LGAs to competent strategic leaders and coordinators of socio-
economic development, accountable and transparent service delivery and poverty reduction 
interventions in their areas of jurisdiction” (URT, 2009a:28). Both the LGRP and LGRP II 
define the process of  ‘decentralization by devolution’ as the main strategy to achieve the 
goals and objectives of the reforms and aim at enhancing citizens’ participation and impro-
ving service delivery, the ‘twin’ objectives of decentralization reforms (URT, 1998, 2009a). 
While policy documents on decentralization in Tanzania and elsewhere claim that 
decentralization leads to improved service users’ participation and service delivery, this link is 
contested in the academic literature. The empirical evidence shows mixed results on the 
expected positive impacts of decentralization on both participation and service delivery. Hope 
(2001), for example, concludes that decentralization in Africa has resulted in better govern-
ance, increased popular participation, allowed better mobilization and use of resources, and 
increased reliability and delivery of public services. In Uganda, a country that has been 
described as having the ‘most far-reaching’ local government reforms in the developing world 
(Francis and James, 2003; Robinson, 2007), Onyach-Olaa (2003) shows that decentralization 
has increased opportunities for citizens to make choices on the type and quality of public 
services they want. Meyer-Emerick et al. (2004:232) report “vast improvements” in service 
delivery at the sub-district levels in Botswana. At the same time, in the literature it is argued 
that there is no automatic assurance that increased participation will lead to improvements in 
public services (Conyers, 2007; Robinson, 2007). For example, a study in six Latin American 
countries indicates that transfer of resources and staff to local governments neither improved 
the provision nor reduced costs of healthcare services (Burki et al., 1999). Studies on decen-
tralised public health services in Uganda show that if not well designed, decentralization may 
lead to outcomes that are potentially worse than in centralized systems (Akin et al., 2005; 
Decision making under the tree 
 
4 
 
Hutchinson et al., 2006). This observation is corroborated by the findings of a World Bank 
(2008:4) review in 20 developing countries which found “weaker connections between decen-
tralization and service delivery in health but stronger connections in education.”  
 A major problem with the empirical literature on decentralization in sub-Saharan 
Africa, and Tanzania in particular, is that most studies do not address the gender dimensions 
of the process and outcomes of decentralization. Little is written about decentralization and 
gender, especially at the sub-district levels. The tendency has been to focus on women’s 
political engagement at the national and district levels (Beall, 2007). There is an on-going 
discourse on gender in development processes, ranging from theory linked to a moderni-
zation perspective to Marxist-oriented theory, and from women in development to gender 
and development paradigms (Parpart et al., 2000). The question that comes up every time is 
whether women should be supported to strengthen their autonomy or whether their 
participation in male-dominated structures should increase. This study contributes to this 
debate by examining the empirical data to test the validity of the theoretical arguments. 
Furthermore, there is limited systematic evidence across different public service sectors on 
whether increased women’s participation in decentralised local institutions generates better 
service delivery outcomes which are accessible, affordable and appropriate to different 
community groups in equal quantity and quality. This study intends to fill this gap by investi-
gating the impacts of decentralization reforms on two sectors: rural water supply and primary 
healthcare services.  
1.2 Motivation for the study 
The motivation to pursue this study stems from the author’s observations and experience 
with community development work for over twelve years in rural settings in the region of 
Dodoma and other parts in Tanzania. One of the main development challenges in these 
areas is the inadequate access to the basic social services of rural water supply and primary 
healthcare, which has serious consequences for people’s welfare, particularly that of women 
and girls. Due to the gendered division of labour, women and girls are the primary actors in 
domestic water provision and in care for children, the sick and elderly, which suggests that 
their needs for water and health services are more urgent than those of men. Various interve-
ntions have been implemented by the government, donors and communities to address these 
challenges, with varying degrees of success. The current local government reforms which are 
part of the wider public sector reforms are examples of such initiatives. However, the extent 
to which these succeeded in improving the interactions and relationships between service 
users and providers and in securing access to gender-sensitive public services, has not been 
clearly documented.  
 Working in an institution1 that is responsible for providing training, research and 
advisory services in the field of rural development planning, and is an anchor institution for 
providing capacity building to LGAs in Tanzania, the author has frequent contacts with 
LGAs in the country. While the local government reforms envisage LGAs as autonomous 
                                                 
1Institute of Rural Development Planning, Dodoma-Tanzania   
General introduction 
 
5 
 
entities that reflect local demands and conditions and deriving legitimacy from services to the 
people (URT, 1996), I could observe that mostly they are still seen as mere implementers of 
national and sectoral development plans. There is inadequate involvement of the public in 
LGAs’ affairs and lack of gender integration in most LGAs plans (URT, 2009a). As a 
member of the team that was involved in developing a proposal for the Netherlands Initiative 
for Capacity Development in Higher Education (NICHE/TZA/002), submitted to the 
Netherlands University Foundation for International Cooperation (NUFFIC) in 2009, my 
interest to explore some of these issues became evident. In line with the overall objective of 
the NICHE/TZA/002 project which is “to enhance the capacity of the Institute of Rural 
Development Planning for strengthening Local Government Authorities to implement 
decentralization by devolution in the light of LGRP II”, it was possible to undertake this 
study. Thus, this thesis is one of the outputs of the NICHE/TZA/002 project. 
1.3 Research problem and objective 
Over a decade now since Tanzania started implementing the local government reforms, 
subsequent reviews have noted that the reform was too ambitious given the complex policy 
and reform environment (URT, 2008a, 2009a). While the logic behind it was that LGAs 
would be able to manage service delivery more efficiently than the central government 
(Hirschmann, 2003), coverage and distribution of health services remains inadequate 
(UNICEF, 2007) and over half of rural households travel more than a kilometre to their 
nearest drinking water sources in the dry season (URT, 2007a, 2009b). Many service users are 
still dissatisfied with the accessibility, quality and affordability of almost all public services 
(URT, 2009b). People’s participation in planning is minimal. The Opportunities and 
Obstacles to Development (O&OD), the official planning methodology for LGAs, appears to 
be disregarded at higher levels of decision making. Hence, the voice of the people, the clients 
and users of services is insufficiently heard (URT, 2009a).  
Decentralization reforms in Tanzania are also expected to address gender inequalities 
with regard to women’s participation in decision-making processes and in improving their 
access to public services. Recent reviews, however, show that women are marginalized and 
their interests and needs filtered out when village plans are integrated into district plans 
(URT, 2009a). While the law stipulates that women must constitute at least 30 percent of 
elected councillors and 25 percent in village councils (though mainly through special seats), 
women’s representation in local decision-making structures is still low (Braathen et al., 2005; 
PMO-RALG, 2006). These are critical observations, because the government acknowledges 
that men and women have different perspectives and affirms that gender diversity must be 
consistently addressed in the on-going reforms (URT, 2009a). It is argued that “it is impossi-
ble to meet the overall goal of local government reforms of poverty alleviation without 
integration of women and gender issues” (PMO-RALG, 2006:5). While the reforms aim at 
enhancing cooperation and trust between citizens and local leadership, it is not clear how 
cooperation and trust affect the user-provider interactions and delivery of gender-sensitive 
services, and whether decentralization reforms have indeed increased cooperation and trust 
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at the local level. Similarly, it has not been established whether there are gendered variations 
in the level of trust between leaders and citizens, and among fellow citizens. 
 The main objective of this study is to examine the impact of decentralization reforms 
on service delivery in rural areas in Tanzania through a gender lens. The main research ques-
tion is: how does decentralization affect the user-provider interactions and gender-sensitivity 
of public services at the local level in rural areas in Tanzania?  As said, the research focused 
on water and health services delivery. 
1.4 Theoretical framework  
To answer the research questions, this study used a combination of theoretical perspectives, 
drawing on both governance and sociological theories. Parpart et al. (2000) describe a theo-
retical framework in the social sciences as a system of ideas or conceptual structures that help 
to ‘see’ the social world, understand it and explain it. It consists of basic assumptions about 
the nature of the social world and how it works, providing a systematic way of examining 
social issues. Lassa and Enoh (2000) view it as a set of theories put together to provide a basis 
or support for explaining, viewing and conceptualising a phenomenon. The functions of a 
theoretical framework include delimitation of scope, providing a context of meaning and 
interpretation, prediction of outcome(s), and integration of research findings. A theoretical 
framework also provides a set of concepts to be used to clarify a problem or issue, which 
fundamentally shape research approaches (Parpart et al., 2000). The research approach com-
prises the formulation of the research problem and research questions, the definition and 
operationalization of concepts and the identification of relationships that are postulated in 
the form of research questions or hypotheses (cf. Niehof, 1999).  
The theoretical framework for this study is based on the following theoretical 
perspectives: an institutional perspective, principal-agent theory, an actor perspective and 
gender theory. In what follows, I briefly discuss each of these perspectives. The subsequent 
empirical chapters apply one or a combination of them because these perspectives are inter-
related in a number of ways and, therefore, connect at some point. In Chapters 3 and 4, I use 
principal-agent theory to elaborate the institutional perspective. The actor perspective is used 
as an analytical framework in Chapters 5 and 6, while the gender perspective is the central 
theme throughout Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7.  
1.4.1 An institutional perspective   
Institutions are defined by North (1989:1321) as the “rules, enforcement characteristics of 
rules, and norms of behaviour that structure repeated interactions.” The purpose of 
institutions is to “provide certainty in human interactions which is accomplished by the 
inherent features of rules and norms” (North, 1989:1324). Mitchell and Pigram (1989:198) 
expand this definition using the concept of  ‘institutional arrangements’ which refers to a 
“combination of legislation and regulations, policies and guidelines, administrative struc-
tures, economic and financial arrangements, political structures and processes, historical and 
traditional customs and values, and key participants and actors.” This study uses the concept 
of institutions because decentralization is an institutional reform which involves the transfer 
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of roles and functions from one central institution to multiple institutions and actors at the 
lower level (Ribot, 2002; Kimaro and Sahay, 2007). The design of institutions and the partici-
pation of various actors in these institutions influence both the process and outcomes of 
decentralization. In the case of public services like rural water supply and primary healthcare 
that directly impact on people’s lives, the design of these institutions has a critical bearing on 
service users’ access to such services. 
1.4.2 Principal-agent theory 
Because institutions shape behaviours of individuals and their interactions, which in turn 
shape institutions, an institutional perspective is an important framework for examining how 
interactions between actors take place including what is allowed or prohibited, and under 
what conditions (Kimaro and Sahay, 2007). In investigating this, this study uses the principal-
agent theory which is considered critical in revealing the roles of different actors in decision-
making processes, in mediating access to public services among different users and, and in 
enhancing cooperation and trust between citizens and leaders. This theory is important in 
analysing decentralization reforms because it focuses on the trade-offs between different 
actors and the changes that decentralization may bring with them (Bossert, 1998; Batley, 
2004; Hiskey, 2010). The theory allows us to view the central government as the ‘principal’ 
with the objective of improving the access, quality and equity of public services, and local 
governments as ‘agents’ charged with responsibilities and resources to implement decentrali-
zation policy to achieve these objectives (cf. Bossert, 1998). At the lower level, the citizens or 
service users and local politicians are principals with mandates to make decisions on local 
service delivery needs and priorities (cf. Batley, 2004). The interest of the study is on both the 
broader institutional framework at the centre as well as the local institutional arrangements 
and their interfaces, and how these arrangements affect service users’ participation in village-
level decision-making processes, service delivery outcomes, and cooperation and trust 
relations between citizens and leaders. 
1.4.3 An actor perspective 
The actor perspective entails “identifying the actors relevant to the specific arenas of action 
and contestation, bearing in mind that neither actor categories nor relevance are uniformly 
defined” (Long, 2001:240). The actor perspective focuses on delineating everyday organising 
and symbolizing practices, and aims at elucidating the sets of interlocking relationships and 
social practices that interpenetrate various social, symbolic and geographical spaces. I use this 
perspective in this study because decentralization processes involve actors at different levels 
including elected bodies, administrative appointees, community groups and central govern-
ment ministries (Ribot, 2002). These actors are not passive recipients of this ‘externally 
designed and planned intervention’ (Long, 2001), but are active agents who participate strate-
gically for meaningful outcomes. Therefore, decentralization processes are likely to be incor-
porated and substantially transformed by local organisational and social structures. This 
requires identifying the linkages between the local and other political and administrative 
levels in order to understand the range of actors, structures, practices and processes operating 
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at different levels (Beall, 2007). The use of the actor perspective in this study contributes to 
this understanding, particularly the linkages between village-level actors and processes, and 
district and national levels, which also links to the principal-agent theory discussed earlier.  
The actor perspective also includes the users’ perspective which assumes that people 
shape and reshape their situation and interact with their environment using their skills, 
knowledge and experience (Niehof and Price, 2001). Campilan (1996:196) describes users as 
“actors, who far from being receivers of services are dynamic individuals and groups with 
ability to perform a range of activities along the service delivery chain, and demonstrate 
informed decision making.” In the context of decentralization, participation of users in the 
design, operation and maintenance of service infrastructure is regarded as key to performance 
(World Bank, 1994, 2004, 2008). Thus, this perspective is essential in assessing whether 
indeed decentralization is contributing to service users’ access to improved gender-sensitive 
water and health services, and whether it is enabling women to meet their needs. In Chapters 
5 and 6, I adopt the users’ perspective with special attention on women users to examine the 
impact of decentralization reforms on improving water and health services, respectively. The 
users’ perspective also overlaps with the gender perspective, as discussed below.  
1.4.4 A gender perspective 
A gender perspective brings in the gender dimensions of both the process and outcomes of 
decentralization. In practice, this means that various questions are analysed and discussed 
from the perspectives of both men and women. This is useful in explaining the role of men 
and women in decision-making processes, whether service delivery outcomes are gender-
sensitive, and the gendered dimensions of cooperation and trust. It is hypothesized that 
decentralization processses are gendered, meaning that they will not equally address men’s 
and women’s needs, while this will also differ per sector. Moser’s (1993) distinction between 
practical and strategic gender needs is used in this study because it is “the basis for much of 
gender and development analysis” (Allen and Sachs, 2007:5). Practical gender needs relate to 
women’s daily needs in caring for themselves and their households, whereas strategic gender 
needs are concerned with changing gender relations and challenging women’s subordinate 
position (Moser, 1993; Parpart et al., 2000). Decentralization reforms more or less explicitly 
aim at addressing the practical gender needs by improving access to the immediate perceived 
service needs such as rural water supply and primary healthcare, and are strategically oriented 
towards changing the structures that subordinate women by enhancing their participation 
and bargaining ability in local decision-making structures. However, these concepts are rarely 
applied in decentralization studies.  
In addition to the general gender perspective, this study also uses the concept of 
intersectionality to reflect on the intersections between gender and other socio-cultural 
variables such as age, marital status, ethnicity and religion. Crenshaw (2000:8) defines inter-
sectionality as a “conceptualization of the problem that attempts to capture both the 
structural and dynamic consequences of the interaction between two or more axes of 
subordination.” It addresses the manner in which patriarchy, class and other discriminatory 
systems create background inequalities that structure the relative positions of women, races, 
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ethnicities and classes. Intersectionality also looks at the way specific acts and policies create 
effects at these intersections that would aggravate the dynamics of disempowerment. Rather 
than viewing women as a unified category, awareness of this intersectionality provides an 
understanding of women’s lives and experiences (Allen and Sachs, 2007). In this study, I use 
this concept to show how gender intersects with other socio-cultural variables such as age, 
ethnicity and religion, that promote or hinder women’s participation and their access to 
public services or mediate cooperation and trust relations. The gender debate also relates to 
the actor versus the institutional perspective, which is why gender is in the centre of the 
conceptual model (Figure 1.1).  
1.5 Research questions 
The main research question of how decentralization affects the user-provider interactions and 
gender-sensitivity of public services at the local level in rural areas in Tanzania, is further 
elaborated into four sub-questions. The first of these questions is a preliminary question of 
which the answers provide the contextual frame within which the answers to the following 
three research questions can be placed.  
 
i). What are the main institutional characteristics of the current decentralization processes 
with regard to water and health services delivery in rural districts in Tanzania, and what 
are the factors that constrain the realization of decentralization? 
ii). To what extent have decentralization reforms increased women’s opportunities for parti-
cipation in local decision-making processes with regard to water and health services 
delivery, and how are women’s gender roles and needs reflected in these processes?   
iii). To what extent has the delivery of gender-sensitive water and health services to rural 
households been improved after the decentralization reforms?  
iv). How does trust between local leaders and citizens affect decision-making processes and 
provision of water and health services, and to what extent have the decentralization 
reforms increased cooperation and trust? 
1.6 Definitions and discussion of key concepts 
In this section, I briefly discuss the main concepts used in this study. As the title of the thesis 
suggests, decentralization and gender are the central organising concepts in this study. These 
concepts feature throughout the thesis and are central in the theoretical perspectives 
discussed in the previous section. Participation is analysed in detail in Chapter 4. Chapters 5 
and 6 use the concepts of decentralization and gender linking them to water and health 
services delivery, respectively, while cooperation and trust are the main themes of Chapter 7.  
1.6.1 Decentralization 
Decentralization is an ambiguous concept to which different authors writing from different 
disciplines have attributed different meanings. This study follows the definition proposed by 
Conyers (1990:19) which refers to decentralization as “the transfer of power and responsibi-
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lity to plan, make decisions and manage public functions from a higher level of government 
to a lower one.” This definition is useful in analysing the decentralization processes in 
Tanzania because it signifies both the processes and the results of decentralization or what 
Dubois and Fattore (2009:707) refer to as the “process of becoming” and “the state of being 
decentralized.” The definition also encompasses the various dimensions that can be distingui-
shed in decentralization: the political, administrative and fiscal dimensions.  
The literature on decentralization identifies three major forms: deconcentration, 
delegation and devolution (Litvack et al., 1998; Manor, 1999; Hope, 2001; Ribot, 2002; 
World Bank, 2004, 2008). Deconcentration is the least extensive form where responsibilities 
are transferred to an administrative unit of central government that is spatially close to the 
population where service is to be provided. The allocation of responsibilities occurs “within 
the hierarchy of central government” (de Visser, 2005:14) whereby ‘allocative decisions’ 
remain at the centre while only control over ‘implementation decisions’ is decentralized 
(Conyers, 2006). Delegation involves the transfer of authority and responsibilities for speci-
fically defined functions to lower level governments outside of central government. The 
ultimate responsibility remains with the central government since power can be ‘circum-
scribed’ and ‘withdrawn’, which creates a degree of accountability to the centre (Rondinelli 
and Nellis, 1986; Litvack et al., 1998; de Visser, 2005). In devolution, the central government 
transfers authority, responsibilities and accountability to subnational governments with some 
degree of political autonomy (World Bank, 2008). Devolution differs from delegation in that 
it is often institutionalised through provisions in the constitution or other legislation, and 
therefore, meant to be a ‘permanent’ placement of power at that level (de Visser, 2005), 
hence, providing a greater scope for strengthening local voice, and the relationship between 
service users and local service providers (World Bank, 2004). According to Hope (2001), 
devolution provides a mechanism that enables citizens to participate in local governance pro-
cesses and allows community interests to be represented in government decision-making 
structures.  
 While this distinction is important in theory, some commentators show that some 
countries have used all three types simultaneously or began with one and later shifted to 
another approach (Rondinelli and Nellis, 1986; Manor, 1999). The World Bank (2004) 
maintains that in practice decentralization involves a mix of deconcentration, delegation and 
devolution. Brinkerhoff and Azfar (2010:82) consider these forms as variants along the same 
“continuum where at one end, the centre maintains control with limited power and 
discretion (deconcentration) to progressively decreasing control and increasing local discre-
tion at the other end (devolution).” However, since the outcomes of decentralization on 
service delivery depend on the extent and form of decentralization (World Bank, 2001; 
Conyers, 2007), the typology provides a useful framework for analysing decentralization of 
service delivery. 
 When viewed along these dimensions, the current decentralization processes in 
Tanzania fall, at least in policy, into the ‘devolution’ category. The central government 
envisages creating local governments that are largely autonomous, democratically governed, 
fostering participatory development, reflecting local demands and conditions, and condu-
cting activities with transparency and accountability (URT, 1996, 1998, 2009a). However, 
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this assertion needs to be taken with caution, since even earlier decentralization initiatives 
from the 1960s to the mid-1990s used similar terminology but the reality turned out to be 
quite the opposite. Using Mawhood’s (1983) analogy of a ‘pendulum’, the question is 
whether the current reforms should be interpreted as just another temporary phase which is 
likely to be followed sooner or later by a ‘swing’ in the other direction towards increasing 
centralization. Or, as Conyers (2006) posits, should it be taken as a more fundamental 
change, stimulated by different factors and involving different forms of decentralization and, 
therefore, not likely to be followed by a reversion to relative centralization?  
1.6.2 Participation 
Even more than decentralization, participation is also a multi-layered concept. As Agarwal 
(2001:1624) writes: there are different views “on how participation is defined, whom it is 
expected to involve, what is expected to achieve, and how it is to be brought about.” 
Definitions of participation range from the narrow perspective where it is defined in terms of 
nominal membership in a group, to a broad perspective where participation is seen as a dyna-
mic interactive process in which different groups have voice and influence in decision 
making (Agarwal, 2010). The World Bank (1996) offers a more general definition stating that 
participation is about the ways in which citizens exercise influence and share control over 
development initiatives and decisions and resources that affect them. Drawing on earlier 
typologies of participation, Agarwal (2001) offers a useful typology on the levels of partici-
pation including: nominal participation, consultation, activity-specific participation, active 
and interactive participation. She also identifies the “striking neglect of a gender perspective 
on who participates, what effects this has, and what factors constrain participation” (Agarwal, 
2001:1624). This study offers such a gendered analysis. 
 In the literature, the emphasis on decentralization is closely linked to an orientation 
towards democratization. Decentralization is theorized as an important element to strengthen 
participatory democracy because it enlarges opportunities for citizens to participate in deci-
sions affecting their lives (Litvack et al., 1998; Manor, 1999; Bryld, 2001; Bardhan and 
Mookherjee, 2006; Ribot et al., 2006). Conyers (1990) summarizes the participatory benefits 
of decentralization as bringing power and government closer to the people and strengthening 
democracy. Bergh (2004) sees participation and decentralization as having a ‘symbiotic relati-
onship’ arguing that decentralization requires some degree of local participation to ensure 
responsiveness of local government to local needs, while at the same time the process of 
decentralization itself can enhance the opportunities for participation by placing more power 
and resources at a level of government closer to the people.  
 In principle, it is difficult to draw a clear boundary between participation as a demo-
cratic right of citizens and service users’ participation. The World Bank (2010:10) refers to 
citizens as “people who participate individually or in groups or organisations in political 
processes to shape and attain collective goals” and service users as “people who use a particu-
lar service.” The focus of this study is on service users’ participation because in most settings, 
all service users are citizens, but depending on the service not all citizens are service users. In 
this case, participation is seen as a means of enhancing the quality and relevance of develop-
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ment plans (Conyers, 2007), which in turn can improve service providers’ responsiveness to 
local needs leading to improved service delivery outcomes. In Chapter 4, I use Agarwal’s 
(2001) typology of participation to examine how men and women participate in decision-
making processes and whether their participation contributes to meeting both the practical 
and strategic gender needs.  
1.6.3 Gender 
Although the term ‘gender’ might seem to be common in the development discourse, more 
often than not, it is confused with the term ‘sex’ or used as a synonym for ‘women’ or 
‘female’. It is, therefore, important to clarify what I mean by ‘gender’ in this study. Gender 
refers to the socio-cultural construct of roles and relationships between men and women (van 
Wijk et al., 1996; Vlassoff and Moreno, 2002) and to the economic, social, political and 
cultural attributes and opportunities associated with being male or female. Parpart et al.  
(2000) describe gender as the differentiation between masculinity and femininity as construc-
ted through socialization. Gender relations are social relations found in all spheres of society, 
and are produced (and reproduced) on a daily basis by the actions, ideas and discourses of 
individuals and groups. In most societies, men and women differ in the activities they 
undertake, in access to and control of resources, and in participation in decision-making 
processes. Gender is, therefore, a socio-economic and political variable which can be used to 
analyse the roles, responsibilities, constraints and opportunities of people (Vlassoff and 
Moreno, 2002).  
 In the literature, decentralization is often represented as a neutral arena in which 
men and women are assumed to benefit equally. The assumption is that decentralization can 
be an effective means to address gender inequality and close gender gaps (Beall, 2004, 2007; 
Goetz, 2007; Lakwo, 2009). The UNDP (2009) argues that without gender-sensitive decision 
making, services may be inappropriately designed and fail to address women’s and girls’ 
needs. This is consistent with Moser’s (1993) observation that basic services delivery has 
fundamental implications in meeting practical and strategic gender needs. She shows that 
most planning interventions meet the practical but not the strategic gender needs, because 
they do not change existing power relations and women’s subordinate position in the society. 
The World Bank (2010) considers service provision to be gender-sensitive if it meets one or 
more of following conditions: sensitive to gender differentials, taking into account that men 
and women have different service needs; addressing the gender-specific service needs of men 
and women; and being transformative and empowering to men and women. The impacts of 
the processes and outcomes associated with decentralization on women, however, need to be 
studied more systematically. This is why this study puts the gender perspective at the centre. 
1.6.4 Cooperation and trust 
Decentralization demands a re-assessment of the role of government and its relationship with 
its citizens, and with the formal and informal organisations of civil society. This connects 
with the concept of trust, defined by Breeman (2006:20) as “a mental status of favourable 
expectations.” As a form of social capital, trust is described as people’s perceptions of the 
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trustworthiness of other people and key institutions that shape their lives, thus encompassing 
attempts to work and solve problems together (Evans, 1996; Grootaert et al., 2004). Trust as 
cognitive social capital is an important factor in people’s motivations that underlie actual 
processes and interactions. It is an important facilitator of democratic governance and the 
legitimacy of democratic systems partly depends on the extent to which the electorate trusts 
the government (Blind, 2006; Kuenzi, 2008). Hence, this concept is relevant in analysing the 
relations between citizens, and their leaders and service providers at the village level because 
it implies “a situation with imperfect information, and a belief that another actor is willing to 
act and capable of acting on another’s behalf” (Jacobsen, 1999:841). Cooperation and trust 
are interrelated in that trust is needed for ensuring cooperation between groups, which in 
turn enhances participation in collective activities (Mendoza-Botelho, 2013). 
 While cooperation and trust have been quite extensively researched in developed 
countries, this is not the case for developing countries. It is known, however, that also in 
developing countries initiatives to improve public services may depend on cooperative efforts 
at the community level (Evans, 1996; Kuenzi, 2008). Such cooperation is based on trust as an 
important factor in people’s motivations to engage in interactions and provide mutual 
support. A study about the synergy between poverty and impacts of HIV and AIDS in 
Tanzania (Nombo, 2007) demonstrates how important trust is for social cohesion and for 
people’s participation and belief in community-based structures. Because of this, trust will 
shape decentralization outcomes. Since social capital is not gender-neutral (Molyneux, 2002), 
it can be expected that cooperation and trust are also gendered.  
1.7 Conceptual model 
The four concepts discussed in the preceding section and their interconnections to the 
theoretical perspectives described earlier in this chapter, form the basis for the conceptual 
model which is graphically presented in Figure 1.1. The model departs from an understan-
ding that decentralization is a multi-dimensional institutional process involving different 
actors at different levels. The design and implementation of decentralization reforms is 
influenced by many factors at the international, national and local levels. Thus, I see the 
decentralization reforms in Tanzania to be taking place within a broader institutional context 
underpinned by the international and national policy frameworks including the changing 
global development discourses and priorities, the need to achieve the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), the national Development Vision 2025 and National Strategy 
for Growth and Reduction of Poverty, and other wider public sector and sectoral reforms. All 
these policies and strategies have a bearing on the design, processes and outcomes of decen-
tralization reforms.  
The framework is also cognisant of the fact that the actors at the LGA and lower 
levels (administrators, politicians and service providers), the main recipients of decentralised 
powers and resources operate within an institutional context (both formal and informal) 
including national guidelines, procedures and priorities. This determines the range of powers 
these actors can exercise and, therefore, is likely to influence the process and outcomes of 
decentralization. Furthermore, decision-making processes and service provision at the local 
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level take place within the socio-cultural context which may influence service users' partici-
pation in these processes, their level of cooperation and trust, their access to basic services, 
and their perceptions on whether the reforms are contributing to improving the services. In 
this, I see gender as a cross-cutting concept that can influence people’s participation, access to 
public services, and cooperation and trust relations. Similarly, I see trust as an important 
mediator in decision-making processes and service delivery arrangements.  
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Conceptual model for the study 
1.8 Relevance of the study 
The design and implementation of decentralization reforms aimed at enhancing service users’ 
participation and improving service delivery requires a thorough understanding of the gender 
dimensions of both the process and impact of these policy changes. This study contributes to 
the theoretical and policy debates on the linkages between decentralization and participation, 
decentralization and cooperation and trust, and decentralization and improved service 
delivery outcomes. From a theoretical stand point, the insights from this study are useful in 
validating and challenging the theoretical underpinnings that inform studies on gender and 
decentralization. An important and innovative theoretical contribution of this study is that it 
puts the gender perspective at the centre, combining it with the institutional and users’ 
perspectives. 
Although decentralization reforms in Tanzania have entailed fundamental changes in 
the entire governance system of the country, this study focuses on the impact of these macro 
processes at the village and household levels. Most studies on decentralization tend to focus 
on macro level units of analyses (district, regional and national levels), but fail to capture the 
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micro-processes at the village and household levels which are likely to be underpinned by 
both the formal and informal institutions. Decentralization is not only about the formal 
powers, but also has implications for the informal power relations between the actors 
involved (Dubois and Fattore, 2009). A gendered analysis at these lower levels, therefore, 
aims to improve our understanding of this relationship because it recognizes the fact that 
political processes such as decentralization operate across wide and deep terrains, which 
traverse and connect the social and political spheres (Beall, 2007).  
 In terms of policy, the study identifies the factors that facilitate or impede people’s 
participation in decision-making processes and delivery of improved public services at the 
local level. This is important for policy makers and implementers because the study shows the 
gaps between theory and practice, and identifies possible areas of intervention. Thus, the 
findings will help to inform actors at different levels on the appropriate design and im-
plementation of decentralization processes so as to enhance equitable service delivery and use 
women’s potential in decision-making and planning.  
1.9 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is organised into eight chapters. After this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 
presents the research context and methodological design of the study. Although the empirical 
chapters of this thesis are based on papers published or in the process of being published in 
international peer reviewed journals and, therefore, contain brief methodological sections, 
this chapter provides a more comprehensive picture. It first introduces the research context 
in terms of the country and the study districts, discusses the study design used, reflects on the 
fieldwork processes, and broadly describes the data collection methods that were used to 
answer the research questions. The chapter also explains how ethical issues were considered 
in this study.  
 Chapter 3 analyses the main institutional characteristics of the current decentraliza-
tion processes with regard to water and health services delivery, and the factors that constrain 
the realization of decentralization. Drawing on the empirical and policy literature, and on 
preliminary study findings, the chapter seeks to answer the first research question regarding 
the institutional arrangements for decentralized water and health services delivery, using 
principal-agent theory and broader decentralization frameworks. The chapter shows that 
decentralized service delivery in Tanzania takes on different forms where the nature of sector 
is an important factor in the kind of institutional arrangements. 
 Chapter 4 discusses the impact of decentralization reforms on service users’ partici-
pation in decision-making processes using the gender perspective and principal-agent theory. 
The chapter addresses the second research question. It investigates whether decentralization 
reforms increased opportunities for service users’ participation in decision-making processes 
for delivery of public services at the local level, how men and women participate in these 
processes, and how this contributes to meeting women’s practical and strategic gender needs. 
The chapter reveals that decentralization reforms have created spaces for service users’ 
participation at the local level. Women’s participation contributes to meeting practical 
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gender needs, but to a lesser extent addresses their strategic gender needs because existing 
power relations have been untouched by the reforms.  
Chapters 5 and 6 focus on the third research question: whether the delivery of 
gender-sensitive water and health services to rural households has improved after the decen-
tralization reforms. Chapter 5 looks at rural water supply and Chapter 6 at primary 
healthcare services. Both chapters combine a users’ and a gender perspective with a particular 
focus on women users. A common finding of both chapters is that the reforms have 
produced mixed results. They have improved access to these services for some users while, at 
the same time, they have created or reinforced inter- and intra-village inequalities, including 
gender inequalities.  
 Chapter 7 examines the impact of decentralization reforms on cooperation and trust 
at the village level using a gender perspective. The chapter seeks to answer the fourth research 
question regarding the effects of cooperation and trust on decision-making processes and 
provision of water and health services, and whether the reforms enlarged cooperation and 
trust at the local level. The chapter demonstrates that the reforms have strengthened both 
formal cooperation aimed at improving public services and the informal mechanisms of 
social networks and groups. Decentralization outcomes in terms of increased citizen’s partici-
pation in decision-making processes and improved services influence political trust, and also 
here gender relations proved to play an important role. 
Chapter 8 presents the general conclusions and synthesis of the study. It highlights 
the main findings and conclusions based on each of the research questions, gives a general 
discussion on the theoretical and methodological issues emerging from the study, and it 
provides some policy recommendations and issues for further research.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Research context and methodology 
 
This chapter discusses the context, methodological design and data collection methods used 
in this study. The first part of the chapter introduces the context of the study: the country 
and the study districts. The research design adopted in the study, particularly the use of the 
embedded case study and the longitudinal perspective is then explained. This is followed by 
reflections on the fieldwork processes showing how the three research phases were impleme-
nted. A major part of the chapter is devoted to the data collection methods that were 
employed to answer the research questions with emphasis on the use of mixed methods 
combining quantitative and qualitative techniques, and how both quantitative and qualita-
tive data were processed and analysed. The chapter concludes by explaining measures taken 
to address ethical issues in the study.   
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2.1 Tanzania and the study area 
2.1.1 Tanzania  
The United Republic of Tanzania comprises the territory formerly known as Tanganyika 
(now mainland Tanzania) and Zanzibar which is made up of the islands of Unguja and 
Pemba. Tanganyika gained independence in 1961 and was united with Zanzibar in 1964 to 
form Tanzania.  The country is located in Eastern Africa between longitude 29o and 41o east, 
and latitude 1o and 12o south. Tanzania covers a land area of 945,203 km2 including inland 
waters. It borders on the Indian Ocean to the east, and has land borders with eight countries: 
Kenya and Uganda to the north; Rwanda, Burundi and Democratic Republic of Congo 
(across Lake Tanganyika) on the west; and Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique to the south. 
Administratively, the country is divided in 30 regions, 25 in mainland Tanzania and 5 in 
Zanzibar (URT, 2013). Dodoma is the official capital and seat of Tanzania's Union 
Parliament. Dar es Salaam (the former capital) remains home to government ministries and 
major institutions, including diplomatic missions. 
According to the 2012 national census, the current population of Tanzania is 44.9 
million with a population growth rate of 2.7 percent and population density of 51 persons 
per square kilometre with variation across regions (URT, 2013). The majority of the 
population (77%) lives in rural areas where farming is the main economic activity (URT, 
2006). There are about 120 ethnic groups on mainland Tanzania, none exceeding 10 percent 
of the population. The official languages are Kiswahili and English, although Kiswahili is by 
far the more widely spoken. Tanzania's economy relies heavily on agriculture, which accounts 
for nearly half of the gross domestic product and employs 80 percent of the workforce. Other 
sectors which have shown significant growth over the last decade are tourism and mining 
(URT, 2011a).  
Tanzania is a unitary state with a two-tier government system: central and local gover-
nments. Local governments are enshrined in the Union Constitution of 1977 and national 
laws. Article 145(1) of the constitution gives recognition to local governments stating that 
“there shall be established local government authorities in each region, district, urban area 
and village in the United Republic, which shall be of the type and designation prescribed by 
law to be enacted by Parliament or by the House of Representatives.” Article 146(1) states 
that: “the purpose of having local government authorities is to transfer authority to the 
people. Local government authorities shall have the right and power to participate, and to 
involve the people, in the planning and implementation of development programmes within 
their respective areas and generally throughout the country” (URT, 1977). Local governments 
are classified into either urban authorities (city, municipal and town councils) or rural 
authorities (district councils and township authorities).  The main legislative texts are the 
Local Government (District Authorities) Act No. 7 of 1982 and the Local Government 
(Urban Authorities) Act No. 8 of 1982, which provide for establishment of rural and urban 
LGAs, respectively. These Acts were amended in 1999 by the Local Government Laws 
(Miscellaneous Amendments) Act (No.6) 1999. Local government is a non-union matter, and 
therefore, Zanzibar has different local government set-up and legislation including the 
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Zanzibar Municipal Council Act No.3 of 1995 and the District and Town Councils Act No. 
4 of 1995. The focus of this study is on mainland Tanzania which has been involved in the 
current reforms. 
By June 2012, there were 133 LGAs in mainland Tanzania, comprising 27 urban 
councils (five city councils, 17 municipal councils and five town councils) and 106 district 
councils. District councils are further divided into 2,555 administrative wards, 10,397 villages 
and 50,836 vitongoji (hamlets) (Venugopal and Yilmaz, 2010). Each LGA is responsible in its 
area of jurisdiction for maintenance and facilitation of peace, order and good governance; for 
the promotion of the social welfare and economic wellbeing of the people; and for the 
furtherance of social and economic development. The district council is the LGA’s main 
decision-making organ and is composed of all ward councillors, special seat (women) council-
lors and parliamentarians representing constituencies within the council area. Each district 
council has three standing committees, namely for finance, administration and planning; for 
education, health and water; and on economic affairs. The district executive director (DED) 
is the head of council administration and accounting officer, assisted by heads of depart-
ments and units. Council elections are held after every five years along with those of the 
president and parliament. The last election was held in October 2010. To ensure gender 
representation in district councils, there is a legal requirement to reserve at least 30 percent 
of all seats for women.  
 The present study was carried out in the districts of Kondoa and Kongwa in Dodoma 
Region (Figure 2.1) as part an embedded or multi-level case study design. The two districts 
were purposively selected to add variation and ensure that the findings are not biased by 
doing the research in one district only. The two districts have similar characteristics, but also 
differ in some other aspects. Both are rural districts located within the semi-arid central 
plateau characterised by low and unreliable rainfall ranging between 500-800mm per annum 
with long dry periods. Kondoa was among the 38 districts participating in the first phase of 
the reform in 2000, whereas Kongwa joined the reform in 2005. Thus, it was possible to gain 
an in-depth insight and make comparisons between and within the two districts. A brief 
description of each district is presented below whereas Table 2.1 compares the key statistics 
and figures for the two districts.  
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Figure 2.1: Maps of Tanzania, Kondoa and Kongwa (Source: Nations Online, 2011) 
 
2.1.2 Kondoa 
Kondoa district is one of the 46 old colonial districts established by the British in 1926 
under the Native Authorities Ordinance, 1926 (Chapter 72 of the Laws). After independ-
ence, the Tanzanian government adopted the colonial districts including Kondoa. The 
district is located in the northern part of Dodoma region, about 160 km from Dodoma 
Municipality, the regional headquarters, and covers an area of 13,210 km2. It borders on the 
districts of Bahi and Chamwino in the south, Kiteto and Kongwa in the east, Hanang and 
Singida Rural in the west, and Babati in the north. The district population is 505,415: 
254,103 males and 251,312 females with a population growth rate of 1.6 percent (URT, 
2006, 2013).  
Kondoa is mainly inhabited by Bantu speaking people who account for over 80 
percent of the district population. These include the Rangi, Gogo, Zigua and Nguu. Other 
ethnic groups found in the district are the Sandawe, Burunge, Barbaig and Masaai. These 
ethnic groups have some characteristic differences in terms of economic activities, some 
depending on pastoralism while others primarily depend on subsistence farming. Agriculture 
and livestock production account for about 95 percent of the district income and the 
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remaining five percent is from other sectors like small scale industries, mining and bee 
keeping. Average farm size varies from three hectares in intensified agricultural areas to six 
hectares in lowlands. The main food crops are maize, cassava, beans, bulrush millet and 
sorghum. Major cash crops are maize, groundnuts, sunflower, sesame and pigeon peas 
(Kondoa District Council, 2012). 
Administratively, Kondoa district is divided into seven divisions, 42 wards and 193 
villages2. In addition, there is Kondoa township authority covering six wards and 23 villages 
and mitaa3 (Kondoa District Council, 2012). The district council is composed of 67 
councillors (including three parliamentarians) and 19 of them are women. There are 23 
heads of departments of whom only one is a woman. At the village level, again, only one 
woman is a village chairperson among the 203 village and mitaa chairpersons. The district is 
accessible by road throughout the year, though with difficulties during the rainy season 
because none of the roads is tarmac. Trunk and regional roads including the ‘Great North 
Road’ are gravelled and have a total length of 356 km. District roads which are under the 
management of the district council have a total length of 470 km whereas village feeder roads 
have a network of 684 km. The district is connected to the national grid which supplies 
power to Kondoa township and few villages (Kondoa District Council, 2011, 2012).  
In terms of health services, the district has 78 health facilities including one hospital, 
six rural health centres and 71 dispensaries. Most of these (64 health facilities or 82%) are 
owned by the government under the management of the district council, 10 dispensaries 
belong to voluntary agencies mainly Faith Based Organisations and another four dispensaries 
are owned by the private sector. These health infrastructures are in different conditions with 
more than half of them (54%) requiring major rehabilitation and one-tenth need to be 
demolished and reconstructed. Current estimates show that about 76 percent of the district 
population lives within five kilometres from the nearest health facility. The district hospital is 
supplied with electricity, four rural health centres have solar power energy and 15 health 
facilities are linked by radio calls (Kondoa District Council, 2011).  Access to water services is 
critical as only about one third (34%) of the district population has access to potable water 
from protected sources within 400m from their households, against a target of 65 percent. 
The main water sources include 201 hand pumps in 54 villages, 27 gravity schemes covering 
42 villages, 136 pumped boreholes in 111 villages and five dams in five villages (Kondoa 
District Council, 2012). There also exist a number of unprotected sources including hand 
dug sand wells, springs and seasonal rivers.  
2.1.3 Kongwa 
Compared to Kondoa, Kongwa is a relatively new district. It was established in 1996 after 
splitting Mpwapwa district into two districts. Kongwa town, the district headquarters has, 
however, a long history dating back to the early 1940s when it started as a centre for British 
                                                 
2At the time of conducting this research, plans were underway to split the district into two districts: 
Kondoa and Chemba.  
3Mtaa (literally translated as ‘street’) is the lowest administrative level in urban areas, equivalent to a 
hamlet (kitongoji) in rural areas. 
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colonial activities following the establishment of groundnuts estates. Kongwa district is 
located on the east of Dodoma Municipality, about 86 km from the regional headquarters 
and occupies an area of 4,041 km2. The major ethnic groups in the district are the Gogo and 
Kaguru. Others, though in small proportions are the Hehe, Bena and Nguu. The district eco-
nomy depends entirely on subsistence farming and livestock production, and to a lesser 
extent on natural resources harvesting and trade. The main food and cash crops grown 
include maize, millet, groundnuts, sunflower, beans and horticultural crops along the streams 
like Tubugwe and Chamkoroma (Kongwa District Council, 2010). 
Table 2.1: Key statistics and figures of study districts in 2012 
Variable  Kondoa Kongwa 
Year of establishment  1926 1996 
Year the district joined local government reforms  2000 2005 
Land area (km2) 13,210 4,041 
Population 505,415 309,973 
Annual population growth rate (%) 1.6 3.0 
Population density (persons per km2) 34.0 76.8 
Average household size  4.8 5.0 
Administrative units  
Number of divisions  8 3 
Number of wards 48 22 
Number of villages  193 74 
Distance from regional headquarters (Dodoma) 160km 86km 
Health indicators   
Infant mortality rate (IMR) 48/1000 28/1000 
Under five children mortality rate (U5MR) 120/1000 98/1000 
Maternal mortality ratio (MMR) 109/100,000 120/100,000 
Child immunization coverage (%) 94 91 
Proportion of assisted deliveries at health facilities (%) 73 82 
Proportion of family planning users (%) 81 49 
Health facilities  
Hospital  1 1 
Rural health centres  6 4 
Dispensaries  71 44 
Proportion of population accessing health facilities within 
5km (%) 
 
76 
 
58 
Water sources  
Boreholes 136 45 
Shallow wells  201 11 
Gravity schemes  27 10 
Charcoal dams  12 - 
Dams 5 - 
Proportion of population accessing potable water within 
400m (%) 
34 51 
Sources: Compiled by author from URT (2006, 2013); Kondoa District Council (2011, 2012); 
Kongwa District Council (2010, 2011). 
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Kongwa district is divided into three divisions, 22 wards and 74 villages. Total 
population is 309,973 (149,221 males and 160,752 females) with a population growth rate of 
3.0 percent (URT, 2006, 2013). The district council has 31 councillors (including one 
parliamentarian), eight of them are women, and one woman is a village chairperson out of 
the 74 village chairpersons. Kongwa district has a total road network of 801 km. More than 
half of this network is village feeder roads (410 km) and 114 km is district roads which are 
earth roads. Regional roads have a total length of 212 km and are gravelled while the trunk 
road (Dodoma – Dar es Salaam highway) is the shortest (65 km) and is tarmac (Kongwa 
District Council, 2010, 2011). Electricity supply is available in Kongwa township and few 
business centres including Mlali, Kibaigwa, Pandambili, Mtanana and Mbande.   
More than half (58%) of the district population lives within five kilometres walking 
distance from the nearest health facility. The district has one hospital, four rural health 
centres and 44 dispensaries; 35 dispensaries are owned by government through the district 
council, five by the private sector and four by religious organizations. Most of the health 
infrastructures are in good condition requiring only minor repairs (81%) while only four 
percent need major repair. Malaria is the major health problem in the district and the 
leading cause of morbidity among under five-children and adults (Kongwa District Council, 
2011). About half (51%) of the district population has access to protected water sources 
within 400m walking distance. The main sources include 45 pumped boreholes, 11 shallow 
wells and 10 gravity schemes.  
2.2 Research design  
Every empirical research has a research design, whether explicit or implicit. Yin (2003:19) 
defines a research design as a “plan that guides the researcher in the process of collecting, 
analysing and interpreting data.” It is the logic that links the data to be collected (and the 
conclusions to be drawn) to the initial questions of the study. Consequently, it acts as a 
logical “model of proof” that allows the researcher to draw inferences about causal relations 
among the variables under investigation. De Vaus (2001:9) argues that a research design is 
the logical structure of inquiry whose function is “to ensure that the evidence obtained 
enables the researcher to answer the questions or test theories unambiguously as possible.” 
Kumar (2005) suggests two other functions of a research design. The first is about 
identification of procedures and logistical arrangements required to undertake a study, and 
the second emphasizes the importance of these procedures to ensure their validity, objectivity 
and accuracy. This study used an embedded case study design, applying a longitudinal perspe-
ctive, and using a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods.  
2.2.1 An embedded case study design 
This study adopted an embedded case study design with multiple units of analysis at different 
levels (Yin, 2003): district councils, villages, households and individual men and women 
within households and villages. A case study design was considered ideal for the study 
because of its relevance in exploring subjects and issues when the boundaries between the 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, where ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions are being 
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asked, and where the researcher has no control over the events under study (Yin, 2003; Gray, 
2004). Further, a case study provides an opportunity for intensive analysis of specific details 
which may not be possible to analyse by other designs (Kumar, 2005). In this study, the 
formal local government and informal institutions, service providers and users, gender roles 
and needs, and cooperation and trust relations are intertwined in a set of inter-relationships 
and, therefore, could best be studied using a case study approach. Because local government 
service delivery functions are implemented, managed and delivered at different levels, this 
study considered the district, village and household as important units of analysis to enable 
comparison between and within these levels. 
At the higher level, the district (or LGA) was used as a unit of analysis because it is 
the focal point for planning, decision making, resource allocation and expenditure, and 
agency for coordinating the implementation of service delivery functions. Although the two 
study districts cannot be claimed to be representative of all rural LGAs in the country (which 
is one of the limitations of case studies), they are part of the multi-level case study that 
represent typical examples of rural LGAs in Tanzania, thus, relevant in studying the process 
and impact of decentralization on service delivery outcomes. This is consistent with Mol 
(2008) who argues that case studies offer points of contrast, comparison or reference to other 
situations.  
At the sub-district level, the village was used as a unit of analysis because in rural 
Tanzania, it is the second lowest administrative and governance level which is crucial in 
terms of planning, decision making, management and service delivery arrangements. 
Households in the same village are exposed to the same leadership and management arrange-
ments, and are likely to collectively use the same water sources and health facilities. Many 
decision-making processes and communication of decisions from higher levels also take place 
at this level. Both the formal and informal institutions of local governance in terms of rules, 
norms and associational groups are involved at this level. Whereas formal institutions have 
power by the virtue of the state and formal rule of law, informal ones acquire power through 
customary influences and beliefs. Thus, the village is an important unit for analysing the 
institutional framework for service users’ participation, cooperation and trust, and service 
provision because the type of village might as well account for the differences. This study was 
carried out in ten villages (five in each district) that were purposively selected. The selection 
criteria were developed based on preliminary interviews and discussions with district officials 
and review of documents. The criteria included the village location within the district, availa-
bility and type of water sources, management arrangements for water sources, and presence 
or absence of a health facility (Table 2.2). Overall, the ten villages were typical of rural areas 
in Tanzania, and were considered adequate to make the villages representative of their 
districts. 
The household was also used as another unit of analysis because it is an arena where 
much of daily life takes place and the centre of processes that determine the welfare of 
individual members. It is within this “arena of everyday life”, this basic unit of human social 
organization, that activities to provide for people’s basic needs are undertaken (Niehof and 
Price, 2001:19). Rudie (1995:228) defines a household as “a co-residential unit, usually 
family-based in some way, which takes care of resources management and primary needs of its 
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members.” Despite its wide application in household studies, this definition has, however, 
been criticised on the ground that notions of family-based, co-residence and joint resource 
management do not capture the diversity of living arrangements, livelihood opportunities 
and changing modes of generating livelihood (Nombo, 2007; Gartaula, 2011, 2013). There 
could be many ways of defining and classifying households because “boundaries around 
households are fluid rather than stable” (Pennartz and Niehof, 1999:3).  
Despite the limitations, Rudie’s (1995) definition is used because it captures 
important household dimensions which are relevant in the context this study. First, the 
‘family’ dimension is useful in the analysis of processes in the ‘domestic sphere’ as family ties 
are assumed to provide moral claims to the home, house, support and care (Niehof, 2011). 
What things are considered as ‘domestic’ or ‘public’ and how ‘masculinity’ or ‘femininity’ are 
conceptualised, do not only depend on the extra-household social norms, but also are in-
fluenced by the intra-household processes (Kevane, 2000). Second, provision for ‘primary 
needs’ is crucial in explaining gender roles and needs and whether households meet practical 
gender needs for their members in accessing water and health services. Third, ‘resource 
management and decision making’ determine the type and degree of household members’ 
participation in decision-making processes in public spaces at different levels. In this case, the 
household is conceptualised as partly responsible for framing gender roles and needs, and for 
determining individual members’ access to resources, opportunities and services.  
In addition, this study sees the household as having permeable boundaries and as 
being embedded within the wider social structures (Niehof, 2011). According to Pennartz 
and Niehof (1999), households are interwoven within the social cultural environment, they 
are active agents with the ability to influence changes within broad structural constraints, and 
can act as mediating agencies between the individual and society. Subscribing to Kevane’s 
(2000:107) argument on the importance of social norms in regulating the “socially 
permissible” activities of women, I recognize the complex interactions between intra-house-
hold and extra-household social norms and the resultant bargaining processes which impact 
household processes. For example, I see decision-making processes as indivisibly interwoven 
with larger and encompassing processes going on within households and within societal 
context (Pennartz and Niehof, 1999). 
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Table 2.2:  Study villages and their selection criteria 
District  Village name Village selection criteria 
Location Type of water source Management of 
water sources 
Health services  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kondoa 
Potea Kondoa north, 46kms from 
the district capital 
Borehole constructed 
under WSDP in 2008 
Village water 
committee 
Dispensary under construction. Villagers 
use dispensaries in Mnenia, Bumbuta  or 
health centre at Pahi village 
Mulua Kondoa north, 16kms from 
the district capital  
Shallow well and traditi-
onal sources  
Village water 
committee 
No health facility in the village. Villagers 
use district hospital in Kondoa town 
Kidoka Kondoa south, 65kms from 
the district capital 
Borehole constructed 
under WSDP in 2008 
Private operator 
under village 
water committee  
Dispensary in the village constructed in 
1972 and renovated in 2005 
Khubunko Kondoa south, 85km from 
the district capital 
Old borehole (not 
operational), traditional 
sources 
Village water 
committee 
A recently constructed dispensary in the 
village 
Humekwa Kondoa south 90km from 
the district capital 
Borehole constructed 
under WSDP in 2002 
Village water 
committee 
No health facility. Villagers use a 
dispensary in Humekwa village in the 
neighbouring Chamwino district 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kongwa 
Songambele A Northern part of the district, 
46km  from the district 
capital 
Borehole constructed in 
1970. A new borehole is 
under construction 
Village water 
committee 
Dispensary in the village  constructed in 
2006 
Chamae Northern part of the district, 
34km from the district 
capital 
Borehole constructed 
under WSDP in 2008  
Private operator 
under village 
water committee 
Dispensary under construction. Villagers 
use a dispensary in Hogoro village 
Sagara A Southern part of the district, 
22km from the district 
capital 
Gravity scheme Village water 
committee 
Completed dispensary building but not 
operational yet. Villagers use a  dispensary 
in Sagara B village 
Mlanga 5km from  district 
headquarters 
Gravity scheme Village water 
committee 
No health facility in the village. Villagers 
use district hospital in Kongwa town 
Manungu  12km from district capital Borehole constructed 
under WSDP in 2006 
Village water 
committee 
No health facility in the village. Villagers 
use district hospital or dispensary in 
Mbande village  
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2.2.2 Longitudinal perspective 
Studying the process and impact of decentralization on service delivery outcomes could have 
benefited from a longitudinal approach. Longitudinal studies measure changes to ascertain 
trends in factual data over time (de Vaus, 2001; Grinnell, 2001; Kumar, 2005). According to 
Pennartz and Niehof (1999), a longitudinal approach is important when the researcher is 
interested in uncovering the dynamics of a process. This would require visiting the study area 
to collect information a number of times at regular intervals, usually over a longer period of 
time (Kumar, 2005; Axinn and Pearce, 2006). This was, however, not feasible due to limited 
time and resources. In addition, the reforms which the study seeks to evaluate their impact 
have been on-going processes for over a decade now. This could mean that the study should 
have as well been going on throughout this period. This reflects the common cited limita-
tions of longitudinal studies, namely: (their) being more costly, time-consuming and 
requiring careful planning and an orientation towards long-term rather than short-term 
research goals (cf. Grinnell, 2001; Kumar, 2005; Axinn and Pearce, 2006). 
To overcome these limitations, this study incorporated a longitudinal perspective by 
following up on already existing information from village and district officials, by asking 
retrospective questions to service users as part of the survey, analysing the perceptions of key 
informants, and by documenting case studies and life histories. This helped to determine 
whether there have been any changes on how service users participate in decision-making 
processes, on levels of cooperation and trust, on what service users perceive as improvements 
or decreases in water and health services, and on what factors they perceive to have caused 
these changes (if any). The focus of the study was on ‘perceived’ changes from the viewpoint 
of users and not on the ‘objective’ changes through a longitudinal approach. This was further 
supported by detailed case studies where each village was visited several times over a period of 
one year to learn about different processes including decision making and service delivery 
arrangements. In general, the information generated through these approaches helped to 
make comparisons on the situation before and after the reforms. 
2.3 Reflections on the fieldwork process 
The fieldwork for this study was carried out for one year from September 2011 to August 
2012 in three overlapping phases: exploratory phase, household survey and in-depth qualita-
tive study.   
2.3.1 Phase one: exploratory study  
The first phase involved a number of exploratory visits to the study districts and villages to 
familiarize with the research areas, collect relevant available secondary data and conduct 
interviews with district council officials. Available district annual development plans, mid-
term expenditure framework budgets, council comprehensive health plans and district 
profiles were reviewed whereas key statistics and figures on district council compositions were 
solicited from council clerks. Semi-structured and unstructured interviews were held with 
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district planning officers, community development officers, medical officers and water 
engineers to get an overview of the planning process and service delivery levels and arrange-
ments in these areas. This procedure was also used to develop the criteria to select the study 
villages. During this phase, research permits were obtained from regional and district autho-
rities and two research assistants were recruited. Research assistants were community develop-
ment officers in their respective districts, therefore, were knowledgeable about the study areas 
and acted as link persons between the researcher, district officials and village leaders 
throughout the research process. Each study village was visited two to three times4 to build 
rapport with village leaders, plan for the fieldwork and collect key village data. During these 
“brief focused ethnographic overviews” (Scrimshaw, 1990:95), semi-structured and unstruc-
tured interviews with village chairpersons, village executive officers, village councils, water 
committees and health committees were also conducted. This process was also used to 
confirm the different village selection criteria developed with district council officials. Table 
2.3 shows some of the demographic characteristics of the study villages. Overall, this phase 
provided important preliminary information for understanding the institutional arrange-
ments for the reforms which was crucial for answering the first research question, and for 
partly addressing the third research question on service coverage levels in the study districts 
and villages.  
Table 2.3: Demographic characteristics of study villages  
District Village name  Population Ham 
lets 
Households Major ethnic 
groups 
Male Female Total 
Kondoa Kidoka 1506 1768 3274 4 784 Rangi, Gogo, 
Masaai, Bulunge, 
Sandawe 
Potea 1796 1203 2999 4 438 Rangi 
Mulua 962 1064 2026 5 623 Rangi 
Khubunko 531 559 1090 3 259 Sandawe, Masaai 
Humekwa 620 728 1348 4 294 Gogo, Masaai, 
Sandawe, Bulunge 
Kongwa Mlanga 2762 2781 5543 4 809 Gogo, Kaguru 
Songambele A 5894 6919 12813 5 2296 Gogo, Kaguru, 
Rangi, Bena, Nguu 
Manungu 2447 2873 5320 3 534 Gogo, Kaguru 
Chamae 1521 1567 3238 5 810 Kaguru, Gogo, 
Hehe, Nguu 
Sagara A 2052 3014 5066 4 1135 Kaguru, Gogo 
Source: Compiled by author based on data obtained from Village Executive Officers (2011).  
2.3.2 Phase two: household survey  
The second phase involved a household survey in ten villages that were selected in the first 
phase. The main research instrument used in this phase was a structured questionnaire with 
                                                 
4The number of times a village was visited depended on how readily the information needed by the 
researcher was available and whether village leaders could be reached on phone or not.  
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open and closed-ended questions. The questionnaire was designed by the researcher in 
English, but was then translated into Kiswahili, a language which is spoken by most people in 
Tanzania, to facilitate common understanding between the researcher, enumerators and 
respondents. Translation was initially done by the researcher and reviewed by three other 
people (including one with linguistic expertise) to ensure that the original meaning in the 
English version was maintained. This step was also taken as a measure to minimize the 
problems that might have resulted from translating during interviews. As Grootaert et al. 
(2004) point out, many inconsistencies arise when translation is done in the process of 
interviewing, the flow of the interview is slowed down, and this may affect the quality and 
comparability of the collected data.  
In this study, four enumerators (two females and two males) were recruited to assist 
the researcher in this phase. Three of the enumerators were fresh Bachelor degree graduates, 
but had been previously involved in field research in the study districts. The other enume-
rator had over 20 years’ experience in carrying out community field research particularly with 
baseline surveys and project evaluations in the study districts. Enumerators were trained to 
familiarize themselves with the objectives of the study, interviewing skills and the household 
questionnaire. The questionnaire was pretested during field training of enumerators in 
Masena hamlet in the village of Songambele A to see how well it would work in practice. 
Based on the observations from this exercise especially on the wording and sequencing of 
questions, the household questionnaire was revised accordingly. The household survey 
provided useful quantitative data on how men and women participate in decision-making 
processes (research question 2), on access to water and health services (research question 3) 
and on cooperation and trust levels (research question 4). 
2.3.2 Phase three: in-depth qualitative study  
The third phase was a detailed qualitative study using the emic or insider’s view (Headland et 
al., 1990). Because qualitative studies are time-consuming and do not necessarily require large 
numbers of respondents (Axinn and Pearce, 2006), two villages were purposively selected for 
this phase. Potea in Kondoa district was selected because of the problematic health services in 
the area, while Songambele A in Kongwa district was included in the in-depth study because 
of problematic water services. Focus group discussions (FGDs), semi-structured interviews 
and non-participant observation were used as methods of data collection in this phase. 
Interview and FGD checklists were prepared after preliminary analysis of survey data. This 
phase was also used to clarify some of the information obtained in previous phases with 
district officials and village leaders and follow-up emerging issues and themes. Detailed case 
studies of these villages were also documented during this phase.  
Of particular interest in the village of Potea was how villagers had shown demand for 
a health facility, a desire which was yet to be realised because the district council provided 
out-dated drawings which were too technical for village leaders to understand. In Songambele 
A, a particular focus was on the problematic water services because of the old borehole that 
has existed since early 1970s. The district council had come in to intervene by drilling a new 
borehole, but villagers were yet to raise the required five percentage contribution of the total 
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initial cost of the borehole. Songambele A also represented a successful story of how decen-
tralization reforms had contributed to improving availability of health services through 
construction of a village dispensary. The qualitative data obtained from this phase comple-
mented the survey and secondary data, and was helpful in addressing the second, third and 
fourth research questions. Table 2.4 is a summary of the research phases, the methods used 
in each phase and how they link to the four research questions presented in Chapter 1. 
Table 2.4: Research phases and data collection methods 
Phase Data collection methods Research question 
Exploratory phase  
(September – October 2011) 
Analysis of secondary data,  semi-
structured and unstructured 
interviews, observations 
1,3 
   
Household survey 
(November 2011 – February 
2012) 
Household survey, observations 2, 3 and 4 
   
In-depth qualitative study 
(March – August 2012) 
Semi-structured and unstructured 
interviews, FGDs, observations, life 
histories, documenting case studies 
2,3 and 4 
 
2.4 Mixed data collection methods 
The nature of this study necessitated the use of mixed methods of data collection from 
multiple sources of evidence to get deeper insights into the process and outcomes of decen-
tralization at the local level, and subsequently contribute to validity and reliability of research 
findings. Mixed methods are data collection strategies that combine elements of qualitative 
methods such as in-depth interviews, exploratory interviews, observation, focus group 
discussions or life histories with elements of quantitative methods such as structured inter-
views and surveys, either simultaneously or sequentially (Creswell, 2003; Axinn and Pearce, 
2006). Quantitative methods are well acknowledged for their strength in studying large 
populations where random sampling, statistical analysis and drawing generalizations about 
causal relationships are possible. However, they are often criticised for their bias towards 
ideal behaviour because they tend to view reality as singular and static, and for their inability 
to explore sensitive topics. Whereas it is possible to identify real versus ideal behaviour and 
explore sensitive topics when using qualitative methods, these methods have limited possibi-
lities of statistical testing, are time consuming and use small samples which are problematic 
in making generations (Scrimshaw, 1990; Niehof, 1999).    
Since all methods and approaches have their strengths and weaknesses and are only 
appropriate for certain research questions, a combination of methods helps to counter-
balance their weaknesses (Axinn and Pearce, 2006; Diefenbach, 2009). According to 
Scrimshaw (1990), combining quantitative and qualitative methods helps to understand the 
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process being studied in culturally appropriate terms, to obtain accurate information on 
behaviour and interpret the meanings behind the behaviour. As Niehof (1999:36) notes: 
“although quantitative data deal with numbers and qualitative data with meanings, the two 
are mutually dependent. Meanings cannot be ignored when dealing with numbers, and num-
bers cannot be ignored when dealing with meanings.” Scrimshaw (1990:88-89) also sees 
validity and reliability as other reasons for integrating quantitative and qualitative techniques. 
Validity is defined as the accuracy of scientific measurement, “the degree to which scientific 
observations measure what they purport to measure”, whereas reliability refers to “replica-
bility: the extent to which scientific observations can be repeated and obtain the same 
results.” She argues that qualitative methods are more accurate in terms of validity, and quan-
titative methods are better in terms of reliability or replicability. Hence, qualitative and quan-
titative methods complement each other, and their combined application optimises both 
validity and reliability of research findings (Niehof, 1999; Nombo, 2007). In this study, the 
survey was used to collect quantitative data, whereas semi-structured and unstructured inter-
views, FGDs, observation, case studies and life histories were used to collect qualitative data.  
The use of mixed methods also relates to the importance of incorporating emic and 
etic perspectives in the research design. According to Headland et al. (1990), the etic or 
outsider’s view examines extrinsic constructs, accounts, descriptions and analyses that are 
meaningful to scientific observers. In this study, the exploratory study and household survey 
were inclined towards this view. The emic or insider’s view focuses on the cultural constructs 
and social processes meaningful to members of society being studied (Headland et al., 1990). 
To elicit emic views, a detailed qualitative study was conducted (third phase). This was crucial 
because citizens’ participation in decision-making processes, gender roles and needs, coopera-
tion and trust relations and even perceptions of whether there is improved access to social 
services are qualitative processes and, therefore, the need for an in-depth qualitative inquiry. 
The different data methods collection used in this study are discussed in the following 
sections. 
2.4.1 Household survey 
One of the advantages of surveys is their ability to collect data from large samples using 
standardized questions in an objective manner (Scrimshaw, 1990; Creswell, 2003; Axinn and 
Pearce, 2006). In this study, a household survey was conducted in ten villages covering 332 
households, with a minimum of 30 households in each village. Grinnell (2001) proposes a 
sample size of at least 10 percent (with a minimum of 30 per category) as sufficient to provide 
reasonable control over sampling error, a rule that was observed in this study. In each village, 
simple random sampling using village registers was used to obtain study households, but in 
situations where village registers were not available convenience sampling was used. Enume-
rators were accompanied by hamlet leaders who introduced them to households. In each 
household, questionnaires were administered preferably to the older female member of the 
household and in cases where the older female member was not present, the male older 
member was interviewed. The household questionnaire comprised five parts, each aiming at 
collecting information on particular aspects related to the research questions. These were 
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socio-economic and demographic characteristics of households, access to water services, 
access to health services, participation in decision-making processes, and trust and coopera-
tion (see Appendix 1). Household interviews took between 45 to 60 minutes to complete, 
and each enumerator interviewed eight households per day, on average.  
Table 2.5 shows the socio-demographic characteristics of household interviewees 
including duration of stay in the village, sex, age, household headship, household size, 
education level, religion and ethnicity.  The majority of respondents were either natives 
(67%) or had lived in the study villages for more than ten years (28%). This suggests that 
most respondents had sufficient knowledge about their villages, including about the issues 
that were investigated in this study and, therefore, could provide relevant information. About 
two thirds of respondents (65%) were women, 35 percent were men. The plan was to have 
more women respondents than men in the sample because women are the main principal 
care-givers in households. As a matter of fact, it turned out that in many households 
surveyed, it was the adult female members who were found at home at the time their 
households were visited for the survey.  
With regard to age, more than one third of respondents were between 30 through 44 
years (40%) and about another one third were between 45 through 64 years (31%). The 
mean age of respondents was 42 years, although men were significantly (p=0.00) older (47 
years) than women respondents (40 years). Thus, a high percentage of respondents was 
within the active productive age group. In terms of household headship, there were more 
male-headed households (88%) than female-headed-households (12%). The percentage of 
female-headed households in the study districts was generally lower than national average for 
rural households which was 32 percent in the 2002 national census (URT, 2006) and 25 
percent in 2010 (URT, 2010b). More than half of households (51%) had between four to six 
members, about one third (35%) had seven or more members, and few had one to three 
members (14%). Average household size was higher in Kongwa (6.04) than in Kondoa (5.82), 
but the difference is not significant. Male-headed households had an average size of 6.11, 
which was significantly (p=0.00) larger than female-headed households, which had a mean 
size of 4.6. Overall, household size in the study districts is higher than the Dodoma regional 
average of 4.6 and the national average of 4.8 (URT, 2013).  
The level of education attainment of respondents differed significantly between the 
districts, and between men and women. More respondents in Kondoa (77%) had primary 
education than in Kongwa (70%), and a relatively higher proportion of respondents in 
Kongwa had no formal education (27%) than in Kondoa (18%). In terms of gender, more 
male respondents (80%) had primary education than female respondents (70%). Levels of 
educational attainment were generally higher in the study villages than the Dodoma regional 
levels reported in the national demographic and health survey: only 24 percent had com-
pleted primary education, 38 percent some primary education and 33 percent had no 
primary education (URT, 2010b).  
Both ethnic and religious compositions were significantly (p=0.00) different between 
the two study districts. Kongwa had few ethnic groups whereas Kondoa was more diverse 
with many groups across the study villages. In Kondoa, the study villages comprised the Rangi 
(45%), Gogo (26%), Sandawe (20%), Hehe (4%) and other tribes (3%). In contrast, close to 
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three quarters of respondents in the Kongwa villages were Gogo (74%), the major ethnic 
group in the region, followed by Kaguru (17%), others (6%) and Hehe (4%). In terms of 
religion, more than half of respondents in Kondoa were Muslims (55%) and 44 percent were 
Christians, mostly Catholic (21%) and Anglican (17%). On the opposite, almost all respon-
dents in Kongwa were Christians (96%) and most of them were Anglican (80%) and few 
belonged to other Christian denominations.   
Table 2.5: Characteristics of survey respondents (n=332) 
Variable  Categories  Kondoa Kongwa Total 
Duration of stay in 
village  
Since birth 118(72.0) 103(61.3) 221(66.6) 
Less than 10 years 9(5.5) 9(5.4) 18(5.4) 
More than 10 years 37(22.6) 56(33.3) 93(28.0) 
Sex Male 50(30.5) 65(38.7) 115(34.6) 
Female 114(69.5) 103(61.3) 217(65.4) 
Age 15-29 years 34(20.7) 33(19.6) 67(20.2) 
30-44 years 60(36.6) 72(42.9) 132(39.8) 
45-64 years  51(31.1) 53(31.5) 104(31.3) 
65+ years  19(11.6) 10(6.0) 29(8.7) 
Mean age (years)  42.7 42.3 42.5 
Household 
headship 
Male headed 140(85.4) 152(90.5) 292(88.0)
Female headed 24(14.7) 16(9.5) 40(12.0)
Household size Small (1-3 members) 27(16.5) 18(10.7) 45(13.6) 
Medium (4-6 members) 80(48.8) 90(53.6) 170(51.2) 
Large (7+ members) 57(34.8) 60(35.7) 117(35.2) 
Mean household size 5.82 6.04 5.93 
Education level Adult education 8(4.9) 3(1.8) 11(3.3) 
Primary education 126(76.8) 117(69.6) 243(73.2) 
Secondary education 1(0.6) 2(1.2) 3(0.9) 
No formal education 29(17.7) 46(27.4) 75(22.6) 
Religion Christian 73(44.5) 162(96.4) 235(70.8) 
Muslim 90(54.9) 2(1.2) 92(27.7) 
Traditional religion 1(0.6) 4(2.4) 5(1.5) 
Ethnicity  Gogo 42(25.6) 124(73.8) 166(50.0) 
Kaguru 1(0.6) 28(16.7) 29(8.7) 
Rangi 73(44.5) 0(0) 73(22) 
Sandawe 32(19.5) 0(0) 32(9.6) 
Bulunge 4(2.4) 0(0) 4(1.2) 
Hehe 7(4.3) 6(3.6) 13(22.0) 
Others5 5(3.0) 10 (6.0) 15(4.5) 
Figures in bracket are percentages.  
2.4.2 Semi-structured and unstructured interviews 
Semi-structured and unstructured interviews were important data collection methods 
throughout this study. Axinn and Pearce (2006) view semi-structured or less-structured 
interviews as critical in qualitative research because of their flexibility, which allows inter-
                                                 
5Other tribes are Zigua, Nyambo, Nyaturu, Zanaki, Masaai, Taita, Nyamwezi, Nguu, Zaramo and 
Sukuma.  
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actions between the researcher and respondents. In this type of interviews, respondents can 
change the course of the conversation and bring up new issues that the researcher might not 
have thought of. Kumar (2005:122) calls this flexibility “complete freedom in content and 
structure” because questions can be formulated in different ways, the researcher can use 
different wording to explain questions, and interviews can be ordered in any sequence.  
In this study, these methods formed the core of the exploratory and in-depth 
qualitative study phases. In the first, unstructured interviews aimed at getting a general 
picture of the planning and decision-making processes, service delivery arrangements and 
coverage levels were conducted with district officials and village leaders. Unstructured 
interviews were also held with district officials during follow-up visits to clarify some issues 
that were observed in the villages. In the third phase, semi-structured interviews were held 
with village leaders in the villages of Potea and Songambele A using interview checklists that 
were developed after preliminary analysis of survey data. Issues covered included perceptions 
on improvements and challenges in access to water and health services, what has contributed 
to the changes, users’ participation in management of services, payment mechanisms for such 
services, organisation of village meetings and perceptions on trust and cooperation within the 
community (Appendix 2). Except for the unstructured interviews with district officials which 
were mostly conducted by the researcher only, all other interviews were conducted by the 
researcher and research assistants and field notes were taken throughout the processes. Semi-
structured interviews with village leaders were also recorded using a digital voice recorder, 
which were then transcribed into field notes after every interview.  
2.4.3 Focus group discussions 
Focus group discussions are among the well-known and widely used methods in qualitative 
research. Morgan (1996:130) defines focus group discussions as “a research technique that 
collects data through group interaction on a topic determined by the researcher.” Although 
FGDs share many of the characteristics of unstructured interviews, they also differ in a 
number of ways. According to Axinn and Pearce (2006), FGDs explicitly call for participants 
to interact with one another in formulating responses, a process which allows participants to 
feel confident, thus encouraging them to discuss issues they would not in individual 
interviews. Kumar (2005) views FGDs as useful in exploring perceptions, experiences, and 
understandings of a group of people with some common experience on the issue being 
investigated. The goal of FGDs is to get closer to research participants’ understanding of the 
research topic in order to gain insight not only into attitudes and opinions, but also into 
experiences and perspectives (Morgan, 1996). A major limitation of FGDs is that participants 
might be hesitant to share ideas in front of their peers, while they would offer those in 
individual interviews (Axinn and Pearce, 2006). However, FGDs can be used in combination 
with other methods such as surveys and individual interviews which helps to overcome this 
limitation (Morgan, 1996). 
In this study, four FGDs were conducted in each of the two villages (Potea and 
Songambele A) with village water committees, village health committees, and groups of men 
and women. FGD checklists were developed after preliminary analysis of survey data to take 
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into account emerging themes and issues which required more detailed exploration in this 
phase. While most of the discussion topics were common to all groups, few were very specific 
to some groups. Specific issues for water and heath committees included criteria for member-
ship into the committees (including issues of age and gender), their roles and responsibilities, 
and how patriarchy influences membership and decision-making in these committees 
(Appendices 3 and 4). For community groups, specific discussion issues included perceptions 
on appropriateness of services to needs of men and women, family planning, and coopera-
tion and trust relations (Appendix 5).  
Morgan (1996) suggests a range of four to six FGDs as adequate because beyond this, 
data become saturated and little new information emerges after the first few groups. This 
suggestion was observed in this study by concentrating on few community groups that were 
relevant in the context of the study. FGDs were held with village water and health 
committees which included men and women, because of their role in decision-making and 
management of these services at the village level. In addition, separate FGDs for male and 
female community members were held so as to learn how perceptions and experiences of the 
on-going processes in their communities are the same or different among men and women, 
and whether gender influences such processes. Except for the committees of which each 
member was invited, twelve persons were invited to participate in each of the other FGDs. 
Considerations were made to ensure representation of different groups in the community in 
terms of age, hamlet and social status in the community. All FGDs were conducted by the 
researcher and assistant researchers where field notes were taken, and digital recording was 
done. The number of FGD participants ranged from 6 to 13, and discussions took about 80 
minutes, on average. In total, 69 participants (44 men and 25 women) were involved in the 
FGDs. 
2.4.4 Non-participant observation 
Observation as a method of data collection is “a purposive, systematic and selective way of 
watching and listening to an interaction or phenomenon as it takes place” (Kumar, 
2005:119). Observations have the advantages of being relatively unstructured, can yield 
unique sources of insight and reflection, and allow the researcher to put themselves “into the 
shoes” of respondents (Axinn and Pearce, 2006:8). In this study, the researcher attended four 
district council meetings (two in each district) as an observer to learn how decision-making 
processes take place. In each district, one budget council meeting and a normal council 
meeting was attended. This method was also used throughout the research process to 
ascertain availability and use of water and health services in the study villages. In many 
instances, the researcher and assistant researchers would hang around water domestic points 
or village dispensary to observe the type of facilities and how community members used 
them. At the beginning, village leaders accompanied the researcher and his assistants to these 
facilities, but as they became used to the areas (especially in the villages where the in-depth 
qualitative study was done), the team could move around on their own, hold informal 
discussions with service users and even take photos. This approach provided opportunities 
for the researcher to see the reality on the ground and, therefore, generate real life data. The 
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method was also used to verify and complement information obtained through other 
methods. 
2.4.5 Life histories  
The life history method entails reconstruction of an individual’s life experiences, document-
ing events in chronological order and assessing the importance and meaning of those events 
(Kakuru and Paradza, 2007). Life histories are important in gender related studies because 
they help to contextualise individual’s experiences within a wider web of meanings 
(Leydesdorff, 1999). Kakuru and Paradza (2007) highlight other advantages of this approach 
including the ‘humanising’ effect on research participants, which allows the researcher to 
‘see’ the research participants in their own context. The method allows in-depth exploration 
of a particular issue, hence generates knowledge characterised by multiple voices, perspecti-
ves, truths and meanings. The method also brings the researcher into the same emotional 
and social space as the storyteller, thereby narrowing the distance between the researcher and 
the participant.  
In this study, five life histories of women in different leadership positions were 
documented. These women were identified in the course of the fieldwork processes and were 
selected to represent variations in type of leadership positions, age, religion and marital 
status. One of them was a special seats district councillor, two were village councillors, one 
was a hamlet chairperson and another was a member of a village water committee. Their age 
was between 31 and 56 years, most them being in their 40s. Three were Muslims and two 
were Christians, and four were married whereas one was a widow. In addition to socio-
demographic characteristics which acted as entry points in the interview process, issues that 
were documented included their experiences in leadership positions, barriers for effective 
women’s participation in local decision-making organs and presence of local organisations for 
women empowerment. Views on how, as women leaders, they had been involved in ensuring 
access to water and health services for their communities, and whether they perceived any 
changes in these services were also documented. Table 2.6 summarises the characteristics of 
life histories’ participants.  In the following chapters, particularly in Chapter 4, parts of the 
life histories are used in the text.  
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Table 2.6: Characteristics of life histories participants  
Name6  Age (years) Religion Marital status Leadership position Experience in 
leadership  
RNS 40 Christian  Married with 
five children 
Village councillor and 
member of social welfare 
committee  
Since 2008 
ANK 47 Muslim Married with 
three children 
Special seats district 
councillor and former 
village chairperson 
Since 1988 
JBH 42 Christian Married with 
eight children 
Hamlet chairperson  Since 1989 
SHP 56 Muslim Widow with six 
grown-up 
children 
Member of village water 
committee and former 
village councillor 
Since 1992 
AJS 31 Muslim  Married with 
three children 
Village councillor and 
member of social welfare 
committee  
Since 2007 
 
2.5 Data processing and analysis  
Quantitative data obtained from household survey were coded and entered into the 
Statistical Package for Social Sciences (IBM SPSS Statistics 19) to make them amenable for 
statistical analysis. Summary frequencies were run at the end of data entry exercise to check 
for completeness and accuracy of the data entered. Analysis of survey data was based on 
descriptive statistics, bivariate, analysis of variance and multivariate analyses. Multivariate 
analyses mainly involved multiple linear regression analyses. In some cases, binary logistic 
regression analysis was used because it can accommodate multiple predictors whether 
categorical or continuous, and was considered relevant in this study because most of the 
explanatory variables are categorical in nature (Field, 2009).  
With regard to qualitative data, field notes and voice clips from semi-structured and 
unstructured interviews, and FGDs were transcribed and analysed using qualitative content 
analysis. Hsieh and Shannon (2005:1278) define qualitative content analysis as “subjective 
interpretation of the content of text data through systematic classification and identifying 
themes or patterns.” It is one of the commonly used methods to analyse text data such as 
verbal, print or electronic that might have been obtained from narrative responses, open-
ended survey questions, interviews, FGDs and observations. The goal of qualitative content 
analysis is to provide knowledge and understanding of the phenomenon under study by focu-
sing on the underlying meanings or the content of the words (Patton, 2002; Hsieh and 
Shannon, 2005). The use of qualitative content analysis in this study helped to interpret and 
construct meanings from the text. The presentation and discussion of research findings in 
the empirical chapters, therefore, weaves together quantitative and qualitative data, illustra-
                                                 
6Pseudonyms were used to conceal participants’ identity.  
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ting survey findings with concrete examples and illustrations, and validating qualitative 
findings with survey data (Scrimshaw, 1990).  
2.6 Ethical considerations 
A number of measures were taken to address issues of research ethics in this study. Before 
commencing the fieldwork process, research permits were obtained from regional and district 
authorities. At the regional level, a permit was issued by the Regional Administrative 
Secretary who introduced the researcher to District Administrative Secretaries in the two 
study districts. At the district level, the District Administrative Secretaries introduced the 
researcher to DEDs. The later issued letters to introduce the researcher to village executive 
officers of respective study villages. The exploratory visits to each study village carried out in 
the first phase helped to introduce the study and the research team to village leaders. During 
data collection processes, all respondents were asked for their consent to participate in the 
research after explaining to them the aims of the research and how the information obtained 
from them was to be used. The fact that enumerators were accompanied by hamlet leaders 
during the household survey also helped to increase respondents’ confidence and willingness 
to be interviewed. Another ethical consideration was anonymity and confidentiality of 
respondents and the information provided. In this case, the researcher assigned pseudonyms 
to respondents, particularly those whose life histories were documented, and throughout the 
data collection and processing, data were aggregated to ensure non-traceability of respon-
dents. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Institutional arrangements for decentralized 
service delivery7 
 
 
This chapter reviews recent literature and research on decentralized service delivery in 
Tanzania. It uses principal-agent theory and broader decentralization frameworks to describe 
and compare decentralization in two sectors: water and health. The analysis shows that 
decentralization between the two sectors differs, with the water sector displaying a mixture of 
bottom-up and top-down principal-agent models while the health sector is more centralized 
with an orientation towards the top-down model. It is concluded that decentralized service 
delivery in Tanzania takes on different forms where the nature of sector is an important 
factor in the kind of institutional arrangements, in which gender plays a role as well.  
 
 
                                                 
7This chapter has been published as: Masanyiwa, Z.S., Niehof, A. and Termeer, C.J.A.M. (2013).  
Institutional arrangements for decentralized water and health services delivery in Rural Tanzania: 
differences and constraints. Basic Research Journal of Social and Political Sciences, 1(4):77-88.   
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3.1 Introduction 
Tanzania has undergone major decentralization reforms over the past one decade through 
local government reforms with an overall objective of improving the quality, access and 
equitable delivery of public services provided through or facilitated by local government 
authorities (LGAs). Although decentralization has been an important part of the develop-
ment agenda for much of the post-independence period, there are major variations in the 
forms that decentralization has taken place. Earlier attempts from the 1960s to mid-1990s 
were often implemented by ‘deconcentrating’ and ‘delegating’ responsibilities to regional and 
local governments (Tordoff, 1994; Hirschmann, 2003; Shivji and Peter, 2003; Kessy and 
McCourt, 2010). The recent reforms which started in 1996 have been described as more 
‘holistic’ and ‘far-reaching’ (URT, 2008a). Local government reforms are being implemented 
under the policy of ‘decentralization by devolution’ with a goal of restructuring LGAs so that 
they can respond more effectively and efficiently to identified local priorities of service 
delivery (URT, 1996, 1998, 2008a,  2009a). 
 Since then, many studies focusing on different dimensions of the reforms have been 
carried out including those looking at the fiscal aspects (Boex, 2003; Fjeldstad, 2004; 
Fjeldstad et al., 2004; Lund, 2007), political devolution and local democracy (Lange, 2008; 
Kessy and McCourt, 2010), and local government discretion and accountability (Venugopal 
and Yilmaz, 2010). Few researchers have examined the relationship between the process of 
decentralization and its outcomes on service delivery. Examples include those looking at the 
water sector (e.g. Cleaver and Toner, 2006; Jiménez and Pérez-Foguet, 2010a, b;  de Palencia 
and Pérez-Foguet, 2011) and the health sector (e.g. Mubyazi et al., 2004; Boon, 2007; COWI 
and EPOS, 2007; Maluka et al., 2010). Although some of these studies highlight the types of 
institutions created by the reforms to facilitate delivery and management of public services, 
little attention has been paid to the interplay between the local level institutional arrange-
ments and the broader governance structures based on an analytical framework. Similarly, 
the differences and constraints in institutional arrangements between different sectors have 
not been fully explored.  
 To bridge this gap and contribute to the decentralization literature in Tanzania, this 
chapter examines decentralized service delivery in the sectors of water and health employing 
the principal-agent theory to explain the relations between actors in the institutional arrange-
ments at different levels. The main question is: what are the main institutional characteristics 
of the current decentralization processes with regard to water and health services delivery, 
and what are the factors that constrain the realization of decentralization? The specific ques-
tions are: which institutions are responsible for delivery of water and health services at the 
sub-district level; how are the power relations between and within these institutions struc-
tured; and what are the constraints and differences between the two sectors?  
 We define institutions as the “structures of rules, procedures and organisations 
whether state provided or otherwise” (Kimenyi and Meagher, 2004:1). Decentralization for 
service delivery entails restructuring institutions and creating new ones because its expected 
outcomes partly depend on institutional arrangements and their power relations (Azfar et al., 
2004; Batley, 2004; Eaton and Schroeder, 2010; de Palencia and Pérez-Foguet, 2011). The 
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assumption is that having the right local institutional framework will result into better use of 
resources leading to improved service delivery (Mubyazi et al., 2004; Cleaver and Toner,  
2006; Ribot et al., 2006). Although decentralization has mostly been approached as a sector-
neutral process, effective institutional arrangements for public services delivery could be 
sector specific. Hence, it is important to analyse decentralization not by focusing on one 
sector only or on local public services in general. Furthermore, it can be hypothesized that 
decentralization processses are gendered, meaning that they will not equally address men’s 
and women’s needs, while this will also differ per sectors. We see gender as a cross cutting 
perspective using Moser’s (1993) distinction between practical and strategic gender needs. 
The next section presents the methodology used in this chapter.  
3.2 Methodology 
The present chapter forms part of a research project on the ‘gender perspectives on 
decentralization reforms in service delivery in rural Tanzania’ carried out in the districts of 
Kondoa and Kongwa. The chapter is based on the information obtained through a desk 
review of the scientific literature, research reports and policy documents on decentralized 
service delivery in general, and Tanzania in particular; semi-structured and unstructured 
interviews with district council officials and village leaders; and analysis of secondary data 
from district councils and village leaders. While a major part of the analysis and discussion 
relies on the literature review, some relevant preliminary empirical findings from the field are 
also integrated. In the next section, we discuss the theoretical perspectives on decentralization 
focusing on its meaning, potential benefits and limitations for service delivery, and the 
principal-agent theory which is the main analytical framework in this chapter. 
3.3 Decentralized service delivery: meaning, rationale and limitations 
Although decentralization has been defined variedly, it is generally accepted that in the broad 
sense, it denotes “the transfer of power and responsibility to plan, make decisions and 
manage public functions from a higher level of government to a lower one” (Conyers, 
1990:19). Decentralization deals with the territorial distribution of power, authority and 
responsibility for the political, fiscal and administrative systems between the centre and the 
periphery (Brinkerhoff and Azfar, 2010). Crucial questions are therefore, what powers are 
transferred and to which local institutions are they transferred to. The answers to these 
questions determine the extent to which local institutions as recipients of decentralized 
powers, can effectively plan and implement development activities including service provision 
(Conyers, 1990).  
 Decentralization is frequently advocated as a means of improving public services 
delivery based on the assumption that in a decentralized system services are more responsive 
to local needs and demands of service users because citizens can directly or indirectly influ-
ence decisions about resource allocation and service delivery (Rakodi, 2002; Conyers, 2007). 
Decentralized institutions are viewed to improve matching of public services to local needs 
and preferences and increase accountability of local governments to their constituencies 
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(World Bank, 2001), resulting in better targeted policies and lower transaction costs (Ribot et 
al., 2006). The World Bank (2004) stresses that decentralization is an institutional mecha-
nism that has the potential of enhancing the service users’ voice in a way that leads to 
improved services.  
 Underlying these arguments is the assumption that decentralization of service delivery 
occurs within an institutional environment that provides the political, administrative and 
financial authority to local institutions, along with effective channels for local accountability 
and central oversight (World Bank, 2001; Azfar et al., 2004). According to Conyers (2007), 
the outcomes of decentralization depend on the type of public services involved, the institu-
tional design, the way it is implemented, the capacity of institutions involved, and the wider 
economic, social and political environment. Hence, decentralized service delivery requires a 
mix of relations between central and local institutions, referred to as ‘institutional pluralism’ 
by Blair (2001). However, many studies indicate that the necessary institutional arrangements 
for the desired outcomes are rarely observed. Most decentralization reforms are either flawed 
in their institutional design or central governments do not decentralise sufficient power and 
resources to local level governments to enable them to have significant impact on local 
service delivery (Devas and Grant, 2003; Ribot et al., 2006; Conyers, 2007). The principal-
agent theory discussed in the next section is, therefore, an important analytical perspective to 
explain the relations between the actors within the institutional arrangements. 
3.4 Decentralization and the principal-agent theory 
The principal-agent theory (in the literature also referred to as agency theory) is one of the 
dominant theoretical perspectives for analysing and describing public governance reforms. 
Initially used mostly by economists (e.g. de Groot, 1988; Dixit et al., 1997; Besley and Coate, 
2003), it is now widely applied by sociologists, political scientists and others (Shapiro, 2005; 
Papenfuß and Schaefer, 2010). The theory proposes a ‘principal’ with specific objectives and 
‘agents’ who are required to implement activities to achieve those objectives. The core of the 
principal-agent theory is the ‘agency relationship’, which depends on power positions and 
information flows between principals and agents. The question, then, is how principals can 
manage the interests of agents so that they are in line with the goals they (principals) wish to 
achieve (Bossert, 1998; Bossert and Beauvais, 2002; Batley, 2004; Brinkerhoff and Azfar, 
2010; Calabrò and Torchia, 2011). 
 Hiskey (2010:30) views decentralization, especially when it takes the form of 
devolution, as “an alteration of principal-agent relationships, where principals theoretically 
gain more leverage over agents directly responsible for service provision.” He emphasizes that 
analysing decentralization reforms using the principal-agent perspective helps to explain the 
trade-offs between different actors and the changes that decentralization may bring with them 
given the new responsibilities of the actors involved. Mewes (2011) links the theory to top-
down and bottom-up models. In the first, local governments are agents, exercising responsi-
bilities on behalf of the central government (principal). In the bottom-up model, the ultimate 
principals are the citizens or service users, while politicians as representatives in decision-
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making organs are agents. In turn, local government administrators responsible for executing 
service delivery functions are agents of local political leaders and service users. 
 The theory has been criticized for focusing on the vertical relationship between the 
centre and periphery in a ‘one-dimensional’ way, which makes it difficult to analyse multiple 
principals and agents, especially if they are at different administrative levels (Bossert, 1998; 
Batley, 2004). However, available evidence shows that the theory can accommodate multiple 
agency relationships (see for example Batley, 2004; Tommasi and Weinschelbaum, 2007; 
Calabrò and Torchia, 2011) or can be modified to address different contexts (Bossert, 1998; 
Bossert and Mitchell, 2011). For example, Bossert (1998) introduces the concept of ‘decision 
space’ to include various functions and activities over which local governments have control 
and the degree of choice they are allowed by the central government, as well as the powers 
actually exercised in practice. The following part introduces the context of local government 
reforms in Tanzania before examining the institutional arrangements for water and health 
sectors using the principal-agent theory and the wider decentralization frameworks as 
analytical tools. 
3.5 The history of decentralized service delivery in Tanzania  
During the first decade of independence (1961-71), the local government system inherited 
from the British colonial government that was based on a combination of chiefdoms and 
locally elected representatives, was amended into a more inclusive system of representative 
local authorities. However, local governments did not meet the expectations due to limited 
financial and human resources, and perception of local governments as implementing 
agencies of the central government rather than representative bodies answering to local 
needs. In 1972, local governments were abolished and replaced by a system of deconcen-
tration for a period of ten years. In 1982, local governments were revived and charged with 
substantial authority over roads, health, primary education and water services. But again, they 
did not deliver as anticipated because of the tendency to centralize and concentrate powers in 
central government agencies (World Bank, 1999; Hirschmann, 2003; Shivji and Peter, 2003; 
URT, 2009a; Kessy and McCourt, 2010; Venugopal and Yilmaz, 2010).  
 As a result of this centralized mode of governance, delivery of social services to the 
largely rural population was mainly the responsibility of central government with support 
from donors. The economic crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s caused deterioration of 
almost all social services up to the early 1990s. According to a World Bank (1999) review, the 
health sector experienced critical shortages of basic pharmaceutical and other medical 
supplies, inadequate and dissatisfied workers, and decreased supervision to district and sub-
district health facilities. In the water sector, implementation of the regional water master 
plans faltered, leaving communities with partially constructed wells and pumping systems and 
no improved access to water services.  In 1996, a decisive step was taken to reform LGAs8 
through a Local Government Reform Program (LGRP) following the publication of the Local 
Government Reform Agenda (URT, 1996) and later the Policy Paper on Local Government 
                                                 
8Initially, the government focused on one third of LGAs and subsequently all 133 LGAs were 
incorporated in the reforms (URT, 2008a). 
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Reform (URT, 1998). LGRP was seen as a vehicle through which government would 
promote and drive the decentralization process. It was envisaged that through the principle 
of subsidiarity, service provision would be brought closer to the users and political powers 
devolved to lower levels as far as possible and feasible (URT, 2008a). In order to create an 
enabling institutional and legal framework, local government reforms have since then been 
incorporated into the Tanzanian Law through the Local Government Laws (Miscellaneous 
Amendments) Act, No.6 of 1999 which amended the Local Government (District 
Authorities) Act No.7 of 1982; the Local Government Finances Act, No.9 of 1982; the Local 
Government Services Act, No.10 of 1982; and the Local Government Negotiating Machinery 
Act, No.11 of 1982 (Shivji and Peter, 2003).   
 The local government reforms involved four main areas. First, political devolution of 
powers by setting up of local democratic institutions and enhancing public participation in 
decision-making processes. Second, fiscal decentralization of local government finances by 
introducing equitable and transparent discretionary and sector-specific grants from the 
central government to LGAs, and giving powers to LGAs to pass their own budgets based on 
local priorities. Third, administrative decentralization entailing de-linking LGA staff from 
central government line ministries and integrating them into LGA administration, LGAs 
recruiting their own personnel, and local government staff being accountable to local 
councils. Fourth, changing of central-local relations, with the central government having over-
riding powers within the constitutional and legal framework, and with local governments 
having devolved powers and responsibilities in law. The main agency for coordinating the 
implementation of service delivery functions in rural areas is the district council (URT, 1996, 
1998, 2008a, 2009a). In the next section, we address the implications of these reforms and 
institutional arrangements on water and health services delivery at the local level. 
3.6 Rural water supply: a mix of top-down and bottom-up models  
Delivery of rural water services in Tanzania has followed different approaches from the 
1960s, reflecting the development philosophy and governance approaches adopted. 
Currently, the national water policy adopted in 2002 is the guiding framework for water 
services delivery. This policy is partly framed by the local government reforms and aims at 
creating a comprehensive institutional and legal framework with a view of promoting 
effective institutional linkages among actors including central government, LGAs, private 
sector, NGOs, community based organisations and communities (URT, 2002). As opposed 
to its 1991 predecessor, which was based on a ‘supply-driven approach’, the 2002 policy 
adopts a ‘demand-responsive approach’ stating that service users should be responsible for 
establishing, owning and managing their water schemes, and ensuring full cost recovery for 
operation and maintenance (O&M). The policy also emphasizes fair representation of 
women in village water entities and effective participation of men and women in rural water 
supply programs.  
 The main policy instrument for domestic rural water supply is the Water Sector 
Development Program (WSDP) (formerly called Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project),  
which was launched in 2007. The main actors in this sector are at three levels: the central 
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government through the Ministry of Water (MoW) and Prime Minister’s Office–Regional 
Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG)9, district councils and communities 
(wards and villages). The main responsibilities of MoW include: design of WSDP according 
to national priorities aiming at increasing equity in water services delivery, funds allocation to 
LGAs in collaboration with PMO-RALG and preparation of guidelines for implementation 
(de Palencia and Pérez-Foguet, 2011). In line with the principles of local government reforms, 
the district council through its water department has the overall responsibility for the mana-
gement and coordination of rural water supply activities including domestic water, water for 
livestock, irrigation and sanitation. It is the focal point for decentralized implementation 
responsible for promoting demand at village level, planning, providing support and 
monitoring the implementation of community projects.  
 However, interviews with district council officials revealed that district councils have 
weak financial and technical capacity to undertake their decentralized mandates. Budget 
allocations for WSDP are not proportional with demand for services and approved budgets 
are not timely disbursed to LGAs. In 2010/11 for example, Kondoa district planned to drill 
27 boreholes but only 19 were approved by MoW. Further, funds and permits to engage 
contractors were released by MoW in June, the last month of the financial year compelling 
the district to implement these interventions in the next financial year. Information obtained 
from district water departments shows that both districts face shortages of staff with Kongwa 
having only 22 percent of the required staff in the water department and Kondoa 50 percent. 
Weak technical, administrative and financial capacities in local governments have been cited 
as major obstacles to efficient and effective service delivery and in some cases used as justifi-
cations for recentralization (Devas and Grant, 2003; Rondinelli, 2006).  
  The district council is also responsible for the selection of beneficiary villages based 
on lack of access to water services, the amount of cash contributed by villagers, presence of 
village water committee, and vulnerability to diseases. These criteria have to be discussed with 
ward councillors and decided on full council meetings. Our interviews with district council 
officials and village leaders revealed that to qualify for WSDP projects, villages have to raise 
five percent of the total initial costs for drilling, pump and engine installation, and water 
distribution, and that the actual amount differs between villages depending on the depth of 
the borehole and the length of the distribution network. Jiménez and Pérez-Foguet (2010b) 
are concerned that the demand-driven approach advocated in policy has been narrowly inter-
preted to imply cash and labour contribution with no consideration of other indicators. 
Vulnerability to diseases and lack of access to water supply services are not rigorously applied 
as selection criteria for WSDP projects. This puts women with their practical gender needs 
for access to sufficient and safe water at a disadvantage.  
 At village level, communities are expected to initiate demand for improvement of 
facilities by using the opportunities and obstacles to development (O&OD) planning process 
(Jiménez and Pérez-Foguet, 2010b; de Palencia and Pérez-Foguet, 2011). Although village 
planning is a well-established and inclusive process that allows villagers to identify their needs 
                                                 
9Prime Minister’s Office-Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG) is the 
ministry responsible for local governments in Tanzania 
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and priorities (Cooksey and Kikula, 2005), it appears that the process is limited in scope and 
quality. Village plans are influenced by national priorities and directives, and local priorities 
sometimes change if budgets exceed available funds. Moreover, the current funding mecha-
nisms do not feed into village priorities because village plans are rarely used as sources of 
information for selection of villages to benefit from WSDP. Thus, the link between inputs 
from village participatory planning processes and district plans and bugdets is generally 
blurred (Venugopal and Yilmaz, 2010; de Palencia and Pérez-Foguet, 2011). 
 Seeing this from the principal-agent perspective, delivery of rural water services is 
compounded with multiple agency relationships exhibiting both top-down and bottom-up 
principal-agent models. In the top-down model, the central government is the ‘principal’ with 
the objective of improving water services delivery and LGAs are the ‘agents’ charged with 
responsibilities for delivering the services. LGAs have some degree of autonomy and ‘decision 
space’ where they can plan and implement a range of water supply interventions, but the 
centre shapes most LGAs’ decisions through conditions for intergovernmental transfers, 
guidelines and directives. Although policy documents stipulate that Tanzania is impleme-
nting “decentralization by devolution” (URT, 1996, 1998, 2008a, 2009a), actual impleme-
ntation on the ground is more inclined towards deconcentration and delegation, and less 
towards devolution (cf. Brinkerhoff and Azfar, 2010). 
 In the bottom-up model, villagers (the service users) and councillors are the princi-
pals, and district council administrators are the agents. It was learnt from interviews with 
village leaders that villagers exercise their agency as principals during survey and final 
selection of sites to drill boreholes using their indigenous knowledge in addition to the 
technical expertise of surveyors, in electing village water committees and in setting water user 
fees and payment modalities for O&M, which is an indication of decentralization moving 
towards the devolutionary end. However, the agency of councillors as principals does not 
appear to work effectively because technical staff often have more power and influence than 
councillors in planning, budgeting and personell management (Venugopal and Yilmaz, 
2010). This reflects power inequality between lower level principals and higher level agents 
who in practice deny the agency of their principals. Batley (2004:41) refers to this as the 
‘agency problem’ where agents have limited incentives to serve the goals of their principals.  
 Adopting the principles of managing water resources at the ‘lowest appropriate level’ 
as stipulated by the water policy has also meant the creation and strengthening of village 
water committees, water user groups and water user associations to own, manage, operate 
and maintain water supply systems on behalf of communities (URT, 2002, 2008c; Cleaver 
and Toner, 2006). Preliminary observations from the field show most of the villages manage 
their water sources through village water committees and few use private operators. It was 
observed that the proportion of women in village water committees ranges from 20 percent 
to 56 percent indicating some variations on how national policies like decentralization are 
interpreted and implemented in different local settings. Whether their members represent 
service users’ interests is questionable. While equal representation of women in water com-
mittees could be expected to contribute to gender equity and address strategic gender needs if 
the bottom-up model were working, the current situation suggests that women representation 
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does not help much, since these committees are in fact agents, and hence, representation is at 
the agent level rather than at the principal level.  
 Cleaver and Toner (2006) examined one water user association in Uchira village in 
Moshi Rural district and conclude that managing water sources at the local level does not 
necessarily lead to community ownership. While acknowleging that rural water supply has 
improved and women no longer have to walk 12km in the dry season to the nearest water 
point, they also point out that local institutions are shaped by historical processes, wider 
social structures, and prevailing community norms and relationships, hence,  are susceptible 
to ‘local elite capture’ (cf. Crook, 2003; Devas and Grant, 2003; Bergh, 2004; Rondinelli, 
2006). The power relations between representative bodies such as village councils and village 
water entities, are also a challenge (Cleaver and Toner, 2006; Giné and Pérez-Foguet, 2008). 
This reflects what was observed in the field, namely that management of water sources 
through village water committees is not very effective because of interferences by village 
councils, untimely banking of water funds and at times funds are diverted to other village 
expenditures.  
3.7 Health services delivery: the limits to decentralization   
The health sector was one of the pioneers of decentralized service delivery through health 
sector reforms (HSRs) starting from the early 1990s aiming at improving the quality of health 
services provided to communities (URT, 2003; Maluka et al., 2010). Delivery of public 
healthcare services is organised at three administrative levels. At the centre is the Ministry of 
Health and Social Welfare (MoHSW) responsible for development of sectoral policy and the 
regulatory framework, monitoring and evaluation in collaboration with PMO-RALG. At the 
regional level, the Regional Medical Officer forms part of the Regional Secretariat and is 
responsible for providing supervisory and technical support to LGAs (Tidermand et al., 
2008). In accordance with HSRs and local government reforms, district councils are 
responsible for running district hospitals, health centres and dispensaries using subventions 
from central government and locally generated resources. Voluntary agencies, faith based 
organisations and the private sector provide health services through contractual agreements 
with district councils (URT, 2003). A number of studies show that there is significant 
progress in decentralizing planning, budgeting and management of health services to LGAs. 
District councils have some autonomy over a wide range of health related matters and 
institutional bodies are in place in almost all districts (Mubyazi et al., 2004; COWI and 
EPOS, 2007; Tidermand et al., 2008; Yoshida, 2008; Maluka et al., 2010).  
 There has been an increase in resource allocation to district councils through central 
government transfers with around 29 percent of their total expenditures going to the health 
sector (COWI and EPOS, 2007; Maluka et al., 2010). Although central government oversight 
is necessary in ensuring that LGAs use financial and other resources in an efficient, effective 
and transparent way (World Bank, 2001; Azfar et al., 2004), LGAs’ authority to plan and 
allocate funds according to their needs is constrained. Most financial transfers are controlled 
by the centre through budget ceilings, guidelines and approvals. In addition, services have to 
comply with national priorities, and the centre can withhold funds if it is not satisfied with 
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LGA’s performance (COWI and EPOS, 2007; Tidermand et al., 2008). This shows a princi-
pal-agent problem where the central government (principal) exercises more power on LGAs 
(the agents). As others have argued, this problem is characteristic of many developing 
countries where in most cases local institutions are given power to make decisions but not 
the control over resources needed to implement those decisions (Ribot, 2002; Conyers, 
2007). This suggests that decentralization in the health sector is more dominated by the top-
down model, and takes the forms of deconcentration and delegation (cf. Rondinelli and 
Nellis, 1986; Litvack et al., 1998).  
 Before the current reforms, management and administration of health services was 
the exclusive responsibility of the central government. At the district level, the district 
medical officer (DMO), the overall in-charge of medical services in the district was directly 
accountable to MoHSW. In the current set up, DMOs and other health personnel are 
employees of the district council, administratively reporting to the DED and to MoHSW on 
technical matters. But, because of persistent recruitment problems at the district and lower 
levels especially in the remote and poorer areas, human resource recruitment has been 
recentralized. URT (2009a:7) identifies “the apparent reluctance by central government to 
devolve autonomy for human resource management to LGAs” as one of the bottlenecks in 
implementing decentralization by devolution, which can be viewed as a principal-agent 
problem. Shortage of skilled staff, inequitable distribution of the existing workforce with a 
tendency for more health workers per population in urban than in rural and less advantaged 
areas, and bureaucratic recruitment processes stand as major challenges in human resources 
for health (COWI and EPOS, 2007; Tidermand et al., 2008). In both districts, health centres 
and dispensaries which are rural based are seriously understaffed as reflected by deficits of 70 
percent and 60 percent of required health personnel in Kondoa and 60 percent and 49 
percent in Kongwa in their health centres and dispensaries, respectively. Certainly, diffi-
culties of recruiting and retaining skilled staff at district level and below is a widely recognised 
constraint (Francis and James, 2003).  
 Another important initiative in the reform process has been the establishment of 
institutional bodies for governance, planning, budgeting, implementation and monitoring of 
local services. Various committees and service boards as centrally determined by MoHSW 
and PMO-RALG have been established at all levels (Table 3.1). With the exception of the 
Council Health Management Teams (CHMTs), which are composed of health staff only 
(agents), all others have mixed membership, involving both principals and agents. In theory, 
service boards and committees have the potential to strengthen the voice of users and respo-
nsiveness of service providers and make politicians and policy-makers more accountable to 
service users (Ribot, 2002; Boon, 2007) i.e. the devolutionary end on the “decentralization 
continuum” (cf. Brinkerhoff and Azfar, 2010:82). However, the state of affairs on the ground 
may differ. Citing an example of the Council Health Service Boards (CHSBs), COWI and 
EPOS (2007) explain that despite their well elaborate roles and functions, most of them are 
not functioning properly and meet infrequently. This implies that council comprehensive 
health plans (CCHPs), the main planning framework for health interventions in LGAs, are 
mostly prepared by CHMT members (agents) with little or no involvement of CHSBs. Boon 
(2007) shows that selection of CHSB members is dominated by the government and that 
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community representatives have no forum for consultation with their constituencies and 
have weak decision making powers. According to Conyers (2007), the effectiveness of 
management and user committees depends on their structure, composition, motivation and 
capacity of their members; and how they are linked to the local and national structures. In 
this case, the presence of committees and service boards does not appear to alter the existing 
power relations between lower level principals (service users and representatives in the 
committees) and higher level agents (technical district staff).   
 At sub-district level, studies show that establishment of health facility committees did 
had a positive impact on participation of communities in managing health facilities, even 
though planning of health delivery targets and priorities, still largely remains under the 
control of the centre (Mubyazi et al., 2004; Tidermand et al., 2008; Maluka et al., 2010). The 
multiplicity of committees (multiple agents) is, however, a challenge at the ward and village 
level. COWI and EPOS (2007) question the necessity of creating special governing 
committees for each health facility when village and ward health committees which are linked 
to local government structures are in place and functioning. This arrangement is seen as 
diluting the relationship between health facilities and local government authorities. In 
principal-agent terms, this shows ‘multiple agents’ at the same administrative level with each 
trying to exercise power and control over the other, resulting in tensions and conflicts.  
 The current situation also raises the question of LGAs’ responsiveness to local needs. 
The health policy emphasizes community involvement and ownership through active 
participation in identification of problem areas, planning, implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation of healthcare services (URT, 2003). However, a study by Mubyazi et al. (2004) in 
Babati, Lushoto, Muheza and Mkuranga districts reports that ward and village leaders 
commonly complained about the failure of district authorities to respond to local priorities 
citing some diseases which were perceived by community members as major health problems 
in their respective areas but were not reflected or were given low priority in district plans. 
Tidermand et al. (2008) arrived at almost a similar conclusion, observing that community 
involvement in health planning and delivery is very minimal because many district health 
plans do not reflect identified community needs through the bottom-up O&OD planning 
process that is supposed to be the basis for district plans.  
 This suggests that LGAs are to a large extent still “implementers of national and 
sectoral development programmes” with little reference to local priorities (URT, 2009a:7). 
Crook (2003) demonstrates with evidence from Ghana, Code d’Ivoire, Kenya, Tanzania and 
Zimbabwe that even where democratic representation mechanisms exist, local governments 
have not been responsive to local needs and community aspirations are mostly ignored in 
drawing up district plans. This conclusion should, however, be taken with caution, consi-
dering the nature of the health sector. For example, interviews with district council officials 
revealed that village plans mostly focus on curative and not preventive health services, and do 
not reflect gender issues. This compels district council officials to harmonize village plans to 
include other national priorities for which funds are available. 
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Table 3.1: Composition and roles of health committees and service boards  
Name of committee/board and 
level 
 Composition Functions  
Council Health Service Board 
(district) 
 Four community service users of whom at least two are 
women 
 One representative from a voluntary agency providing 
services in the area 
 One representative from private sector providing services 
in the area 
 The chairman of the council social services committee 
 District planning officer 
 District medical officer (secretary) 
 One representative of the regional health management 
team  
 Ensure that the population receives appropriate and 
affordable healthcare services 
 Discuss and approve health plans, budgets and reports from 
CHMT and submit to the Full Council for approval 
 Support CHMT in managing and administering health 
resources 
 Promote community involvement through sensitization 
Council Health Management 
Team  
(district ) 
 District medical officer 
 District health secretary  
 District health officer 
 District nursing officer 
 District pharmacist  
 District medical laboratory technologist 
 District dental surgeon  
 Prepare district comprehensive health plans 
 Ensure that health services are implemented as per 
comprehensive health plans 
 Carry out supportive supervision to health staff at all levels in 
the district 
 Ensure data collection, analysis, utilization and feedback 
mechanisms by health workers 
 Monitor and evaluate implementation of health activities   
Hospital Governing Committee 
(district hospital) 
 Three community representatives appointed from service 
users 
 Two members appointed from the health centre 
committee and dispensary committee  
 One person appointed from voluntary agencies providing 
health services in the district 
 One person appointed from private sector providing 
health services in the district 
 Oversee management of resources at the hospital 
 Discuss and pass proposals and budgets for the hospital and 
submit to the council through CHSB 
 Identify, mobilize and solicit financial resources for the 
financing of the hospital services  
 Receive and discuss implementation reports from hospital 
management team 
 Provide feedback to the community about hospital 
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 One member of the CHSB 
 District medical officer  
 One representative of the MoHSW 
development plans and their implementation 
Health Centre Committee (health 
centre) 
 One person appointed from private sector providing 
health services in the area 
 The officer in-charge of the health centre (secretary) 
 Three persons appointed from community members 
receiving services from the health centre 
 One member from dispensary committees 
 One member from ward development committees 
 Receive and discuss implementation reports prepared by the 
Health Centre Management Team 
 Identify and solicit financial resources for the running of 
health centre services 
 Advise and recommend to the CHSB on matters related to 
human resources development 
 Overseer the availability of essential supplies of drugs and 
medical equipment 
Ward Health Committee (ward)  Ward councillor 
 Ward executive officer 
 One head teacher of a primary school within the ward 
 Two community members of whom one is a female 
 Clinical officer in charge of a healthcare facility within 
the ward 
 One representative from community based organisations   
 One representative from the ward development 
committee 
 Initiate and coordinate comprehensive community health 
plans 
 Monitor level of contributions and user-fee revenues 
 Mobilize community members to join the community health 
fund (CHF) 
 Organise general meetings of members of CHF 
Dispensary Committee 
(dispensary)   
 Three members from dispensary users 
 One representative from a private health facility 
 One representative from a voluntary health facility 
 One representative of ward development committee 
 One representative of village council 
 In-charge of dispensary (secretary) 
 Discuss and pass dispensary plans and budgets  
 Identify and solicit funds 
 Assist Dispensary Management team in planning and 
managing community based initiatives 
 Ensure the delivery of appropriate services 
Source: Adapted from URT (2001); Maluka et al. (2010). 
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3.8 Water and health services: does sector make a difference?  
It is apparent from the above analysis that there have been significant efforts to decentralize 
the institutional arrangements in both sectors, although the effectiveness of the decentralised 
structures leaves much to be done. Decentralization theory argues that services should be 
decentralized if demand and supply conditions are highly localised (Andrews and Schroeder, 
2003). While both sectors are prime candidates for decentralization, they differ in a number 
of ways. Rural water supply requires substantial infrastructure investments along with opera-
ting and maintenance inputs, its users are defined territorially and can organize themselves 
on that basis. This localised nature of the service provides a justification for decentralizing 
organisation, implementation and O&M. Under the on-going reforms the central govern-
ment has changed its role from an implementer and manager to facilitator and regulator, and 
encouraged community participation in rural water supply schemes, displaying both bottom-
up and top-down models. By contrast, primary healthcare is provided through a vertically 
integrated chain of service delivery units which is produced by combining skilled health staff, 
non-recurrent resources and infrastructure, and involves benefits and risks that extend 
beyond local jurisdictions. Clients also use the service while in a state of crisis and 
vulnerability, and information asymmetry limits their choice (Batley, 2004). Therefore, 
decentralization of primary healthcare services requires more central government involve-
ment especially with regard to financing, allocation of expertise and coordination. The 
current situation in Tanzania shows that the health sector has a more hierarchical 
institutional set-up from the lowest village and health facility level up the ladder to the centre 
with more orientation towards the top-down model, which could also be viewed as decentra-
lization in the forms of deconcentration or delegation. 
 Decentralization in the two sectors also shows some similar constraints. Fiscal 
decentralization as a supporting strategy to service delivery functions has evolved in both 
sectors. Intergovernmental transfers from central government to LGAs have been institu-
tionalised and are the major sources of local government financial resources. Despite the 
increased proportion of resources spent at the local level, LGAs are highly dependent on 
central government grants with limited capacity to raise their own local revenue. Experience 
from other African countries shows that central governments use their fiscal strength to 
influence provision and production decisions at the local level (Andrews and Schroeder, 
2003). In both sectors, poor community involvement in planning and integration of local 
needs into district plans contests the widely held notion that ‘decentralization brings govern-
ment and services closer to people’. Generally, there are discrepancies between the decent-
ralized structures as they appear in policy and what is actually happening in practice. The 
changes in institutional arrangements have not matched with changes in the processes, rules 
and attitudes of technical and administrative staff that would enable the newly created 
structures to operate with greater autonomy to achieve ‘decentralization by devolution’. 
Whereas the role of central government is in principle supposed to be limited to policy 
making, regulation, monitoring and quality assurance, or ‘eyes on’ and ‘hands off’ (URT, 
1998, 2008a, 2009a), in practice there is a high degree of central government involvement in 
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LGAs’ affairs (Kessy and McCourt, 2010; Venugopal and Yilmaz, 2010). This reflects what 
Blair (2001:120) refers to as ‘distributed institutional monopoly’ where the central govern-
ment decentralizes authority and responsibility for certain functions, but maintains a hierar-
chical state control in the form of deconcentration or delegation.  
3.9 Conclusion  
The main impression gained from this review is that water and health sectors present 
different institutional arrangements and spaces for the exercise of control between multiple 
principals and agents. The nature of sector plays an important role in the institutional 
arrangements for decentralized service delivery because it determines which functions to 
decentralize and which ones to centralize. Different forms of decentralization are being used 
simultaneously though with varying degrees depending on the nature of sector. This has also 
created some principal-agent problems, thus limiting LGAs’ autonomy to exercise their 
decentralised service delivery functions. The evidence from this review therefore raises a 
number of issues for further investigation. For example, using a gender lens, it is crucial to 
assess from the users’ perspectives the extent to which the delivery of gender-sensitive water 
and health services to rural households has improved after the reforms. The lens is also 
important to assess whether decentralization reforms have increased opportunities for service 
users’ participation in decision-making processes, how different community groups 
participate in these processes, and how gender roles and needs are reflected in the decision-
making processes regarding service delivery. 
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Chapter 4 
Service users’ participation10 
 
This chapter examines the impact of decentralization reforms on service users’ participation 
for delivery of water and health services in rural Tanzania, using a gender perspective and 
principal-agent theory. The chapter investigates how decentralization has fostered spaces for 
participation and how men and women use these spaces, and identifies factors that constrain 
or encourage women’s participation. It shows that decentralization reforms have created 
spaces for service users’ participation at the local level. Participation in these spaces, however, 
differs between men and women, and is influenced by the socio-cultural norms within the 
household and community. Men have gained more leverage than women to exercise their 
agency as principals. Women’s participation is contributing to addressing practical gender 
needs, but the strategic gender needs have been less adequately addressed because gendered 
power relations have been largely untouched by the reforms. 
 
 
                                                 
10This chapter has been published as: Masanyiwa, Z.S., Niehof, A. and Termeer, C.J.A.M. (2014). 
Gender perspectives on decentralization and service users’ participation in rural Tanzania. The Journal 
of Modern African Studies, 52(1). 95-122. Doi: 10.1017/S0022278X13000815  
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4.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the impact of decentralization reforms on service users’ participation 
in decision-making processes regarding the delivery of water and health services at the village 
level in rural Tanzania, using a gender perspective. There is a growing body of literature on 
gender and decentralization that emphasizes the importance of women’s participation in 
local decision-making processes (Agarwal, 2001, 2010; Maharaj and Maharaj, 2004; Agrawal 
et al., 2006; Todes et al., 2010). Based on the premise that decentralization ‘brings govern-
ment and services closer to the people’ (Devas and Grant 2003; Bergh, 2004; Maharaj and 
Maharaj, 2004), women’s participation in local structures is seen as a means of increasing 
gender-sensitivity to local conditions and priorities, thus enabling greater influence of women 
over planning and service delivery (Beall and Todes, 2004; Maharaj and Maharaj, 2004; 
Hicks, 2011). This helps to ensure better understanding of the gender dimensions of service 
requirements and community needs (Beall, 2005; Lakwo, 2009; Matembe, 2010). Others 
view it as a way of empowerment to transform unequal power relations, enable new actors (in 
particular women) to gain influence in development processes, increase women’s bargaining 
power in the private and public spheres, and address gender inequality and close gender gaps 
(Agarwal, 2001; Bryld, 2001; Agrawal et al., 2006; Goetz, 2007; Todes et al., 2010).  
However, despite the popularity of decentralization reforms in recent decades, and a 
long history of initiatives to mainstream gender in development (Todes et al., 2010), much of 
the debate on gender and politics in sub-Saharan Africa has been on women’s representation 
in political institutions at national and regional levels. Studies on gender and decentra-
lization in sub-Saharan Africa are few and mainly focus on women’s participation in district 
or municipal structures, rarely going beyond these levels to the lower village levels. Examples 
include studies in Ghana (e.g. Gyimah and Thompson, 2008), Uganda (e.g. Lakwo, 2009; 
Matembe, 2010), and South Africa (e.g. Todes et al., 2010; Hicks, 2011). The evidence from 
these studies, as well as those from rural India where the village-level panchayat institutions 
have been extensively studied (e.g. Bryld, 2001; Jayal, 2006; Ban and Rao, 2008), show that 
women’s participation in local institutions remains low, and is determined by the socio-
cultural rules and norms, relationships, structures, processes of local governance, and the 
historical and political context of communities (Bryld, 2001; Ban and Rao, 2008; Hicks, 
2011). In addition, women’s triple role in production, reproduction and community 
management (Moser, 1993) leave them with very limited time to participate in local gover-
nance (Gyimah and Thompson, 2008). Hence, increasing women’s bargaining power and 
involvement in decision-making processes at different levels requires changing these stru-
ctural constraints to render them more responsive to women (Agarwal, 2001).  
Against this background, the present chapter focuses on the experiences of women’s 
participation in village level institutions in Tanzania. After more than a decade of imple-
menting decentralization reforms, recent studies in Tanzania show that the extent of people’s 
participation in planning and decision-making processes at the local level is limited, minimal 
or ineffective (Kessy and McCourt, 2010; Norman and Masoi, 2010; Venugopal and Yilmaz, 
2010), and that institutional arrangements under decentralization are not facilitating partici-
pation for local development (Mollel, 2010). However, empirical studies looking at the 
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gender dimensions of these processes are scant. Although it is widely acknowledged that men 
and women have different access to decision-making processes due to socially constructed 
gender roles and needs, most studies are gender-neutral and assume that decentralization 
affects men and women equally. In Tanzania (and in other sub-Saharan African countries) 
most studies on gender and politics have focused on women’s representation in parliaments 
(e.g. Meena, 2003; Ballington and Karan, 2005; Shayo, 2005) or district councils (e.g. Meena, 
2003; PMO-RALG, 2006). The village level where decisions that directly affect the lives of 
men and women are made, has been much less examined.  
Thus, whether decentralization results in increased participation and decisions that 
are in the interests of village-level service users in general, and of women in particular, 
remains an empirical question that warrants further investigation. This chapter addresses this 
issue by suggesting answers to the following questions. First, to what extent have decentrali-
zation reforms enhanced the opportunities for service users to participate in decision-making 
processes? Second, how do men and women make use of these opportunities to participate in 
decision-making processes regarding the delivery of public services? Third, how are practical 
and strategic gender needs reflected in decision-making processes about service delivery at the 
local level? Fourth, which factors constrain or promote women’s participation in these 
processes? The chapter contributes to the literature on gender and decentralization in 
Tanzania using the cases of water and health services. It focuses on the micro-level processes 
at the village level where men and women, the actors in and beneficiaries of decentralization 
reforms, live. Analysis at the village level is crucial for revealing the interfaces between the 
macro- and micro-level processes, and between the formal and informal institutions. The 
following section presents the theoretical framework that informs this analysis.  
4.2 Decentralization, participation and gender: A theoretical framework 
Three main concepts are central to our analysis in this chapter: decentralization, partici-
pation and gender. Decentralization is broadly defined as “the transfer of power and 
responsibility to plan, make decisions and manage public functions from a higher level of 
government to a lower one”  (Conyers, 1990:19). The literature treats decentralization and 
participation as having a “symbiotic relationship” (Bergh, 2004:781), where men and women 
are often assumed to participate equally in local politics (Lakwo, 2009). Decentralization is 
expected to foster women’s participation in local decision-making structures because it 
focuses on basic services that address women’s needs (Beall, 2005; Lakwo, 2009; Matembe, 
2010). However, a closer look suggests that this relationship is not straight-forward, given the 
hegemonic power relations and gender inequalities at the local level, that become evident 
when incorporating a gender perspective into our analysis (Matembe, 2010). This entails 
looking at the influence of gender on people’s opportunities, social roles and interactions 
(FAO, 1999) and exploring how men and women contribute to and benefit from local 
governance as citizens or as service users (Beall, 1996). Our second research question thus 
relates to men’s and women’s agency in decision-making processes, and the third and fourth 
consider the content and extent of women’s participation in decision-making processes and 
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the factors that constrain or encourage their participation. All of these questions are nece-
ssary in unpacking the gender perspective. 
In addition, the chapter uses principal-agent theory to explain whether participation 
in decision-making processes enables service users to exercise their roles as principals. In the 
context of decentralization, there is a complex ‘agency relationship’ where local governments 
act as agents for two different principals: the national government and the citizens or service 
users. The theory is a useful analytical tool because it focuses both on the relationship 
between actors in decentralized institutions and on the duties and responsibilities that the 
decentralization reforms impose on these actors (Hiskey, 2010). The theory helps explaining 
how participation in decision-making processes is structured at the village level. Despite its 
widespread use in decentralization literature (e.g. Bossert 1998; Bossert and Beauvais, 2002; 
Brinkerhoff and Azfar, 2010; Hiskey, 2010), this theory has, however, not been linked to 
gender. This chapter addresses this missing connection. 
The assumption is that decentralization reforms have created formal local institutions 
that provide opportunities for men and women to participate and exercise their agency as 
principals or as agents representing other service users. We refer to these institutions as 
spaces for participation. To examine the effectiveness of participation in these spaces, we 
draw on the typology of participation developed by Agarwal (2001), as presented in Table 4.1. 
We argue that achieving effective participation entails a shift from the lower level, where 
participation merely involves attending meetings, towards the higher levels, where men and 
women have ‘voice’ and influence in reaching decisions (Agarwal, 2001, 2010).  
Table 4.1: Typology of gendered participation in village structures 
Level of participation Characteristic features Gender needs 
addressed  
Passive participation Attendance in public meetings and listening 
without speaking up or having influence in 
decision making 
None  
Consultative 
participation  
Being asked to give opinions in specific 
matters without guarantee of influencing the 
decisions e.g. in preparation of village annual 
plans 
Practical  
Activity-specific 
participation  
Being asked to undertake specific tasks such 
as labour or material contributions in 
construction of service infrastructure 
Practical  
Active participation  Membership in village councils and 
committees 
Practical and strategic  
Interactive 
participation  
Having voice and influence in reaching 
decisions in public meetings and committees; 
holding influential leadership positions in 
committees 
Practical and strategic  
Source: Adapted from Agarwal (2001) and modified by authors  
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The strong point of the typology is that it emphasizes ‘how’ men and women partici-
pate in the available spaces and whether their participation can be considered effective in 
addressing women’s practical and strategic gender needs (Moser, 1993). Practical gender 
needs relate to the immediate perceived necessities articulated from women’s experiences, 
and are based on the sexual division of labour within the household and community. 
Strategic gender needs relate to women’s subordination to men and the need for equal 
organisational and structural relationships between men and women (Moser, 1993). This 
categorization is relevant in the context of decentralization because women’s participation is 
expected to champion women’s interests (Beall, 2005; Lakwo, 2009; Matembe, 2010).  
We measured practical gender needs in terms of topics men and women talk about in 
meetings and their involvement in the construction of service infrastructure. Strategic gender 
needs were measured in terms of women’s ability to speak up and influence decisions in 
meetings and the extent to which women hold influential leadership positions in village 
committees. Convenience of public meetings to women in terms of time, venue and language 
is used as an indicator of gender roles and gender division of labour. Gender is further seen 
as intersecting with other variables such as age, ethnicity and religion, which all play a role in 
enabling or constraining effective women’s participation. The specific discussion must be 
situated in the context of decentralization reforms in Tanzania and the spaces for partici-
pation created by the reforms at different administrative levels.  
4.3 Gendered participation spaces: The rural context  
Since independence in 1961, decentralization in Tanzania has been implemented as a means 
of increasing people’s participation in development and improving local service delivery 
(Tordoff, 1994; Cooksey and Kikula, 2005). Early decentralization attempts from the 1960s 
to mid-1990s, however, did not lead to increased people’s participation because they were 
checked with a tendency towards administrative deconcentration (Cooksey and Kikula, 
2005). Over the past decade, however, participation has gained impetus after the commence-
ment of local government reforms implemented through  the policy of ‘decentralization by 
devolution’. The current reforms aim to establish broad based community awareness and 
people’s participation, and to promote principles of democracy, transparency and accounta-
bility. Local government authorities are expected to “facilitate the participation of the people 
in deciding on matters affecting their lives, planning and executing their development 
programs” (URT, 1998:4, 2004:35).  
Women’s participation and gender are also consistently affirmed in the reform policy 
documents. The Local Government Reform Agenda states an intent “to promote the 
participation of women in management of local authorities” (URT, 1996:20). The Policy 
Paper on Local Government Reform states that local government reforms aim “to establish a 
democratic and gender-sensitive administrative set-up in local governments” (URT, 1998:13). 
The Prime Minister’s Office–Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG) 
recognises women as “potential drivers of change for decentralization” stating that “most 
women have something to gain” from decentralization reforms (PMO-RALG, 2006:5). 
Although the Local Government Reform Program II notes that marginalization of women’s 
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interests in village and district plans was one of the problems encountered in the first phase 
of the reforms, again, it advocates gender mainstreaming, particularly in the composition of 
councils (URT, 2009a).  
Consequently, the reforms have created a number of spaces for service users to 
participate in decision-making processes at the local level. These include hamlet (kitongoji) 
meetings, village assemblies, village councils and committees and district full council 
meetings. Figure 4.1 shows the relationship between these spaces at different levels. The 
hamlet is the lowest administrative level where residents elect a chairperson who represents 
them in the village council. The hamlet chairperson can organise residents’ meetings to 
discuss development issues of the hamlet, although it is not stipulated how often such 
meetings should be held. The village assembly and village council are the major decision-
making spaces at the village level. The village assembly is composed of all adult members of 
the village, and it elects the village chairperson, a village council of 15–25 members, and 
other village committees (Shivji and Peter 2003; Venugopal and Yilmaz, 2010). The legal 
framework guarantees women’s representation in village structures stating that “not less than 
one quarter of the total members of village councils should be women.” This is implemented 
through a quota system in addition to normal local election procedures (Shivji and Peter, 
2003:27). The village assembly meets every three months while the village council meets 
monthly.  
The most important decision-making space at the district level is the full council 
meeting which meets once every three months and involves ward councillors, special seat 
councillors (women), parliamentarians representing constituencies in the district and heads 
of district council administration. Citizens can also attend full council meetings as observers 
(Kessy and McCourt, 2010; Venugopal and Yilmaz, 2010). Other spaces for participation are 
consultation meetings during preparation of village plans organised at either the hamlet or 
the village level and in the construction and rehabilitation of service infrastructures such as 
rural water supply schemes, village dispensaries, rural health centres or primary schools. So, 
how and to what extent do men and women make use of these spaces and, thus, participate 
in decision-making processes? We address these questions using a gender perspective and 
principal-agent theory, after a description of the methodology. 
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Figure 4.1: Local government decision making spaces 
4.4 Study design and methodology 
The present chapter is based on empirical research carried out between September 2011 and 
August 2012 in the rural districts of Kondoa and Kongwa in the Dodoma Region in 
Tanzania. The two districts were purposively selected because they differ in terms of both the 
phase at which they joined the reforms and in their ethnic and religious composition. 
Kondoa joined the reforms from the start in 2000 whereas Kongwa was only included in 
2005. Kondoa has a more diverse number of ethnic groups including the Rangi, Gogo, 
Sandawe, Hehe, Bulunge, Masaai and Barbaig. The major ethnic groups in Kongwa are 
Gogo, Kaguru and Hehe. More than half of respondents (55%) in Kondoa are Muslim, while 
in Kongwa the majority (96%) is Christian. The fieldwork was carried out in ten selected 
villages, five in each district (Table 4.2), most of which had been involved in construction of 
water and/or health service infrastructures in recent years as part of the reforms. Although 
the findings from two districts may not justify general conclusions on gender and decentrali-
zation throughout the country, they do serve to identify mechanisms of gendered 
participation in local institutions by service users, and suggest the problems that constrain 
effective women’s participation in specific contexts. 
Lines of reporting 
Representational linkages 
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Table 4.2: Location and research participants in the study villages  
District Village Distance from 
the district 
capital (km) 
Number of surveyed 
households 
Interviewees and 
focus groups’ 
participants 
Kondoa 
 
Kidoka 65 32 34 
Potea 46 32 47 
Mulua 16 34 8 
Khubunko 85 34 7 
Humekwa 90 32 11 
     
Kongwa 
 
Mlanga 5 35 5 
Songambele A 46 33 50 
Manungu 12 33 5 
Chamae 34 33 5 
Sagara A 22 34 11 
 
 Data were collected using a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods as a 
strategy for enriching our understanding of the issue (Niehof, 1999; Axinn and Pearce 2006), 
and contributing to both the validity and reliability of findings (Scrimshaw, 1990). A 
household survey was conducted among 332 randomly selected households, with a minimum 
of 30 households in each village, allowing a reasonable control over sampling error (Grinnell, 
2001). Overall, 115 men and 217 women participated in the survey. Qualitative data were 
collected through semi-structured and unstructured interviews with district council officials 
and village leaders. Eight focus group discussions were done with groups of men, women, 
village water committees and village health committees. Five life histories of individual 
women leaders were also collected to learn about their experience in local decision-making 
processes. These qualitative methods provided an opportunity to explore different issues in a 
flexible manner and to capture the richness of experiences and perceptions of the 
respondents in their own terms. Review and analysis of available data at district and village 
levels provided relevant secondary data to complement the primary data.  
 The household survey data were coded and analysed, frequency distributions, mean 
scores and chi-square tests were computed for most variables. Binary logistic regression was 
used to determine the factors associated with respondents’ ability to speak up and influence 
decisions in public meetings. Field notes from interviews and focus group discussions were 
transcribed and analysed using qualitative content analysis so as to interpret and construct 
meanings from the text. We present and discuss our findings, below, weaving together the 
survey and qualitative data, illustrating survey findings with examples, and validating 
qualitative findings with survey data.  
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4.5 Decentralization and participation by service users 
A consideration of four forms of participation allows us to examine how men and women 
participate, respectively, in the spaces created by the decentralization reforms. These include: 
attendance at public meetings, participation in the construction of service infrastructure, 
membership of village committees, and the ability to speak up and influence decisions (see 
Table 4.1).  
4.5.1 Attendance in public meetings 
The majority of surveyed households (91%) reported that at least one member had attended 
public meetings over the year preceding the survey: 87% village assemblies, 72% hamlet 
meetings, and 33% village committee meetings (Table 4.3). Only about half of respondents 
(52%) reported having attended village planning meetings. Villagers as principals, men and 
women alike, do not see themselves as having influence in these ‘consultation’ processes 
because in most cases village plans are not implemented as planned partly due to limited 
funding from the district councils.  
Although district full council meetings are open to the public, citizen’s attendance 
was very low (2%). In two full council meetings (one in each district) observed by the author, 
only 30 citizens in Kondoa (22 men and 8 women) and 10 in Kongwa (all men) attended the 
meeting. Most citizens do not attend full council meetings due to long distances and 
associated travel costs to the district council headquarters where meetings are held, as well as 
lack of information on meeting schedules which are mostly posted on council headquarters 
notice boards, and rarely in ward and village offices. The law allows citizens to attend full 
council meetings as observers (the passive form of participation) but not to speak up (the 
interactive form of participation). This implies that decision making at the district level is the 
responsibility of agents (councillors and parliamentarians). Whether the outcomes of these 
decision-making processes reflect the voice of the principals, depends on the efforts of the 
councillors (agents) to consult and represent the views of their constituencies. There are no 
clearly established consultation mechanisms between councillors and citizens. It remains the 
discretion of the councillor to convene meetings with constituencies. As a result, such 
consultations may be haphazard and biased (Devas and Grant, 2003) and do not necessarily 
represent the views of different groups within the community.   
Attendance at village public meetings differed significantly between districts, with 
many respondents in Kongwa reporting having attended hamlet meetings (77%) while in 
Kondoa many attended village assemblies (92%). The district council officials stated that the 
reforms have been successful in increasing the number of village statutory meetings, 
including assemblies, councils and committee meetings. Village executive officers are requi-
red to report to the district council the number of statutory meetings held in their villages, 
which acts as a catalyst for such meetings to be held. When villagers (principals) demand such 
meetings, village leaders (agents) are compelled to convene them. Villagers also ask for 
financial reports in these meetings, an indication that principals are demanding accounta-
bility from their agents. Comparatively, citizens’ attendance in village assemblies in our 
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sample is almost twice what was reported at national level which was only 44 percent in 2006 
(URT, 2009b) and higher than that reported by Kessy and McCourt (2010) in Mwanza City 
Council and Moshi Rural district where 55 percent of the respondents reported having 
attended village assemblies over the last 12 months. 
Table 4.3: Citizens’ attendance in public meetings over the last 12 months by district (n=331) 
Type of meeting Kondoa Kongwa Both Chi-square values 
Hamlet meetings   110(67.1) 128(76.6) 238(71.9) χ2=4.132, p=0.042** 
Village assemblies   151(92.1) 137(82.0) 288(87.0) χ2=7.375, p=0.007*** 
Village committee meetings   57(34.8) 51(30.5) 108(32.6) χ2=0.669, p=0.413 
Preparation of village plans 84(51.2) 89(53.0) 173(52.1) χ2=0.103, p=0.749 
Full council meetings  5(3.0) 3(1.8) 8(2.4) χ2=0.538, p=0.463 
Figures in brackets are percentages. **Significant at 5% level, ***Significant at 1% level.  
 A review of village records for 2010/2011 and 2011/2012, however, revealed that 
none of the study villages had held the four annual village assemblies as required by law. This 
means that the frequency of public meetings is still low, thus limiting the opportunities for 
service users to voice their concerns and to exercise their agency as principals. At the national 
level, URT (2009b) shows that just over half (56%) of respondents in 2006 reported that 
their village assembly had met in the last three months, a situation which does not appear to 
have substantially improved. The problem appears to be widespread including in other 
countries; studies in Uganda also point to low attendance at community meetings given the 
perception that decisions in such meetings are a prerogative of elected representatives 
(Francis and James, 2003), as well as because meetings at village level do not happen as 
frequently as they should (Devas and Grant, 2003). 
In most households, more men than women attended public meetings. While the 
proportion of women was generally low for all meetings, the higher the level of the meeting 
the higher the proportion of men (Table 4.4).  
Table 4.4: Citizen’s attendance in public meetings over the last 12 months by gender  
Type of meeting Who attended the meetings?  
Men  Women  Both men and women 
Hamlet meetings   66(27.7) 63(26.5) 109(45.8) 
Village assemblies   91(31.6) 70(24.3) 127(44.1) 
Village committee meetings 55(50.9) 31(28.7) 22(20.4) 
Preparation of village plans 88(50.0) 51(29.0) 37(21.0) 
Full council meetings  5(62.5) 2(25.0) 1(12.5) 
Figures in brackets are percentages. 
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 The relatively high proportion of both men and women in hamlet meetings and 
village assemblies was partly because of the proximity to the venues of the meetings. 
Presumably, the more spatially closer to home the meeting is held, the more likely that both 
men and women will attend. These findings are in agreement with what was shown by URT 
(2009b) that women were slightly under represented in village meetings.  
In some villages, however, leaders noted that more women than men attend village 
meetings. In Humekwa, a village leader said: “most men in this village have a tendency of 
neglecting meetings, they usually send their wives.” A woman village councillor in Sagara A 
remarked: “it is the women who mostly attend village meetings compared to men who are always busy 
in their local brew clubs.” In Kidoka, a village with more than three major ethnic groups, 
ethnicity played a role as well. In some ethnic groups, women were said to have more 
freedom to attend public meetings than in others. A leader in this village noted: “in this 
village, it is the Rangi women who mostly attend the meetings, but not the Gogo and Masaai women 
who are afraid of sitting in a meeting with men because of their culture.” This shows that actual 
participation in the formal spaces created by the reforms differs with context. It also shows 
that gendered attendance is a cultural issue where gender also intersects with ethnicity. As 
Pennartz and Niehof (1999) point out, the relationship between decision-making and power 
depends on the benefits and status of the specific decision-making area. Shivji and Peter 
(2003) observed that in some parts of the country (Muleba and Sengerema districts), the 
majority of those who attend public meetings are women, while in other parts (Lindi Rural 
district), there are hardly any women in meetings, not even the village councillors. 
Table 4.5: Respondents’ perceptions on convenience of public meetings to women by sex 
Criteria Response Men (n=114) Women (n=212) Both (n=326) 
Time of meetings Not convenient  22(19.3) 31(14.6) 53(16.2) 
Convenient  87(76.3) 176(82.6) 263(80.4) 
Very convenient  5(4.4) 6(2.8) 11(3.4) 
Mean score  1.85 1.89 1.87 
Venue of meetings Not convenient  36(31.6) 61(28.6) 97(29.7) 
Convenient  75(65.8) 150(70.4) 225(68.8) 
Very convenient  3(2.6) 2(0.9) 5(1.5) 
Mean score  1.71 1.72 1.72 
Language used  Not convenient  10(8.8) 15(7.0) 25(7.6) 
Convenient  98(86.0) 186(87.3) 284(86.9) 
Very convenient  6(5.8) 12(5.6) 18(5.5) 
Mean score  1.96 1.99 1.98 
Figures in brackets are percentages. 
4.5.2 Participation in construction and rehabilitation of service infrastructure  
The majority of respondents (88%) reported having participated in construction or rehabi-
litation of water and health service infrastructures over the past ten years (90% in Kongwa 
and 87% in Kondoa). More households had participated in water infrastructures (77%) than 
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in health (57%), reflecting the fact that six of the study villages (Humekwa, Potea, Kidoka, 
Manungu, Chamae and Songambele A) had constructed boreholes through the decentralized 
Water Sector Development Program. Construction of village dispensaries had been impleme-
nted in the villages of Khubunko, Chamae, Songambele A, Sagara A and Potea, although not 
many households appeared to have taken part in these activities.   
 For both services, more men than women were reported to have had participated in 
these activities. Nevertheless, in about half of households (50% in water and 46% in health), 
both men and women had participated in these initiatives (Table 4.6). In construction of 
water wells and boreholes, 32 percent of the households indicated that only men had 
participated compared to 18 percent reporting only women. In village dispensaries, 37 
percent of households reported men only compared to 17 percent that reported women only. 
Although women are the principal care givers in households and main users of water and 
health services, their participation in these services related activities is somewhat lower than 
that of men.  
Table 4.6: Citizen’s participation in service infrastructure activities by district and sex (n=332) 
Variable  Categories  Water wells and boreholes  Village dispensaries 
District Kondoa 127 (77.4) 82 (50.0) 
 Kongwa 130 (77.4) 107 (64.5) 
 Both districts  257 (77.4) 189(57.3) 
Sex  Men 83(32.3) 70(37.0) 
 Women  46(17.9) 32(17.9) 
 Both men and women 128(49.8) 87(46.0) 
Figures in brackets are percentages.  
 In terms of how service users participated in these activities, three forms of 
participation were identified: provision of unskilled labour, cash contribution, or a 
combination of the two. Many respondents participated in construction of water infrastruc-
tures through cash contribution (43%) and most (62%) contributed their labour in construc-
tion of village dispensaries (Table 4.7).  
Table 4.7: Type of participation in construction or rehabilitation of water sources  
Type of participation 
Water infrastructure 
(n=257) 
Health infrastructure 
(n=189)  
Labour contribution 97 (37.7) 117(61.9) 
Cash contribution 112(43.4) 49(25.9) 
Labour and cash contribution 48(18.6) 23(12.2) 
Figures in brackets are percentages.  
 
The relatively high participation in water services infrastructure projects through cash 
was because villages were required to raise five percent of the total initial costs for drilling, 
pump and engine installation, and for water distribution. In some villages, each adult 
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member contributed a fixed amount (e.g. in Chamae and Humekwa) while in others each 
household contributed a fixed amount regardless of household size (e.g. in Songambele A, 
Potea and Kidoka). In most male-headed households, it was the husband or older male 
member who was responsible for paying this contribution. In villages that had constructed 
new dispensaries, women participated by collecting and bringing sand, stones, gravel and 
water to building sites while men were involved in brick making and other masonry work. 
This ‘activity-specific’ form of participation is common in many ‘participatory development 
projects’ and reproduces the traditional gender division of labour within the community.  
4.5.3 Membership of village committees 
The village council has three standing committees: for planning and finance, social welfare, 
and security. In addition, it can establish other committees depending on the needs of the 
village or as directed by the district or central government. The most common ones in all 
villages are water, health, school, environment and disaster management committees. In this 
study, the proportion of women in village councils ranged from 24 percent to 48 percent, 
with an average of 34 percent (Table 4.8). At the global level, the figure of one-third has 
gained popularity as the critical mass for gender quotas in various institutions from parlia-
ment to village councils (Agarwal, 2010). The affirmative action imposed by the reforms that 
village councils should have at least one-fourth women councillors (Shivji and Peter, 2003) 
mainly through the ‘special’ women seats appears to have an effect: 90 percent of the study 
villages are above the one-fourth and 70 percent above the one-third thresholds.  
The proportion of women was higher in the social welfare, health and water 
committees than in the security, village councils or planning and finance committees. The 
former relate more to women’s practical gender needs and were seen as ‘feminine’, while the 
latter were seen as ‘masculine’. Very few women held leadership positions in the committees, 
and if they did, mostly as secretaries or treasurers. Women’s presence in village structures in 
our study thus exhibits the form of ‘active’ participation but rarely the ‘interactive’ form of 
participation. This parallels findings elsewhere. Hemson’s (2002) study on women’s 
participation in rural water committees in South Africa showed that women tended to hold 
the less powerful positions as ‘vices’ or ‘auxiliaries’ to the main positions. Agarwal (2010) 
found that women in community forestry institutions in rural India and Nepal usually 
occupied ‘supportive’ leadership positions as vice-presidents, joint secretaries and co-
treasurers. In Kenya, Friis-Hansein et al., (2012) reported that while membership in farmer 
field school groups was dominated by women, elected leadership positions tended to be held 
by men, apart from the post of group treasurer, which was often held by a woman. These 
findings raise the question, then, of the extent to which women’s presence in village 
structures has enabled them to articulate their needs, both practical and strategic and perhaps 
translate them into locally relevant policy outcomes, by speaking up and influencing 
decisions in these spaces. We turn to this question in the next sub-section, as we move up the 
ladder of participation from ‘active’ to ‘interactive’ participation. 
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Table 4.8: Proportion of women in village committees by village 
Village Proportion of women in the committee (%) 
Village 
council 
Planning and 
finance 
Security Social 
welfare 
Water Health 
Kidoka 36.0 50.0 44.4 44.4 50.0 62.5 
Potea 28.0 20.0 25.0 37.5 37.5 50.0 
Mulua 32.0 60.0 14.3 77.8 50.0 12.5 
Khubunko 48.0 25.0 30.0 70.0 30.0 nd* 
Humekwa 29.2 33.3 33.3 22.2 56.3 35.0 
Mlanga 24.0 25.0 11.1 44.4 20.3 30.0 
Manungu 32.0 33.3 25.0 33.3 33.3 50.0 
Songambele A 38.1 71.4 12.5 33.3 33.3 38.1 
Chamae 35.0 25.0 0.0 75.0 50.0 50.0 
Sagara A 34.8 50.0 22.2 50.0 42.9 54.5 
Overall  33.7 39.3 21.8 48.8 40.3 42.5 
*nd = no data could be obtained  
4.5.4 Speaking up and influence in meetings 
The survey findings show that fewer than half of respondents who attended public meetings 
either spoke up (45%) or felt they were able to influence decisions (49%) in such meetings. 
Nevertheless, significantly (p=0.00) more men than women reported to either having spoken 
up or felt that they had influence (Table 4.9). The focus group discussions revealed that 
despite the relatively high number of women in public meetings, very few of them speak up. 
In Potea, focus group discussion participants explained that only three women speak up in 
public meetings, and in Songambele A between five and seven. One participant (a woman) in 
Potea said: “if a woman is too talkative in public meetings, men will say don’t marry from that 
household, their women are very noisy.” While in the south Asian context Agarwal (2010:107) 
concluded that “the greater the percentage of women in a meeting, the more likely that some 
or most of them will speak up”, our findings show that despite women’s numerical strength 
in public meetings, many of them participate only ‘passively’. Apparently, the gendered 
power relations have not been transformed to allow women’s equal access to ‘effective’ and 
‘interactive’ participation. Because of this, men have gained more leverage to play their roles 
as principals in public meetings than their female counterparts. 
Table 4.9: Proportion of respondents who can speak up and influence decisions by sex  
Variable  Male Female Both Chi-square values 
Can speak up (n=301)  67(63.8) 69(35.2) 136(45.2) χ2=22.588, p=0.000*** 
     
Have influence  (n=299) 71(68.3) 74(37.9) 145(48.5) χ2=24.965, p=0.000*** 
Figures in brackets are percentages. *** Significant at 1% level. 
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 The findings also revealed gender variations on what men and women spoke about in 
public meetings. Women mostly talked about water, health and education services for their 
children. It was argued that women have first-hand experiences with these services and, 
therefore, know better what is working and what needs to be improved. Men talk about 
financial matters, roads, elections or recalling village leaders. One interviewee (a man) in 
Songambele A said: “it is the women who take children to clinics and fetch water. If there are any 
problems in these services, they are the first ones to experience them. So, if they don’t speak about them, 
how do we [men] know if there is problem?” Another woman added: “although we are always silent 
most of the time leaving men to talk about their politics, we just wait for our topics [water and health], 
that is where we talk and they have to listen to us.” ANK, a special seats councillor and former 
village chairperson explained how she had facilitated the construction of a village dispensary 
and a new borehole amidst resistances from male village councillors because they did not see 
them as priorities. There are thus ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ topics for discussions, and 
domains of decision making. Practical gender needs like water and health services are 
acknowledged by men and women as being a women’s domain. 
In addition to gender, other factors associated with the ability to speak up and 
influence decisions in public meetings were education and occupation (Table 4.10).  
Table 4.10: Factors influencing ability to speak up and influence in public meetings  
Explanatory variables 
Speaking up (n=297) 
R2 = 0.175,  
Log likelihood = 351.977 
Influence (n=295)  
R2 = 0.167,  
Log likelihood = 354.667 
B coefficient Std error B coefficient Std error 
Sex (1=male) 0.946*** 0.286 0.922*** 0.286
Household size 0.166*** 0.058 0.027 0.055
Marital status (1=married) 0.012 0.424 0.152 0.412
Age (years) 0.015 0.011 0.027*** 0.010
Education (1=educated) 1.075*** 0.373 0.793** 0.360
Occupation (1=farmer) -0.638 0.566 -0.728 0.593
Occupation (2=farmer and livestock 
keeper) 
1.236** 0.628 1.638** 0.654
Household income 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Religion (1= Christian) -0.311 1.020 0.143 1.023
Religion (2 = Muslim) 0.369 1.179 0.294 1.187
Ethnicity (1=Gogo) 0.531 0.526 0.846 0.520
Ethnicity (2=Kaguru) 0.758 0.663 0.767 0.654
Ethnicity (3=Rangi) 0.008 0.737 0.712 0.747
Ethnicity (4=Sandawe) -0.307 0.656 0.309 0.635
Constant  -2.614 1.423* -2.581* 1.427
*Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5% level, ***Significant at 1% level.  
 
Literate villagers were more likely to speak up and influence decisions. Livestock 
keepers were more likely to speak up because having a large herd of cattle is considered as a 
sign of wealth and respect in the community. Family size had an influence on speaking up 
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because having many children means more prestige and respect in the community for both 
men and women. Age was positively associated with ability to influence decisions, again for 
both men and women. Older women in their late forties or fifties, married and mostly with 
grand children were more respected, more likely to be committee members, and could speak 
up and be listened to. They were regarded as ‘gender-neutral’ and could mix with men in 
public settings. These women often talked to village leaders in public, or privately after 
meetings, to exert pressure on them for the improvement of certain services of interest to 
women. Other women in the village gave their opinions and asked these women to speak on 
their behalf. Young women are often refused permission to involve themselves in public 
affairs by their husbands, since these are still regarded as ‘men’s domain’. Gender thus 
intersects with age, as it does with ethnicity (see above) in shaping the extent of participation. 
These patterns reflect the power relations interwoven within both the formal and informal 
community structures. Perhaps because of this, few women participate ‘effectively’ and 
‘interactively’ in local spaces and are able to address both the practical and strategic gender 
needs.  
4.5.5 Factors constraining women’s participation in decision-making processes 
A number of constraints to effective women’s participation in decision-making processes 
were identified: patriarchy, household responsibilities, complicated election procedures and 
personal qualities of women. Many respondents mentioned the patriarchal system prevailing 
at household and community levels as a major constraint. The fact that there is a Swahili 
term for patriarchy, mfumo dume, which literally means ‘a male-dominated system’, shows that 
patriarchy is an emic concept within the community, although men and women conceptua-
lise it differently. Men expressed patriarchy using phrases like: ‘women are inferior to men’, 
‘men disrespect women leaders’, ‘a woman’s place is in the home doing what is told by her 
husband’, ‘decision-making is the responsibility of men and not women’ or ‘we (men) cannot 
be led by women.’ Women expressed patriarchy using phrases like: ‘they (men) don’t respect 
us’, ‘women are denied by their husbands to join village committees’, ‘they (men) say a 
woman leader cannot help us in anything’, ‘they (men) say women are weak’, ‘young men are 
just rude to women’ or ‘they (men) discriminate against us.’ This suggests that men see 
patriarchy as a given feature of society, while women identify it a social problem, and express 
the dissatisfaction they experience in their communities. Feelings of being sidelined, margina-
lised, excluded, discriminated and denied dominate among women (Hicks, 2011), “they 
reinforce internally what is stated externally” and inhibit women’s effective participation in 
local structures (Hemson, 2002:13).  
When asked why this was happening, women in one mixed focus group discussion in 
Songambele A replied: “ask these men who behave like bulls.” Peer pressure especially among 
young men, ethnicity, and the custom of paying bride price were reported as contributing to 
the perceptions that men ‘buy’ their wives and therefore must exercise ‘control’ over them. 
One male respondent in Potea commented: “my wife cannot stay outside the home doing 
community work for many hours. To me that is a sign of disrespect.” Another man in Songambele A 
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remarked: “I don’t allow my wife to contest for any leadership position in this village. I contest for 
leadership and she only votes for me.” 
Village leaders explained that in most cases it is men who competed for leadership 
positions. Most women village councillors and committee members came through the 
‘special’ women seats and rarely through the normal election procedures involving competi-
tion with men. In the village of Potea, even getting the required number of ‘special’ seats for 
women on the village council and committees was said to be quite challenging. One village 
leader told us: “We have serious problems getting women in the village committees as required by law. 
In the past, we used to advertise committee vacancies and ask people to apply, but no women would 
turn out. Nowadays, we just ask people in a meeting to mention names of potential candidates and vote 
for them in a public meeting.” However, even this strategy seemed not to work quite well 
because “some women are elected in public meetings to become members of village committees, but most 
of them drop out because their husbands refuse them to join the committee. The husband might even be 
present in the meeting when the wife is elected and does not say anything publicly, but the moment they 
get home the trouble begins” (said a man village leader). Explaining her more than 20 years’ 
experience in leadership at village and ward levels, ANK noted: “when I was a village 
chairperson, many men were questioning, why they were led by a woman. Don’t we have men to take up 
this position?, they said.” In Potea where most of the population is Muslim, respondents associ-
ated patriarchy with religion arguing that Muslim women are not allowed to stay outside 
their homes for many hours, although this was not a serious issue in other villages. This 
shows the intersection between gender and religion, which are both influenced by patriarchy.  
Most respondents did acknowledge that things were changing, though slowly, among 
other reasons because of economic groups with mixed membership and because women’s 
economic activities involve travelling outside the village or interacting with outsiders. 
Community awareness and sensitization initiatives by NGOs, politicians and government 
officials from the district, regional or national levels were also contributing to the change, 
although with limitations. The district gender officer in Kondoa said that the district council 
was conducting gender awareness meetings at village level, but only three villages were 
reached in the previous year. Kongwa district did not have a gender desk and gender issues 
were handled by the community development department.  
Household responsibilities due to the gender division of labour were another 
constraint noted by the interviewees. In particular, membership in village committees was 
said to be time-consuming, making it difficult for most women to combine household 
responsibilities and committee work. While this is true for some women, particularly those 
with young children, this idea was dismissed by some of the women leaders interviewed. They 
explained how they were able to combine committee work with household responsibilities. 
ANK said that: “leadership is not like being an executive officer where you have to be in the village 
office on daily basis. All you need to know is when you have meetings or other committee work and plan 
accordingly. I have done this for more than 20 years and I have always managed to handle both my 
leadership and family responsibilities. My family does not complain that I don’t do my household work.” 
SHP, a member of the village water committee and former village councillor pointed out 
that: “I have time to do my household work and committee work. I have no problems combining both; 
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all I do is to plan.” These observations support the idea that “women have ingrained 
organisational abilities which allow them to plan their day successfully and create a balance” 
(Maharaj and Maharaj, 2004:269). This also challenges the men’s conviction that women are 
unable to fulfil leadership roles because of their household responsibilities.  
Women leaders mentioned the complicated election processes as another constraint. 
For village councillors, this included being a member of a political party, filling in application 
forms that must go through party committees for scrutiny and appraisal, and campaigning. 
Since few women belong to a political party (Shayo, 2005), most women are ‘institutionally’ 
excluded from village leadership. The women village councillors who went through these 
processes reported that the ‘playing ground’ was not equal for men and women. RNS 
commented: “I competed with men, but the election procedures were difficult. Many of my competitors 
[men] had friends in the party committees who supported them, they had money to bribe voters, and 
many laughed at me that I was just wasting my time.” ANK said: “in the past elections were very 
objective, how you expressed yourself in campaign meetings mattered a lot. But nowadays, elections are 
crowded with corruption and other rough games. Most women are afraid of confronting all these 
problems.” Devas and Grant (2003) and Venugopal and Yilmaz (2010) found that vote buying 
and vote bargaining are common features of local level elections. These practices exclude 
those who cannot afford such political purchases, particularly women. 
  Other constraints related to assumed personal qualities of women, such as being shy 
and uncomfortable in speaking among men, lack of self-confidence, lack of experience in 
public affairs, and fear of making ‘mistakes’ and being laughed at or ridiculed. Again, these 
factors are related to socio-cultural norms which circumscribe women’s activities and 
behaviour in the public domain. This shows that despite the mechanisms instituted by the 
reforms to increase women’s participation in decision-making processes, their participation is 
inhibited by social dynamics of inclusion and exclusion at the intra-household and extra-
household levels (cf. Devas and Grant, 2003; Conyers, 2007; Matembe, 2010).  
The experience of the five women leaders interviewed in depth shows that despite the 
challenges they were facing, their participation was an empowering process. The life histories 
revealed that many of them were afraid of speaking up in public meetings or sitting in 
meetings with men in the past, but are now able to do these things. These women can argue 
and convincingly pursue their interests and those of the women they represent, thus meeting 
both practical and strategic gender needs by participating ‘actively’ and ‘interactively’ with 
men. They were motivated by their participation in local leadership and were able to 
challenge the community stereotypes of women leaders because the community recognised 
their potential. Some were also involved in mobilizing other women to be engaged in local 
politics and in the formation of women groups to help women earn additional incomes. RNS 
reported how she had facilitated the formation of a group of 15 women involved in a piggery 
project and another group of 30 women running a village community bank. At group 
meetings women discuss different issues including public services. These local organisations 
function as informal institutions for women to meet their practical gender needs, but also 
gradually encompass strategic gender needs.  
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4.6 Conclusion 
The foregoing discussion shows that decentralization reforms have created spaces for service 
users’ participation in the form of village assemblies, councils, committees, and consultations 
during preparation of annual village plans. Participation in these spaces is realized through 
attending meetings, construction of service infrastructures (through labour, cash or both), 
membership in committees, speaking up and influencing decisions in meetings. Attendance 
in lower-level hamlet and village meetings is higher compared to high-level district council 
meetings. The quota system imposed by the reforms of at least one-fourth women members 
in village councils and committees has contributed to increasing the proportion of women in 
the local structures, enabling some women to participate actively and to address both the 
practical and strategic gender needs. 
In some aspects, the factors constraining service users’ participation in these spaces 
are not gender specific, but are related to the institutional set-up and power levels. Villagers 
as principals, men and women alike, perceive themselves as having little influence on their 
agents. They participate passively, by consultation or through activity-specific spaces. Some 
constraints, however, are more specific to women. Despite their numerical strength in public 
meetings, most of them do not speak up and have low influence. Thus, there is a missing link 
between attendance and influence because women’s attendance in public meetings is gene-
rally ‘passive’. Indeed, speaking up and influencing decisions in public meetings is more 
complicated than just attending them. As has been found elsewhere in the world, village 
women tend not to speak in male-dominated forums even when they have something to say 
(Devas and Grant, 2003; Agarwal, 2010). Thus, it is relatively easy to increase the number 
and range of people who participate in local institutions, but much more difficult to increase 
the extent to which they influence decision making, due primarily to the local power struc-
tures that determine how decisions are made (Pennartz and Niehof, 1999; Conyers, 2007). 
While holding leadership positions in committees is an important indicator for effective 
women’s participation in local institutions (Agarwal, 2010), signifying a move towards the 
‘interactive’ form of participation, few women in fact hold leadership positions in village 
committees. The few who did were mostly present in the less influential ones. The patriarchal 
system is a major constraint to women’s effective participation, reflecting Sachs’s (2010) 
argument that patriarchy constantly reproduces itself and filters through the practices of male 
bureaucrats who are likely hold influential positions.  
The reforms have mainly focused on creating and strengthening formal institutions 
such as councils and committees, but not on addressing the informal power structures that 
influence the behaviour of the different actors in these institutions. The formal local structu-
res are more “responsive to informal institutions, systems, and relations of power than to 
formal rules and procedures” (Beall, 2005:257). Consequently, stereotypical behaviour and 
perceptions against women that exist within the community continue to be reflected in these 
spaces and influence decision-making processes. This interface between formal and informal 
institutions at the village level is to the advantage of men and limits capability women to 
participate effectively and to exercise their agency as principals in village decision-making 
spaces. While decentralization is thus carried out in the expectation that it can help to 
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address gender inequalities, it in fact often reproduces them, because the socio-cultural 
barriers that have long prevented women from effective participation in local decision-
making processes are not addressed.  
Gender roles and needs are given some consideration in organising public meetings 
and in reaching decisions on services that have direct implications for women’s lives. 
Women’s participation is thus in some way helping to address the practical gender needs in 
fields that both men and women consider a women’s domain. However, because the norms 
that justify social inequality have hardly changed, women’s opportunities to address their 
strategic gender needs are minimal. Few women leaders have the power and bargaining ability 
to ensure that women’s interests are reflected in decision-making processes, enabling them to 
participate ‘actively’ and ‘interactively’ and do something about both women’s practical and 
strategic gender needs. Activities and programs that contribute to women’s empowerment, 
such as local initiatives in the form of income generating activities, economic activities 
involving interactions with outsiders, and community awareness initiatives by NGOs and 
government agencies could all be seen as catalysts for change to address strategic gender 
needs.  
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Chapter 5 
Users’ perspectives on decentralized rural 
water services11 
 
This chapter examines the impact of decentralization reforms on improving access to domes-
tic water supply using a users’ and a gender perspective. The chapter addresses the question 
whether and to what extent the delivery of gender-sensitive water services to rural households 
improved after the reforms. Household- and village-level data were obtained through a house-
hold survey and qualitative methods. The findings show an increase of the proportion of 
households using improved sources of domestic water between 2002 and 2011. However, 
transaction costs in terms of distance and time to collect water are still major limitations. 
More than half of users travel over a kilometre and use more than an hour to collect water in 
the dry season. Despite the increased proportion of women in water management commit-
tees, the outcomes of these decentralized arrangements differ for men and women. Overall, 
the reforms have produced contradictory effects by improving access to water supply for some 
users, and creating or reinforcing existing inter- and intra-village inequalities. 
 
                                                 
11A shorter version of this chapter has been accepted as: Masanyiwa, Z.S., Niehof, A. and Termeer, 
C.J.A.M. Users’ perspectives on decentralized rural water services in rural Tanzania. Gender, Place and 
Culture . 
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5.1 Introduction  
In recent decades, the provision of domestic water has been high on the international 
development agenda. The International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade 
1981-1990 aimed to achieve full access to water and sanitation for all by 1990. These targets 
still are a top priority for development (Singh et al., 2005; Jiménez and Perez-Foguet, 2010a). 
The Dublin Principles of 1992 represented a re-orientation from the previous focus on the 
urban water supply sub-sector to rural water supply (Lane and Jarman, 1998; Jiménez and 
Perez-Foguet, 2010a). As part of the 7th Millennium Development Goal (MDG) the target is 
to reduce by half the proportion of people without access to safe drinking water and 
sanitation by 2015 (Gleitsmann et al., 2007; Falk et al., 2009; WHO and UNICEF, 2010; 
Wallace and Porter, 2010). In July 2010, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a 
resolution that “recognized the right to safe and clean drinking water and sanitation as a 
human right” (Sultana and Loftus 2012:1). These developments have entailed changes in the 
governance of domestic water supply in countries like Tanzania.  
 Water governance refers to the system of actors, resources, mechanisms and processes 
that mediate a society’s access to water (de Palencia and Perez-Foguet, 2011). Partly due to the 
failure of centralised government services to provide reliable water services, particularly in 
rural areas, in many countries water governance is currently shaped by decentralization 
processes (de Palencia and Perez-Foguet, 2011; UNESCO, 2012). It is argued that decentra-
lization has the potential to improve the allocative and productive efficiency of water services 
delivery, with potential benefits for women (UNESCO, 2012). Accordingly, the current 
emphasis is on participatory approaches involving users, planners and policy makers at all 
levels; recognising the role of women as providers, users and guardians of water; and seeing 
water as an economic good (Lane and Jarman, 1998; Wilder and Lankao, 2006; Laurie, 
2011). Service users are expected to initiate demand and implement and finance the long-
term delivery of water services (URT, 2002; Jiménez and Perez-Foguet, 2010a).The assump-
tion is that water systems are better designed, better maintained and better sustained if users 
are involved (Laurie, 2005). However, evidence shows that decentralization does not always 
result in improved rural water supply. In many cases, users’ participation is often understood 
in non-political ways with little understanding of how decentralization can translate into 
effective management and outcomes (Laurie, 2011).   
 At the same time, in the literature, there is considerable discussion on gender and 
water access and governance because water is a ‘gender issue’ (Wallace and Potter, 2010; 
Laurie, 2011). Men and women have different requirements for and access to water and, 
different roles and responsibilities in relation to water provision and management due to the 
gendered power relations at household and community levels (Wallace and Porter, 2010; 
Laurie, 2011). Women’s access to an improved, convenient, reliable and safe water source 
close to the home is recognised as a basic need (Singh et al., 2005; Wallace and Porter, 2010). 
The role of women as water providers and managers is well established in water literature. 
Women and girls do most of the domestic water collection, storage and household distri-
bution. Where no standpipes or other sources are available, they spend hours on this task 
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(Singh et al., 2005; IOB, 2007; Wallace and Porter, 2010; Laurie, 2011). Access to domestic 
water supply contributes to better health for women and families, thus, addressing women’s 
practical gender needs (Moser, 1993), and is critical for advancing the human rights of 
women (Brown, 2010). Women also participate in a range of water management institutions 
at the community level. Thus, they are key actors in water provision and management 
(Laurie, 2011). 
 Despite the recognition of the ‘gender-water nexus’ in national and international 
frameworks, gender issues remain under-theorized and marginal in much of the decentralized 
water literature. Historically, women’s interests have been under-represented in domestic 
water supply development interventions (Laurie, 2011). Recent studies have mostly focused 
on how to involve women in water management institutions. The commitment to being 
gender-sensitive in water projects has been narrowly translated into women’s participation in 
decentralised local institutions such as village water committees. Other dimensions of social 
differences that shape women’s access to water, are often overlooked (Harris, 2009; Cleaver 
and Hamada, 2010). Little attention has been paid to the workings of local level institutions 
and their impact on improving gender-sensitive access to water services. Evidence shows that 
women’s participation in decentralized water management structures does not necessarily 
lead to more gender-sensitive outcomes (Harris, 2009). In Tanzania, as in many other count-
ries, women function within a system of structural and gender-based inequality that in-
fluences their access to water, and their involvement in water governance (Brown, 2010).  
 This chapter contributes to this debate by examining the impact of decentralization 
reforms on service delivery outcomes in rural villages in Tanzania, using a users’ and a gender 
perspective. The two perspectives are relevant in providing contextual information on service 
users’ knowledge and experiences about local situations as beneficiaries of decentralised water 
services. The users’ perspective is a bottom-up perspective that emphasizes the interests of 
users in service delivery processes with the aim of the users taking control of and benefiting 
from these processes (Kabeer, 1992; Hardon-Baars, 1997). This perspective has mostly been 
applied in family planning studies (e.g. Bruce, 1980; Kabeer, 1992) and agricultural research 
and development (cf. Campilan, 1996; Hardon-Baars, 1996, 1997; Niehof et al., 2003). This 
article draws on the users’ perspective because the reforms aim at “bringing service manage-
ment and provision closer to the end-users” (URT, 2008a:6). In addition, though partly over-
lapping with the users’ perspective, the article incorporates a gender perspective because of 
the ‘gendered nature’ of water (cf. Brown, 2010; Wallace and Porter, 2010). 
 The chapter explores the question of to what extent the delivery of gender-sensitive 
domestic water services to rural households improved after the decentralization reforms. 
Gender-sensitive water services are defined as services that address the “gender-specific needs” 
of men and women “based on the goal of providing men and women with equal opportu-
nities to flourish in their productive and private lives” (World Bank, 2010:11). The next 
section puts the context of decentralised rural water supply in Tanzania in a historical pers-
pective that reflects changing national and international policies. 
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5.2 Historical overview of rural water supply in Tanzania 
Tanzania’s water sector reform needs to be understood in the context of new national and 
international approaches to public management (Batley, 2004; Larbi, 2005). Between the 
1960s and 1970s, the government and development partners implemented large water invest-
ment schemes aimed at delivering improved and safe water services to rural areas. In 1970, 
the central government took responsibility for operation and maintenance (O&M) due to a 
failure of LGAs to manage and maintain water infrastructures, and from this time on water 
became a ‘free good’ in rural areas (Cleaver and Toner, 2006; Jiménez and Pérez-Foguet, 
2010a). In 1971, a 20-year Rural Water Supply Program was launched with the aim of provi-
ding access to adequate, safe and reliable water supply to the whole population by 1991 
(URT, 2008b). This target was not attained: only 46 percent of the rural population had 
access to water supply in 1991 (World Bank, 1999). Unsustainability of water schemes due to 
lack of timely maintenance and repair was identified as the main problem (World Bank, 
1999; Kaliba et al., 2003; Cleaver and Toner, 2006). This situation was attributed to the lack 
of users’ participation, the use of inappropriate technologies, the use of top-down approaches 
and the lack of decentralization as a result of the abolishment of LGAs in 1972 (Kaliba et al., 
2003; Cleaver and Toner, 2006; URT, 2008b). 
 The water policy launched in 1991 emphasized community participation, decentra-
lized management, use of appropriate technology and cost sharing for rural water supply 
(URT, 2002). However, it failed to address the problems that had constrained earlier 
initiatives, such as non-involvement of the private sector, participation of users being limited 
to provision of free labour, and an inadequate legal and institutional framework. The policy 
was also implemented at a time when the country was undergoing major economic and socio-
political changes, including the structural adjustment programs that policy makers had to 
deal with (URT, 2008b). There were only limited improvements in rural water supply. 
Coverage did hardly increase (estimated at 50% in 2002) and, in some places, even 
deteriorated further (URT, 2002).  
 In 2002, a new water policy was launched as a response to the shortfalls identified in 
the 1991 policy. The 2002 policy recognizes access to clean and safe water as a basic need and 
right for all, and aims to provide adequate, affordable and sustainable water supply services to 
the rural population. It embodies principles of decentralization and subsidiarity in managing 
rural water services (URT, 2002, 2008b). The policy recognises women as “principal actors in 
the provision and management of water services” arguing that “rural water supply should be 
based on what both men and women in rural communities know, want and are able to 
manage, maintain and pay for” (URT, 2002:32,36). Consequently, delivery of rural water 
supply has been decentralised to local government authorities (LGAs) and the role of the 
central government has been confined to policy making, regulation, monitoring and perfor-
mance assessment (URT, 2002; IOB, 2007). In 2007, a twenty-year nationwide Water Sector 
Development Programme (WSDP) was launched following a pilot phase implemented 
between 2002 and 2007 in twelve districts (URT, 2008c). WSDP is implemented at village 
level, and LGAs are responsible for village selection, technical support and monitoring (IOB, 
2007; URT, 2008c; Masanyiwa et al., 2013). WSDP reflects the international shift in water 
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governance from an ‘interventionist’ state towards managing water services through poly-
centric governance (Cleaver and Toner, 2006; Falk et al., 2009; Termeer et al., 2010), and the 
wider public sector reforms in the country.  
 In Tanzania, water supply coverage in rural areas has only shown modest progress 
over the past two decades, from 48 percent in 1990 to 58 percent in 2010 (URT, 2008d, 
2010a, 2011a, 2011b), with average district coverage levels ranging from 37 percent to 96 
percent (URT, 2008d). However, only 21 percent of the 133 LGAs implementing WSDP 
have achieved the 65 percent coverage that was set for 2010 (URT, 2008d). In most districts, 
the outcomes of the reforms fall short of the expectations. Most of the data on water access 
only reflect the situation at district level based on the routine data system that monitors the 
presence and functionality of water infrastructure (URT, 2009b). Statistics on household-
level access to water based on national surveys also do not pay attention to gender differe-
nces, despite its ‘gendered nature’ (cf. Brown, 2010; Wallace and Porter, 2010).  
Studies on decentralized water services in Tanzania have revealed the limitations of 
decentralized structures in managing and improving equitable access to water (e.g. Cleaver 
and Toner, 2006) concluding that decentralization is not beneficial for citizens per se, as it 
creates opportunities for some and risks for others (e.g. Jiménez and Perez-Foguet, 2010b). 
Many studies, however, do not capture the ‘human factor’ of the process and outcomes of 
decentralization from the users’ perspective. Despite the assertions about the role of service 
users in managing water sources and in operation and maintenance, many studies often 
conceptualise service users as passive actors (Singh et al., 2005) or treat them as objects rather 
than subjects (Rakodi, 2000). Similarly, there is little gendered analysis on the impact of the 
reforms on service delivery outcomes. Thus, the question of the extent to which decentrali-
zation reforms have contributed to improving gender-sensitive access to water supply of rural 
households is a valid one. We pursue this question using the lenses of a users’ and a gender 
perspective, after a description of the methodology.    
5.3 Study area and methodology 
The fieldwork for this study was carried out between September 2011 and August 2012 in 
the rural districts of Kondoa and Kongwa in Dodoma region. The districts are located within 
the semi-arid zone of central Tanzania where ground water is the main source of water supply 
and is only found at a considerable high depth (Kaliba et al., 2003). Most rural water schemes 
here are either deep boreholes with mechanised pumps or gravity schemes. There are few 
shallow boreholes with hand pumps. During the rainy season, small sandy river beds and 
hand dug wells fill with water and become primary sources of water for many households. 
The two districts were among the twelve pilot districts for WSDP in 2003 before it was ex-
tended to other districts in 2007 (URT, 2008c). The study was carried out in ten villages (five 
in each district), purposively selected on the basis of their location within the district, type of 
water source and management arrangements for the sources. Six of the study villages had 
WSDP- constructed boreholes, two had gravity schemes and two depended on hand pumps 
and traditional sources. 
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 Many user-satisfaction studies use sample surveys to ascertain patterns of use and 
levels of satisfaction, but such methods provide little scope for the users to influence the 
research process (Rakodi, 2000). Also because the aim of this study was to analyse the 
qualitative impacts of decentralization, both quantitative and qualitative methods of data 
collection were used to enhance the validity and reliability of the results (cf. Scrimshaw, 
1990; Axinn and Pearce, 2006). A household survey was carried out in 332 households, 
involving 115 men and 217 women, using a structured questionnaire. Additionally, six focus 
group discussions (FGDs) were held with groups of men, women and village water 
committees (VWCs) in two villages in which 33 men and 21 women participated, and 
interviews were conducted with village leaders and district council officials to capture their 
perspectives. Non-participant observation was used throughout the research process to ascer-
tain availability and use of water sources in the study villages. Case studies of two villages 
were documented to obtain detailed qualitative information on water supply arrangements. 
Analysis of secondary data from district water departments and villages complemented the 
primary data. 
  Domestic water supply was defined as “water used for all usual domestic purposes 
including consumption, bathing and food preparation” (Howard and Bartram, 2003:2). 
Household access to domestic water supply was assessed in terms of type of water source, 
distance and time spent on collecting water, both in the rainy and dry seasons, and per capita 
water-use. The Tanzanian national water policy defines the minimum basic service level for 
domestic water supply in rural areas as “a protected, year-round supply of 25 litres of potable 
water per capita per day (lpcd) through water points located within 400 metres from the 
farthest homestead and serving 250 persons per outlet” (URT, 2002:34). Gender was opera-
tionalized in terms of division of labour in fetching domestic water, and the appropriateness 
of the location and technology of water sources to the needs of women and girls. The causal 
relations between the reforms and water supply were assessed in terms of improvements and 
satisfaction as perceived by the users.   
 The survey data were analysed at the household level and qualitative data at the 
village level. Frequency distributions, means and correlations were computed for most of 
survey variables. One-way analysis of variance was performed to compare means on distance, 
time and per capita water-use, and to determine statistically significant differences using the 
Tukey-HSD post-hoc test. Multiple linear regressions were run to identify the variables 
associated with quantity of water collected and users’ satisfaction. The qualitative data were 
transcribed and analysed using qualitative content analysis which helped to interpret and 
construct meanings from the text.  
5.4 The case villages  
5.4.1 The case of Songambele A 
Songambele A village is located 46km from Kongwa district headquarters along a gravel road 
to the neighbouring Kiteto district. The village has a population of 12,800 distributed over 
2,300 households and five hamlets. The main water source is an old borehole constructed in 
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1970. In the 2011/2012 financial year, the borehole was rehabilitated by the district council. 
There are three distribution points (DPs), also used by households in the neighbouring 
Songambele B village which was formerly part of Songambele A. Due to frequent break-
downs and the water demand exceeding the borehole supply capacity, many households use 
hand dug wells and sand river beds. Management of the borehole is through an elected VWC 
of 12 members: eight men and four women. Formerly, VWC members were responsible for 
supervising fetching of water at the DPs, collecting water user fees, monitoring cleanliness 
around the borehole, DPs and water reserve tanks, and doing minor repairs. More recently, 
the village council has contracted a private operator to run the borehole. The role of the 
VWC is now to supervise the provider to ensure a continuous flow of water and make sure 
that the private operator deposits 20 percent of the revenue collections to the village water 
bank account. Service users pay Tshs. 50 (US$ 0.03)12 per 20-litre bucket of water. There are 
no water metres at the DPs, so that the VWC cannot ascertain whether what is remitted by 
the private operator reflects the actual amount collected.  
 In the 2010/2011 financial year, the district council approved drilling of a second 
borehole to address the water problems in the village. The new borehole is meant to supply 
water in the two villages, and is planned to have three DPs and one cattle trough. Drilling of 
the borehole has been completed, but the construction of the water reserve tank, DPs and 
laying of the distribution network are yet to be accomplished. The two villages are required to 
raise Tshs. 17 million (US$ 10,888), which is five percent of the initial capital as required by 
the water policy. This was translated into Tshs. 4,000 (US$ 2.60) per household and Tshs. 
1,000 (US$ 0.60) per cow. Up to August 2012, almost two years since the start of the project, 
the village had not achieved the target: only four million (about 24% of the target) had been 
raised. Villagers blame their leadership for insufficiently coordinating the contributions, as 
some households have already contributed while others have not.   
5.4.2 The case of Humekwa  
Humekwa village is located 90km on the south of Kondoa district. The village has a 
population of 1,350 distributed over 300 households. There is one borehole that was 
constructed under WSDP in 2003. In the past, villagers depended on hand dug wells and 
they had to spend up to seven hours to get a bucket of water in the dry season. Villagers 
participated by contributing Tshs. 5000 (US$ 3.20) per adult household member and 
providing unskilled labour in digging trenches and collecting sand and stones. The borehole 
was planned to have one DP in each of the four hamlets, one in the primary school, and a 
cattle trough. Laying of the distribution network to DPs was, however, not completed. As a 
result, water is not pumped to the reserve tank and villagers have improvised one DP by 
cutting one of the pipelines at the centre of the village. The same DP is used by both 
domestic users and livestock. Village leaders are concerned about the contractor leaving the 
project unaccomplished, but could not intervene because the contractor was engaged and 
supervised by the district council. They have reported the matter to the district water 
                                                 
12 This is based on exchange rate of one US$ = 1561.42 Tanzanian Shillings (Tshs). 
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department, but no definite measures have been taken despite frequent promises from local 
politicians and district council officials to resolve the issue.  
 Water service provision is managed by the VWC, which is composed of 16 members: 
seven men and nine women. Two VWC members are on duty each week to oversee water 
provision and collect user fees. The VWC was trained by facilitators from the district council 
on management of the borehole, carrying out minor repairs, and safeguarding cleanliness 
around the borehole and reserve tank. Water users pay Tshs. 40 (US$ 0.03) per 20-litre 
bucket of water. Daily user fees collections range from Tshs. 2000 (US$ 1.30) during the 
rainy season to 50,000 (US$ 32) in the dry season. The water fees collected are kept by the 
VWC treasurer and are spent on buying diesel to run the water engine (about two litres per 
day), and on paying allowances to security guards and VWC members on supervision duty. 
The village has a water bank account, but it is inactive and the money collected is not 
banked. The amount collected during the rainy season is not enough to meet O&M expenses 
because of few water users, necessitating the borehole to be closed for a few months. It is 
revived again when the demand increases in the dry season.  
5.4.3 Discussion of the cases 
The two cases reveal the on-going decentralized interventions aimed at improving access to 
water services in rural villages. Both villages have boreholes with standing pipes as their main 
source of domestic water supply, although DPs do not cover all hamlets. Management of 
water sources is decentralised to village level institutions, either through the VWCs or private 
operators. These arrangements have largely transferred ownership, finance and management 
of water sources to users. Both men and women are represented in local water management 
committees. Elsewhere, we have shown that the proportion of women in VWCs in the study 
villages ranges from 20 percent to 56 percent (Masanyiwa et al., 2013). So, what are the 
perceptions of users on these decentralised arrangements, and to what extent do they ensure 
access to gender-sensitive domestic water supply? We address these questions in the following 
section that presents and discusses the results of the study, weaving together the survey and 
qualitative data. 
5.5 Results and discussion  
5.5.1 Main sources of domestic water supply 
The source of water is an important indicator of the suitability of the water for drinking and 
other domestic uses. Sources that are likely to provide suitable water for domestic use are 
classified as ‘improved sources’ and include household connections, public standpipe, 
borehole, protected well, protected spring and rain water harvesting (URT, 2008a, 2010b). 
Table 5.1 shows the changes in the number of improved water sources in both districts 
between 2003 and 2011, many of which constructed through the WSDP. The survey results 
showed that 61 percent and 65 percent of households used improved sources in the rainy 
and dry seasons, respectively. Significantly (p=0.00) more households in Kongwa used 
improved sources than in Kondoa in both seasons. Although the survey was conducted 
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during the dry season, the use of the main sources of domestic water appeared to be rather 
stable across the seasons: 87 percent of respondents were using the same sources throughout 
the year (94% in Kongwa and 73% in Kondoa). District data showed that the proportion of 
the population with access to domestic water supply from improved sources between 2002 
and 2011 increased from 23 percent to 34 percent in Kondoa and from 29 percent to 51 
percent in Kongwa. Still, overall coverage in both districts was below the national average of 
58 percent. Neither of the districts had met the national target of 65 percent that was set for 
2010, and are unlikely to meet the MDG target of 74 percent by 2015 (URT, 2010a, 2011a, 
2011b).   
Table 5.1: Improved water sources in Kondoa and Kongwa between 2003 and 2011 
District Type of source  2003 2011 Percentage increase 
Kondoa Borehole 73 136 86.3 
Shallow wells  71 201 183.1 
Gravity schemes 26 27 3.8 
Total  170 364 114.1 
Kongwa Boreholes 40 45 12.5 
Shallow wells  7 11 57.1 
Gravity schemes  6 10 66.7 
Total   53 66 24.5 
 
 Nevertheless, 45 percent of the households in Kondoa and 25 percent in Kongwa 
relied on unimproved water sources in the dry season. Survey results thus suggest that the 
high demand for improved sources at the village level has not been met. Each year, the 
district council selects only ten villages to receive WSDP support based on a combination of 
need and demand. In practice, however, village selection is mainly based on the ability of 
villagers to contribute part of the capital costs and to meet O&M costs (Brown, 2010; 
Masanyiwa et al., 2013). Villagers raise five percent of the total initial costs for borehole 
drilling, pump and engine installation, and water distribution. The actual amount depends 
on the depth of the borehole and the length of the distribution network, and the payment 
modalities as agreed by villagers in village assemblies (Masanyiwa et al., 2013). In some 
villages, contributions were organised at individual level requiring each adult household 
member to contribute; ranging from Tshs. 2000 (US$ 1.28) in Chamae to Tshs. 5000 (US$ 
3.20) in Humekwa. In others, the contribution was per household, and varied from Tshs. 
1500 (US$ 0.10) in Kidoka to Tshs. 8200 (US$ 5.25) in Potea. Jiménez and Perez-Foguet 
(2010b) found that the mechanisms for village selection and implementation of WSDP in 
LGAs perpetuate existing inequalities because they tend to favour bigger villages that are 
better connected to their district headquarters and have more influential politicians.  
 The village data on the population per water distribution point revealed that all study 
villages served more population per DP than the policy requirement of 250 persons per 
outlet (URT, 2002). Hence, the presence of an improved source in a village does not neces-
sarily ensure access for all households. The findings also contest the definition of access used 
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by district routine data which defines access to domestic water supply based on the number 
of households expected to utilise an improved source within a village (URT, 2009b). In this 
study, some households had limited access because DPs were inadequate to meet the actual 
village water requirements. For instance, most households in the remote hamlets of 
Miomboni, Mgomole and Mlimani in the village of Humekwa were too far from the DP and 
rarely used the borehole. In Songambele A, households in the hamlets of Masena and 
Chang’ombe relied on unimproved sources because the nearest DPs were more than five 
kilometres away.  
 To assess users’ perceptions on changes in the number of improved sources in their 
villages over the past ten years, respondents were asked to rank the change on a scale of one 
to four (from ‘deteriorated to ‘significantly improved’). The results revealed that 39 percent 
of users saw ‘no improvement’, while 37 percent indicated ‘some improvement’. Significantly 
(p=0.00) more users in Kondoa indicated either ‘no improvement’ or ‘deteriorated’ with a 
mean score of 2.4 (which could be interpreted as ‘no improvement’) than in Kongwa with a 
mean score of 2.7 (implying ‘somewhat improved’). There was no significant difference 
between the views of men and women, possibly because they were all using the same sources, 
whether improved or unimproved (Table 5.2).  
 The views of FGD participants support the survey findings. In Potea, women FGD 
participants explained that there was ‘moderate’ improvement in access to water services in 
their village. Before the construction of the new borehole, villagers depended on hand dug 
wells and had to travel to neighbouring villages in the dry season. Men FGD participants said 
that: “there is some improvement compared to the past when we had very serious water problems in this 
village. However, water is still insufficient to meet our daily needs.” In Kidoka, one woman VWC 
member told us that: “we no longer walk the five miles to Haneti village in the middle of the night 
escorted by our husbands to collect a bucket of water, like we used to do in the past.” A somewhat 
different picture was observed in Songambele A where women FGD participants explained 
that: “in the past we were getting sufficient water, but because our borehole is very old many distribu-
tion points are not functioning and the only three functional ones do not meet the demands of the village 
population.” Although a new borehole was under construction, most users in this village felt 
that the water supply had deteriorated over the past few years.  
Table 5.2: Users’ views on the change in numbers of improved sources by district and sex 
(n=331) 
Criteria Category Deteriorated No 
improvement 
Somewhat 
improved 
Significantly 
improved 
Mean 
score 
Chi-square 
values 
District  Kondoa 23(14.0) 71(43.3) 58(35.4) 12(7.3) 2.4 χ2=13.448, 
p=0.004*** Kongwa 13(7.8) 58(34.7) 64(38.3) 32(19.2) 2.7 
Both  36(10.9) 129(39.0) 122(36.9) 44(13.3) 2.5 
Sex Men 17(14.9) 44(38.6) 39(34.2) 14(12.3) 2.4 χ2=3.076, 
p=0.380 Women 19(8.8) 85(39.2) 83(38.2) 30(13.8) 2.6 
Both  36(10.9) 129(39.0) 122(36.9) 44(13.3) 2.5 
Figures in brackets are percentages.  ***Significant at 1% level.  
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5.5.2 Who fetches domestic water and how?  
In studying gender-water relations, it is important to understand who does what and how, 
and what such relations mean for access to gender-sensitive water services (Sultana, 2009). In 
this study, respondents were asked to rank the frequency of fetching water according to 
gender and age of household members on a scale of one to four (from ‘never at all’ to 
‘everyday’). Over half of respondents (57%) indicated that women were fetching water every 
day, followed by girls (20%) and 51 percent said men never fetched water at all. Women had 
the highest mean score (3.4), followed by girls (2.8), boys (2.0) and men (1.7). In most 
households (76%), water was carried on the head in a 20-litre bucket. Few households carried 
water both on the head and by bicycles (10%), eight percent used bicycles, and six percent 
used oxen or hand drawn carts. Male-headed households (32%) were significantly (p=0.00) 
more likely to use bicycles or carts to transport water than female-headed households (20%), 
possibly because female-headed households cannot afford these means of transport. Data on 
household income showed that female-headed households had a significantly (F(1,329)=4.872, 
p=0.03) lower mean annual income (Tshs. 261,875 or US$ 168) than male-headed house-
holds (Tshs. 825,606 or US$ 529). The means of transport was indeed a major issue for 
households living far away from improved sources, necessitating some of them to hire men 
with bicycles or carts to fetch water for them, especially in the dry season. 
 These findings corroborate earlier observations that women and girls in rural areas 
bear the primary responsibility for domestic water provision. In Shinyanga, IOB (2007) 
found that women fetched water more often than girls, boys or men, and girls ranked 
second. Thompson et al. (2003) show that the principal mode of domestic water transport 
has remained unchanged over the past three decades; women and children continue to walk 
from the source, carrying water on their heads. As a consequence, they are prone to health 
problems such as headaches, general fatigue and pains in the chest, neck and waist. PMO-
RALG (2006) explains that whether water is near or far, women have the responsibility to 
fetch and carry water for domestic uses on their heads, while men transport water on bicycles 
and mainly for sale. This reflects the central role played by women in domestic water 
provision (Lane and Jarman, 1998; Wilder and Lankao, 2006; Gleitsmann et al., 2007), 
which is often underpinned by socio-cultural norms and thus is a key gender issue. Men do 
not fetch domestic water as it is considered a ‘feminine’ duty (Sultana, 2009). 
5.5.3 Distance and time to main water sources 
The presence of an improved water source in a village is a poor measure of whether house-
holds have access to water (MoWLD et al., 2002). The effort required to fetch water may 
favour some households and exclude others from using the water source. Since there were no 
household connections in the study area, distance and time were used as indicators of the 
collection effort. Whereas the national water policy uses the indicator ‘within 400 metres’ 
from the household, none of the previous national surveys have used this indicator. The 
nearest coding bracket used is ‘within less than 1km’ (MoWLD et al., 2002). We used both 
distances to compare with previous studies and ascertain the extent to which the policy target 
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has been achieved. The findings showed that 52 percent and 48 percent of users collected 
water within less than 1km in the rainy and dry seasons, respectively. The mean distance to 
water sources was 1.2km in the rainy season and 1.3km in the dry season. Significantly 
(p=0.05) more users in Kongwa (54%) collected water within 1km than in Kondoa (43%) in 
the dry season. When the definition of access was narrowed down to include only those 
collecting water within 400 metres, only 37 percent and 35 percent of users had access to an 
improved source in the rainy and dry seasons, respectively.   
 Many service users (42%) indicated ‘no improvement’ in reducing distances to water 
sources over the past ten years and 38 percent reported ‘some improvement’. The views of 
users on this variable showed neither significant differences between districts nor between 
men and women. The mean scores for all groups were close to three, implying ‘some impro-
vement’ in reducing distances to water sources (Table 5.3). These findings show that despite 
the efforts in water infrastructure development as indicated in Table 5.1, the situation in 
some villages has not substantially changed. Over half of households (52%) still has to travel 
more than one kilometre to the nearest water point in the dry season, almost similar to what 
was reported by the household budget survey in 2007 (URT, 2007a).  
Table 5.3: Users’ views on reduced distance to sources by district and sex (n=331) 
Criteria Category Deteriorated No 
improvement 
Somewhat 
improved 
Significantly 
improved 
Mean 
score 
Chi-square  
values 
District  Kondoa 3(1.8) 74(45.1) 65(39.6) 22(13.4) 2.65 χ2=5.135, 
p= 0.162 Kongwa 6(3.6) 65(38.9) 60(35.9) 36(21.6) 2.76 
Both  9(2.7) 139(42.0) 125(38.0) 58(17.5) 2.70 
Sex Men 4(3.5) 52(45.6) 39(34.2) 19(16.7) 2.64 χ2=1.596, 
p= 0.660  Women 5(2.3) 87(40.1) 86(39.6) 39(18.0) 2.73 
 Both  9(2.7) 139(42.0) 125(38.0) 58(17.5) 2.70 
Figures in brackets are percentages. 
 
 In theory, the time spent on collecting water should be closely related to the distance 
from the source, but distance does not truly measure the collection effort because in many 
cases water users spend long times queuing (Thompson et al., 2003).  Hence, respondents 
were asked to indicate the time spent on a round trip i.e. going to the water source, waiting, 
collecting water and returning home. Less time required for water collection leaves more time 
for other economic activities for women as well as for children’s school attendance (MoWLD 
et al., 2002; URT, 2012). Since most national surveys in Tanzania use 30 minutes as a cut-off 
point in defining having access to an improved source (MoWLD et al., 2002; URT, 2007a, 
2010b, 2012), we adopted this as well for reasons of comparison.  
 The results showed that 56 percent and 53 percent of users were getting water within 
30 minutes in the rainy and dry seasons, respectively. Significantly (p=0.00) more households 
(64%) in Kongwa collected water within 30 minutes than in Kondoa (42%) in the dry season. 
Female-headed households used more time (57min in the rainy and 59min in the dry season) 
than male-headed households (49min in the rainy and 54min in the dry seasons). As shown 
above, about one third of male-headed households used bicycles or carts to transport water. 
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The mean time used to collect water from improved sources in the dry season was significant-
ly (F(1,329)=25.209, p=0.00) lower (43min) than from unimproved sources (76min). At national 
level, URT (2012) shows that 47 percent of rural households had access to improved sources 
within 30 minutes in 2010, which was 28 percent in 2007. 
 The time spent on water collection can be a substantial burden, particularly for those 
who spend more than one hour on a round trip. The mean collection times in the study area 
are higher than those reported by IOB (2007), which were 27 minutes and 48 minutes for 
improved and unimproved sources, respectively. Estimations based on the amount of dome-
stic water collected per household per day showed that on average, households make up to 
five trips to the water source per day. In all villages and hamlets without improved sources, 
women were concerned about the long time they ‘wasted’ on water collection at the expense 
of other household activities. In Songambele A, women interviewees reported spending more 
than one hour on a round trip, whereas this was up to six hours in Mulua. In Humekwa, a 
woman interviewee stated that: “we spend many hours fetching water because there is only one stand 
point which is too far from most households.” 
 Thompson et al. (2003) show that on average households in East Africa make about 
four round trips of water collection per day, which could mean a time expenditure of about 
three hours when using improved sources and five hours for unimproved sources in the dry 
season. More critically, this burden falls disproportionately on women and girls. In Tanzania, 
the Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (2009) shows that on average, women aged 
18–49 years spend 277 minutes (more than four hours) on unpaid work including water 
collection each day, compared to only 76 minutes for men. Thus, women’s workload is much 
heavier than men’s. This parallels studies on time use and unpaid work elsewhere, which 
show that “women tend to spend substantially more time than men on both household 
maintenance and care of persons across all countries” (Budlender, 2012 as cited in Kidder, 
2013:607).   
5.5.4 Per capita quantity of water collected  
The quantity of water collected and used by households is an important measure of domestic 
water supply because it depends on accessibility as determined by distance, time, reliability 
and cost (Howard and Bartram 2003). There are different minimum threshold levels on the 
quantity of water that is required to meet domestic uses and promote good health, some 
suggesting at least 20 lpcd (e.g. World Bank, 2004) and others 25 lpcd (e.g. URT, 2002). 
Howard and Bartram (2003) propose four ‘service levels’ instead of a specific quantity of 
water used. They include ‘no access’ (less than 5 lpcd), ‘basic access’ (unlikely to exceed 20 
lpcd), ‘intermediate access’ (50 lpcd) and optimal access (100 lpcd or more). In this study, the 
mean quantity of water collected was 19 lpcd (18 lpcd in Kongwa and 20 lpcd in Kondoa). 
The majority of households (74%) collected 5-20 lpcd, the ‘basic access’ level of Howard and 
Bartram (2003) but below the national threshold of 25 lpcd (URT, 2002). URT (2002) shows 
that water usage in rural areas ranges from 5 lpcd in acutely water scarce areas to 30 lpcd in 
other areas. Thompson et al., (2003) indicate that households using unpiped water use an 
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average of 19.7 lpcd. A recent study found that rural Ugandans use an average of 15.4 lpcd 
regardless of the time and distance to the source (Mellor et al., 2012).  
 Per capita water usage was significantly (F(2,329)=5.902, p=0.00) associated with house-
hold size. Small households (1-3 members) used a significantly larger quantity per person (27 
lpcd) than medium size households with 4-6 members (19 lpcd) and large households with 
seven or more members (15 lpcd). A post-hoc Tukey-HSD test confirmed the significance of 
the differences. Further analysis using linear regression (Table 5.4) revealed that households 
involved in brewing activities collected large quantities of water, not only for this economic 
activity but also for domestic uses. The short distance to unimproved sources in the rainy 
season influenced households to collect large quantities of water. Time used to fetch water in 
the dry season was also a key determinant for the quantity of water collected. These findings 
contest those of IOB (2007) and Mellor et al. (2012) who found that the amount of water 
collected is not correlated with distance and time. In this study, both distance and time were 
associated with seasonality. However, the findings confirm the conclusion by WHO and 
UNICEF (2010) that households spending more than half an hour per round trip are likely 
to collect less water and may fail to meet their households’ minimum daily requirements.  
Table 5.4: Variables associated with quantity of water collected (n=331) 
Explanatory variable  B coefficient Std. Error p-value 
Household size -12.289 4.398 0.027** 
User fee per 20-litre bucket 0.091 0.011 0.000*** 
Age of household head 3.487 0.374 0.000*** 
Non-farm activities (1=brewing) 10.554 1.693 0.000*** 
Distance to water source in rainy season  44.329 8.455 0.001*** 
Time used to fetch water in dry season -0.706 0.097 0.000*** 
Constant  -32.978 15.307 0.068 
R2 = 0.963. F(6,13)=30.101,  p=0.000. **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1% level.  
5.5.5 Payment arrangements for water services 
The payment arrangements for water services to meet O&M costs depended on the type of 
water source in the village as agreed by users in village assemblies. In villages with pumped 
boreholes, users paid a fixed amount per a 20-litre bucket on a ‘pay as you fetch’ basis. The 
price ranged from Tshs.20 in Kidoka to Tshs.50 in Songambele A and the mean was Tshs.32. 
In villages with hand pumps (Mulua and Khubunko), water was provided free of charge, but 
ad hoc contributions were solicited from users in case of pump breakdowns to meet 
maintenance costs. Two of the study villages had gravity schemes, with different payment 
arrangements. In Sagara A, users paid Tshs. 50 on a ‘pay as you fetch’ basis, while in Mlanga 
water was provided free of charge. Comparatively, users in Kongwa paid significantly 
(F(1,180)=6.326, p=0.01) higher user fees (Tshs.36) than in Kondoa (Tshs.27). Based on the 
total amount of domestic water collected per household per day, households spent an average 
of Tshs. 182 per day on water services. In all villages, the elderly and people with disabilities 
were exempted from paying user fees.   
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 A large majority of users (92%) indicated that they were able to afford the user fee. 
Male-headed households (93%) were more likely to afford water user fees than female-headed 
households (81%). Those who could not afford the fees relied on unimproved sources of 
water, which were likely to be contaminated, hence posing health risks to users. This 
challenges the concept of access to domestic water as a basic need and human right, especially 
where the inability to pay is due to poverty (Rakodi, 2000). Since the Dublin Principles of 
1992 that, in part, framed water as an economic good, studies have shown that full cost 
recovery improves access for those who can afford to pay, excluding the poor from water 
provision (Sultana and Loftus, 2012). Thus, the ‘right’ to water is to affordable water, hence 
subjective and ambiguous. 
 The FGDs revealed that most users were willing to pay user fees as long as water 
supply was assured. Many users felt responsible for meeting O&M costs through user fees in 
order to sustain water infrastructures and have a reliable water supply. Kaliba et al. (2003) 
found that water users in central Tanzania are willing to contribute more resources to 
improve services especially in villages where there is a strong users’ satisfaction. But our find-
ings also indicate that user fees may reinforce gender inequalities of access to water services 
because in most households women have limited access to and control over financial 
resources. In this study, 74 percent of respondents in the male-headed households reported 
that men paid the user fee. This suggests that women are largely dependent on men for access 
to and control over domestic water supply (cf. Cleaver and Hamada, 2010, Laurie, 2011).  
 There were widespread complaints about the lack of transparency from village leaders 
on the management and allocation of the generated revenues. In villages without private 
operators, revenues collected from user fees were low and hardly enough to buy diesel. They 
were mostly kept by VWC treasurers and could hardly be accounted for. A woman FGD 
participant in Potea complained: “We buy up to eight buckets of water per household per day. We 
wonder why there are frequent pump breakdowns despite all the money they [village leaders] collect, 
which we don’t know how it is spent.” Although village leaders are required to give financial 
reports (including on water fees revenues) in village assemblies, which are held every three 
months, this was rarely done in most villages. Villages using private operators seemed to be 
successful in collecting higher revenues to cover fuel costs and ensure timely banking. District 
council officials preferred private operators to VWCs due to better cost recovery for O&M. 
VWCs were said to be ineffective because of interferences from village councils and local 
policians. Rakodi (2000) points out that day-to-day management of water services is likely to 
be more efficient if it is distanced from the political arena.  
5.5.6 Appropriateness of water sources to women  
Most users viewed water sources as either ‘appropriate’ or ‘very appropriate’ to women and 
girls: 70 percent for the source location and 80 percent for the source type. There were 
significant differences on users’ views on ‘appropriateness’ between districts, but not between 
men and women (Tables 5.5 and 5.6). Users who saw water sources as ‘not appropriate’ were 
mainly concerned with long distances to DPs, long waiting queues especially in the dry 
season, and multiple use of sources. The majority (74%) of respondents collected domestic 
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water from sources that were also used for other purposes, mainly watering livestock, brick-
making and gardening. Our interviews with district water engineers revealed that water for 
livestock was considered in the design and construction of rural water schemes by ensuring 
that each borehole has a cattle trough. However, we observed that many cattle troughs were 
not functioning, and where they did, it took considerable time and diesel to pump water to 
fill them. In Potea, VWC members explained that the gate valve was broken and, therefore, 
water was not pumped to the cattle trough. In Humekwa, where the same DP was used by 
both livestock and domestic users, one woman leader remarked: “Men force to water their cattle 
first and women have to wait.” Mulua village had a more critical situation with only one hand 
pump located downstream close to a sandy river. The VWC members told us that “between 
September and November, people walk up to six kilometres to the well, mostly at night because of very 
long queues in the day. There are many conflicts between domestic users (women) and livestock keepers 
(men) at the well, each struggling to get this limited resource.” A female VWC member added: 
“Livestock keepers spend the whole night watering their livestock. When we go to fetch water in the 
morning, we either find it very dirty or there is no water at all. The only option we have is to fetch water 
at night which is very risky to women and children.” 
Table 5.5: Users’ views on the appropriateness of water sources to women by district (n=332) 
Criteria Ranking Kondoa Kongwa Both Chi-square 
values  
Location of 
water source 
Not appropriate  65(39.6) 33(19.8) 98(29.5) χ2=20.735 
p= 0.000*** Appropriate 64(39.0) 105(62.9) 169(50.9) 
Very appropriate 35(21.3) 30(17.9) 65(19.6) 
Mean score  1.82 1.98 1.90 
Type of water 
source 
Not appropriate  47(28.7) 20(12.0) 67(20.2) χ2=18.717 
p= 0.000*** Appropriate 83(50.6) 121(72.5) 204(61.4) 
Very appropriate 34(20.7) 27(16.1) 61(18.4) 
Mean score  1.92 2.04 2.12 
Figures in brackets are percentages. ***Significant at 1% level. 
 
 These findings show that the ‘gender inappropriateness’ of water sources in the study 
area is not about the design or technology of the source (cf. Regmi and Fawcet, 1999; Singh 
et al., 2005; Gleitsmann et al., 2007), but has to do with inadequate number of DPs, their 
location within the village, and the multiple uses of sources. Men and women alike judge the 
appropriateness of a source by women’s ease of access to water rather than technological 
design. The findings also show that women’s gender needs of having access to domestic water 
conflicts with men’s productive gender needs. Because of the socio-cultural norms and power 
relations in the community, women are more likely to lose out in the process. Brown (2010) 
found that in a number of cases where new boreholes had been constructed, water use was 
prioritised for brick-making or agricultural activities, supporting men’s ability to generate 
income while undermining women’s access to domestic water. Indeed, as Laurie (2011:178) 
posits: “gender roles and relations around water are neither fixed nor separate from wider 
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socio-economic livelihood issues.” Thus, decentralized water arrangements can lead to 
different outcomes for men and women reflecting social relations and processes in the 
community (Cleaver and Hamada, 2010).   
Table 5.6: Users’ perceptions on gender appropriateness of water sources by sex (n=332) 
Criteria Ranking Men Women Both Chi-square 
values 
Location of 
water source 
Not appropriate  32(28.1) 66(30.4) 98(29.5) χ2=0.326 
p= 0.850 Appropriate 59(51.8) 110(50.7) 169(50.9) 
Very appropriate 24(20.9) 41(18.9) 65(19.6) 
Mean score  1.92 1.89 1.90 
Type of water 
source 
Not appropriate  21(18.4) 46(21.2) 67(20.2) χ2=0.655 
p= 0.721 Appropriate 74(64.9) 130(59.9) 204(61.4) 
Very appropriate 20(17.4) 41(18.9) 61(18.4) 
Mean score  1.98 1.98 1.98 
Figures in brackets are percentages. 
5.5.7 Users’ satisfaction with water services  
More than two thirds (68%) of users were either ‘satisfied’ or ‘very satisfied’ with the water 
services, which is above the national average of 42 percent (URT, 2009b). The levels of 
satisfaction differed significantly (p=0.03) between districts, but not between men and women 
(Table 5.7). The high proportion of satisfied users could imply that they acknowledge some 
improvements in water supply in recent years due to WSDP interventions. The mean dista-
nce to water sources in the dry season was significantly (F(1,330)=5.546, p=0.00) higher for users 
‘not satisfied at all’ (1.5km) than those ‘very satisfied’ (0.5km). The mean water collection 
time in the dry season was also significantly different between the groups (F(1,330)=22.898, 
p=0.00). Users who were ‘very satisfied’ spent 22 minutes, significantly less than the 51 
minutes for the ‘somewhat satisfied’ and 80 minutes for users ‘not satisfied at all’. The mean 
user fee was significantly (F(1,330)=7.026, p=0.00) lower for the ‘very satisfied’ users (Tshs.25) 
than the ones who were ‘somewhat satisfied’ (Tshs.30) and  ‘not satisfied at all’ (Tshs.45).  
Table 5.7: Users’ satisfaction with domestic water supply by district and sex (n=332) 
Criteria Category Not satisfied  
at all 
Somewhat 
satisfied 
Very satisfied Chi-square 
values  
District  Kondoa 61(37.2) 79(48.2) 24(14.6) χ2=7.250 
p= 0.027** Kongwa 44(26.2) 83(49.4) 41(24.4) 
Both  105(31.6) 162(48.8) 65(19.6) 
Sex Men 34(29.6) 57(49.6) 24(20.9) χ2=0.408 
p= 0.816 Women 71(32.7) 105(48.4) 41(18.9) 
Both   105(31.6) 162(48.8) 65(19.6) 
Figures in brackets are percentages. **Significant at 5% level.  
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 The regression results (Table 5.8) show that seasonality had an influence on users’ 
satisfaction. Users who used the same source throughout the year were more likely to be 
satisfied than the ones who switched to unimproved sources in the rainy season. The time 
used to fetch water in the rainy season was shorter than in the dry season, which had an 
influence on users’ satisfaction. Location of the water source was also an important determi-
nant of users’ satisfaction. The World Bank (2010) found that users’ satisfaction with drink-
ing water supply in rural India did not depend on household characteristics but on the 
household’s location in the village because of its implications for the distance to the source 
and the time to collect water, variables which feature prominently in this study as well. The 
level of users’ trust in the water pump attendant also influenced users’ satisfaction since 
pump attendants interact with users at the point of service delivery. This user-provider 
relationship, whether good or bad, has implications for how users perceive the service.  
 The ability of service users to complain about the situation of water supply also 
featured as a crucial factor. The majority of the ‘dissatisfied’ users (79%) complained about 
the situation mostly to village leaders (64%), in public meetings (12%), to ward councillors 
(10%), district council officials (8%) or to their members of parliament (7%). Female-headed 
households (38%) were more likely to complain than male headed-households (31%), presu-
mably because of domestic water supply being seen as ‘feminine’. Domestic water supply is 
considered a ‘women’s domain’ and it is the women who talk about it in public meetings. 
These findings show that there are some formal mechanisms through which users can 
exercise voice and demand accountability from service providers and local politicians, which 
is an important success factor for decentralised service delivery (Rakodi, 2000).  
Table 5.8: Variables associated with user’s satisfaction with water services (n=330) 
Explanatory variable  B coefficient Std. Error p-value 
Sex of respondent (1=female) -0.033 0.058 0.568 
Household size -0.010 0.012 0.398 
Water source used throughout the year (1=yes) 0.219 0.086 0.011*** 
Appropriateness of source location  (1= appropriate) 0.121 0.070 0.000*** 
Time to fetch water in rainy season 0.002 0.001 0.000*** 
Level of trust to water pump attendant (1= to a large 
extent) 
0.210 0.063 0.001*** 
Need to improve water services (1=yes) 0.208 0.066 0.002*** 
Ability to complain if not satisfied (1=yes) 0.783 0.064 0.000*** 
Constant  0.455 0.196 0.021** 
R2 = 0.531, F(8,327)=45. 088, p=0.000. **Significant at 5% level.  ***Significant at 1% level.  
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the impact of decentralization reforms on rural water supply using 
a users’ and a gender perspective. The findings show that the evidence is mixed. On a 
positive note, the numbers of improved sources have increased in both districts, as have the 
proportions of households using these sources. Management of water sources is decentralised 
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to village level institutions with technical inputs from the district water departments. Most 
users are willing to pay user fees, which reveals responsibility among users and an increased 
efficiency of the system. However, the inadequacies in water sources management and the 
lack of transparency from village leaders give rise to frequent complaints. Theoretically, 
decentralised service delivery should improve accountability mechanisms and responsiveness 
to users’ complaints (Rakodi, 2000). The concerns of water users require context specific 
solutions. The inability of village leaders and district council officials to respond promptly to 
users’ concerns challenges the notion that local governments are more likely to be responsive 
to local needs. District councils and village leaders need to respond better to users’concerns. 
 The reforms have also reinforced the existing inter- and intra-village inequalities in 
access to domestic water supply. Since district councils do not have the financial and tech-
nical capacity to support water projects in all villages, many villages are yet to benefit from the 
WSDP and still depend on unimproved sources. Within the villages with improved sources, 
not all households have access to these due to inadequate numbers of DPs and their location 
within the village. There are also inequalities between those who can afford to pay water user 
fees and those who cannot, and thus compelling the latter to rely on unimproved sources. 
This shows that the intra-village inequalities have not been addressed by the reforms, which 
supports the argument by Cleaver and Toner (2006) that local level governance cannot be 
automatically assumed to overcome inequalities in distribution and access to water.  
 The findings also show the overlap and differences between the users’ and the gender 
perspective. In terms of governance, the reforms have been successful in increasing women’s 
representation in village water committees. However, the outcomes of these decentralized 
arrangements differ between men and women due to social relations at the local level. 
Women and girls are the main drawers of domestic water and carry it mostly on their heads, 
whereas men and boys do it ‘occasionally’ and mostly use bicycles or carts. Many female-
headed households are disadvantaged in several ways: they live far away from improved water 
sources, have no means to transport water, and, therefore, need to make multiple trips and 
spend more time on water collection, and are unable to pay water user fees. Because of this, 
many of them may not collect sufficient water for domestic uses.  
 Women’s practical gender needs to have adequate access to domestic water 
sometimes conflict with men’s gender needs for water for livestock or brick-making. This 
problem is escalated by the rising number of cattle. Especially in the dry season when there is 
water scarcity, the increased water requirement for livestock competes with domestic water 
needs. Although productive water needs (men’s domain) and domestic water needs (women’s 
domain) are both in the common interest of the household, it is women and girls who carry 
the immediate burden of domestic water provision. Thus, the competing priorities over water 
use between men and women at household and village levels are not resolved by the reforms 
to ensure that water services are actually ‘gender-sensitive’. Domestic water is considered a 
‘women’s domain’, but not a domain with priority.  Equitable access to water supply by 
women is, therefore, necessary for women to meet their practical gender needs and contri-
bute to their household’s health and welfare. Thus, policy makers and actors at different 
levels should create the necessary conditions for ensuring that women play a central role in 
setting priorities and in managing water facilities so as to enable them to have influence and 
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control over the services, for the well-being of their own households and that of the 
community.
 
  
 95 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 
A gendered users’ perspective on 
decentralized primary health services13 
 
 
This chapter draws on a gendered users’ perspective to address the question whether the 
delivery of gender-sensitive primary health services has improved after the reforms. The 
chapter is based on empirical data collected through a household survey, interviews, focus 
group discussions, case studies and analysis of secondary data. The analysis shows that the 
reforms have generated mixed effects: they have contributed to improving the availability of 
health facilities in some villages but have also reinforced inter-village inequalities. Men and 
women hold similar views on the perceived changes and appropriateness to women on a 
number of services. Gender inequalities are, however, reflected in the significantly low mem-
bership of female-headed households in the community health fund and their inability to pay 
the user fees, and in the fact that women’s reproductive and maternal health needs are as yet 
insufficiently addressed. Although over half of users are satisfied with the services, more 
women than men are dissatisfied. The reforms appear to have put much emphasis on buil-
ding health infrastructure and less on quality issues as perceived by users. 
                                                 
13This chapter has been published as: Masanyiwa, Z.S., Niehof, A. and Termeer, C.J.A.M. (2013). A 
gendered users’ perspective on decentralized primary health services in rural Tanzania. The 
International Journal of Health Planning and Management. DOI:10.1002/hpm.2235. 
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6.1 Introduction 
Over the past few decades, Tanzania has implemented major health sector reforms (HSRs) in 
a context of decentralization. At the same time, compared to other components of HSRs14, 
there is considerable attention in the health management literature on decentralization, 
usually as part of the broader political and economic reforms (Cassels, 1995; Jeppsson and 
Okuonzi, 2000; Bossert and Beauvais, 2002; Lambo and Sambo, 2003; Elsey et al., 2005; 
Hutchinson et al., 2006; Bossert and Mitchell, 2011). Decentralization, a process which 
involves the transfer of the fiscal, administrative and political authority from the central 
government to local governments, is viewed as a strategy for improving the access, equity and 
quality of primary health services. Its proponents argue that decentralization has the potential 
to improve the allocative efficiency, accountability and responsiveness of health services to 
users, thus improving the user-provider interactions (Akin et al., 2005; UNICEF, 2007; 
Guanais and Macinko, 2009). It is expected that local governments will more frequently 
involve users in priority setting and decision making than central governments (Jeppsson and 
Okuonzi, 2000; Bossert and Beauvais, 2002; Lambo and Sambo, 2003; Akin et al., 2005; 
Elsey et al., 2005). Despite the extensive theoretical support for the positive effects of 
decentralization, there is limited evidence of a positive impact on primary healthcare services. 
Thus, whether the expectations are justified, is an issue that warrants investigation. 
 When applying a users’ perspective to investigate this, the factor of gender should be 
considered because of the different health needs of men and women, their unequal control 
over household resources to allocate to healthcare, and the gendered division of labour in 
care work (Standing, 1997; Vlassoff and Moreno, 2002; Niehof, 2004; Razavi, 2007). Gender 
refers to “the different cultural roles and expectations of men and women” that are socially 
constructed (van Wijk et al., 1996:708; Vlassof and Moreno, 2002). In the health sector, 
gender is an important variable because it affects men’s and women’s access to healthcare, 
healthcare-seeking behaviour, health status and the way health policies and programmes are 
designed and implemented (Vlassof and Moreno, 2002). Women users have different 
biological-based health needs, particularly regarding reproductive and maternal health, and 
because their access to health services is affected by gender inequalities. In this, gender also 
intersects with other inequalities and disadvantages in healthcare such as those deriving from 
age, class, religion and ethnicity (van Wijk et al., 1996; Standing, 1997; Sen and Östlin, 
2008). In 1994, the Cairo International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) 
recognised “women’s health needs and well-being as important in their own right, not as a 
means towards the ends of fertility reduction or child health” (DeJong, 2000:945). Because 
women’s access to and utilization of health services are influenced by cultural and ideological 
factors, gender-sensitive healthcare should take into account the socially constructed and 
culturally underpinned differences between men and women (van Wijk et al., 1996; 
Standing, 1997; Vlassof and Moreno, 2002; Sen  and Östlin, 2008). However, as Vlassof and 
                                                 
14Cassels (1995) outlines six components of HSRs, namely: improving the performance of civil 
service, decentralization, improving the functioning of national ministries of health, broadening 
health financing options, introducing managed competition, and working with the private sector. 
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Moreno (2002) show, gender roles and needs, and in particular women’s roles and needs, 
although central to decentralization processes, have been largely ignored in many studies. In 
this chapter, we intend to address this gap by applying a gendered users’ perspective in in-
vestigating the effects of the decentralization processes in the health sector in a rural area in 
Tanzania.  
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. The following section explains the 
theory and practice of decentralization in Tanzania, identifies gaps in the literature, and 
outlines the objectives of the study. We then explain how we measured the key concepts and, 
subsequently, describe the methodology and the detailed case studies. In the next section, we 
present and discuss the results. First, we provide a general picture of the health services 
situation in the study area since the implementation of the decentralization reforms. Then, 
we focus on the gendered users’ perspective, with particular emphasis on women users. The 
chapter concludes with a reflection on the results of the research regarding the question 
whether the users of healthcare services, and in particular women, experience the intended 
benefits of the decentralization reforms.   
6.2 Theory and practice of health sector reforms in Tanzania 
The current reforms in Tanzania aim at improving the access and quality of primary 
healthcare services by strengthening the planning and management capacity of local 
government authorities (LGAs), and through construction, rehabilitation, extension and 
provision of equipment to health facilities (URT, 2007b). Like in other developing countries, 
the reforms were implemented in the context of already declining public services due to the 
economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s (World Bank, 1999, 2004; Batley, 2004; Ahmad et 
al., 2005; Mehrotra, 2006). In practice, decentralization has meant the transfer of the 
administration and management of primary health services from the Ministry of Health and 
Social Welfare (MoHSW) to LGAs, health facilities and users (Munishi, 2003; URT, 2003, 
2007b; Mamdani and Bangser, 2004; Mubyazi et al., 2004; Semali et al., 2005; Boon, 2007; 
COWI and EPOS, 2007). The national health policy spells out that health services at district 
level have been devolved to LGAs to increase their mandate in health services provision. 
Under this arrangement, it is the duty of the LGAs to ensure that health facilities and 
services at the district and lower levels are of acceptable quality and managed by qualified 
personnel according to staffing levels set by the Ministry of Health (URT, 2003). 
 In Tanzania, primary healthcare facilities form the base of the pyramidal structure of 
health services, which is made up of dispensaries, health centres and district hospitals (URT, 
2003, 2007b; Maluka et al., 2010). In 2007, there were 4679 dispensaries, 481 health centres 
and 95 district hospitals. Although the private sector is also involved in health services 
provision, the government still owns 64 percent of all health facilities (URT, 2007b). Thus, 
the government remains a major provider of primary health services, especially in rural areas. 
To test the validity of the assumptions of the positive effects decentralization from a gendered 
users’ perspective, it is important to understand how decentralization works and whether it 
contributes to improved services at the local level.  
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 A few studies have investigated different aspects of the reforms. Examples include 
studies focusing on decentralized healthcare financing through a community health fund 
(Munishi, 2003; Kamuzora and Gilson, 2007), the impact of decentralization on the control 
of communicable diseases (Mubyazi et al., 2004), stakeholder involvement in a decentralized 
programme on immunization (Semali et al., 2005), accountability and representation in 
health boards and committees (Boon, 2007), and the effects of decentralization on recrui-
tment and distribution of health workers (Munga et al., 2009). However, little is known 
about the impact of the reforms on the access, quality and appropriateness of primary health 
services in rural areas from a users’ perspective. Similarly, the possible implications of the 
reforms for gender-sensitive health services have received almost no attention. A joint 
external evaluation of the health sector (COWI and EPOS, 2007:95) attests that “gender is 
not regularly discussed or considered relevant in efforts to improve health service quality.”  
 This chapter, therefore, aims to gain insight into the impact of decentralization 
reforms on access, quality and appropriateness of primary healthcare services using a gender-
ed users’ perspective. It focuses on the questions of whether the delivery of primary 
healthcare services has improved for users after the decentralization reforms, and whether 
these services can be considered gender-sensitive. Gender-sensitive healthcare can be defined 
as care that is “available, accessible, affordable, appropriate and acceptable” for general as well 
as gender-specific health needs of men and women (van Wijk et al., 1996:708). A gender-
sensitive healthcare takes into account the socially constructed gender differences between 
men and women in all aspects of care including curative health, preventive health, infor-
mation and education, infrastructure, policy making and financing (van Wijk et al., 1996). 
Additionally, access to and appropriateness of health services might be evaluated differently 
by men and women since they are positioned differently in relation to healthcare services, 
and are more likely to experience different specific barriers (Standing, 1997).  
6.3 Measuring the effects of decentralization on health services  
In this study, the impact of decentralization reforms on primary healthcare services was 
measured with regard to access, quality and appropriateness for users of the services, with a 
particular focus on women users. Access was measured in terms of availability of health facili-
ties, distance to the facilities, cost sharing arrangements and users’ ability to pay. Following 
Standing (1997:3), we see ‘access’ as a useful and straightforward concept to operationalize 
especially from a gender perspective because it emphasizes the “problems of access and under-
utilization of health services by women.” The causal relations between the reforms and 
improved quality of services was assessed in terms of users’ perceived changes on seven 
indicators: drug availability, availability of essential facilities, availability of health staff, their 
trustworthiness, proximity of the health facility, quality of health facility buildings and 
availability of health related information, and their levels of satisfaction. Our focus was on 
the ‘perceived quality’ of care from the viewpoint of users and not the ‘technical’ aspects of 
care (Gilson et al., 1994; Atkinson and Haran, 2005).  
In this study, gender was conceptualised in terms of men’s and women’s access to 
gender-sensitive and affordable primary healthcare, and the gendered division of labour 
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within the household. In turn, this was assessed by comparing the views of men and women 
on the perceived changes on the different aspects of health and healthcare, and on the 
deemed appropriateness for women of seven health services: antenatal, delivery, postnatal, 
family planning, immunization, child health, and treatment of common diseases. Despite the 
challenges of conceptualizing and operationalizing a gendered analysis especially in a context 
where women are more disadvantaged than men, we argue that a comparative analysis of 
men’s and women’s views is useful in revealing the gendered users’ perspective.   
6.4 Study design and methodology 
The research on which this chapter is based was carried out between 2011 and 2012 in two 
rural districts, Kondoa and Kongwa, in the Dodoma Region, central Tanzania. The study 
used an embedded case study design with units of analysis at three levels: district, village and 
household. These levels were considered important because the administration and manage-
ment of decentralized health services is implemented at the district level, most health facili-
ties are based at the village level, and individuals within households are the ultimate users of 
such services. We see the household as not only the “producer of health” but also as the 
“principal financier” of health services (Mehrotra and Jarrett, 2002:1688; Niehof, 2004), 
which makes it a relevant unit of analysis. In each district, five villages were purposively 
selected for the study because of the differing availability of health infrastructure. They 
included villages with operating dispensaries (Kidoka and Songambele A), those with 
dispensaries that were constructed but not yet operational at the time of the study 
(Khubunko and Sagara A), villages with on-going dispensary construction (Potea and 
Chamae) and those without dispensaries at all (Mulua, Humekwa, Manungu and Mlanga). 
Some of these villages were easily accessible from their district council headquarters while 
others could be accessed with difficulties. None of the villages had a private health facility, 
hence for most of the villagers the public dispensary or health centre in the village or nearby 
village was the only healthcare option available. 
The study used a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods of data 
collection. A survey was conducted among 332 households, interviewing 115 male and 217 
female respondents, and using a structured questionnaire. Semi-structured and unstructured 
interviews were held with district medical officers (DMOs), village leaders and health staff in-
charge of dispensaries, to get an overview of the management and functioning of the facili-
ties. In the villages of Potea and Songambele A, which were selected for a detailed case study, 
six focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted with groups of men, women, and village 
health committees, in which 32 men and 22 women participated. FGD participants were 
drawn from different hamlets and socio-economic backgrounds within the villages to 
represent the diverse categorises of users. Relevant secondary data from the Comprehensive 
Council Health Plans (CCHPs) was reviewed and analysed to complement the primary data. 
The survey data were analysed for descriptive statistics, correlations, analysis of variance and 
multiple linear regression. Qualitative data from interviews and FGDs were analysed using 
qualitative content analysis which involved reading through the field notes and transcripts to 
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identify key themes and patterns relevant to the research questions and concepts (Patton, 
2002).  
To contextualize the results of the survey and the focus group discussions, the next 
section presents the case studies of the selected two villages. The cases highlight the village-
specific pathways of the decentralization reforms in the health sector and the problems that 
are encountered at the local level.  
6.5 The case villages 
6.5.1 The case of Potea 
Potea is a remote village in the northern part of Kondoa district about 46km from the district 
capital. In 2012, the village population was estimated to be about 3000 living in 438 
households and four hamlets. The village does not have a dispensary, a situation which nece-
ssitates villagers to obtain health services from dispensaries in the neighbouring villages of 
Bumbuta, Mnenia, Kisaki or Pahi. In the rainy season, it is almost impossible to travel 
outside the village as it becomes ‘land locked’ by sand rivers, hence the wish of villagers to 
have a dispensary of their own. In 2002, villagers started constructing a dispensary building 
by mobilising locally available resources such as by making bricks, collecting and bringing 
sand, stones, gravel and water to the construction site, and hiring local masons. As part of the 
reforms, the district council promised to complement community efforts by roofing and fini-
shing the building, and by providing medical staff, supplies and facilities for the dispensary. 
 However, the wish of the villagers to have an operational dispensary turned into a 
nightmare when the DMO inspected the site and found that the building was too small and 
its design not in accordance with the official guidelines. According to the DMO, a dispensary 
building should be big enough to accommodate all primary healthcare services with rooms 
for consultation, dispensing, delivery, recovery and clinic services. This requires a plot size of 
10-15 acres to allow future expansion into a health centre or hospital depending on popula-
tion growth and the demand for health services. The intended dispensary, however, was built 
on a two-acre plot using a standard design of 1985 that was no longer valid. It seemed that 
the former DMO had given the villagers old drawings, which they had not been aware of.  
 As a result, villagers were asked by the district council to demolish the building and 
start constructing a new one using the new standard guidelines. This proposal sparked 
different reactions among the villagers. Some saw it as a problem of the district council 
because it was the district council officials who had provided the old drawings. Others 
blamed their village and ward leaders for not following up the matter with the district council 
and for not providing feedback to the villagers. Some villagers felt that the issue was being 
politically motivated, since the village council was dominated by the opposition party and 
local politicians could use the issue for their own political agenda and to win votes during 
elections. On its part, the district council confirmed that it was aware of the issue and was 
ready to support the village but on the condition that the village would meet the set require-
ments.  
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6.5.2 The case of Songambele A 
Songambele A village is located in the northern part of Kongwa district about 46km from the 
district headquarters. The village has a public dispensary that was constructed by the district 
council between 2006 and 2008 as part of the reforms. Villagers provided labour by making 
bricks, contributing sand, stones and water, and by paying Tshs. 2000 (US$1.30) per 
household for local masons. Before the new dispensary was built, the villagers had to go to a 
dispensary in the neighbouring village of Hogolo (about 8km away) for medical services. The 
dispensary serves a catchment area of four villages (Songambele A, Songambele B, Mtungu 
Chole and Muungano) with an estimated number of about 13,800 users, out of whom only 
4500 (about 33%) live within 5km from the dispensary.  
 Service provision in the dispensary is managed by two staff, a clinical officer and a 
Maternal and Child Health Aide, while it should have five medical staff (two clinical officers 
and three nurses). The two staff members diagnose and treat common diseases and refer 
serious cases to the nearest health centre or district hospital. The dispensary also offers 
maternal and child health (MCH) and family planning services. Once per month, the 
dispensary staff organises outreach for MCH services to the villages and hamlets that are 
located far from the dispensary, using bicycles. However, in the rainy season outreach services 
are virtually impossible because some of these areas are inaccessible due to poor road 
conditions and seasonal rivers.   
 The dispensary committee, composed of five men and three women, is responsible 
for service provision at the dispensary. Together the eight members represent the users, 
private service providers (drug shops owners), village council, and dispensary staff. Every 
three months, the dispensary staff and committee put a request for drugs to the national 
medical stores department (MSD)15 through the district council. The budget comes from cost 
sharing revenues and funding from the district council. However, in most cases drugs are not 
delivered on time, leaving the dispensary for up to six months without drugs. The users 
complained that drugs and other supplies are often out of stock at the dispensary, leading to 
poor quality services. 
6.5.3 Discussion of the cases 
The two cases illustrate the on-going decentralized interventions aimed at improving access 
and quality of primary health services in rural villages. These interventions include putting 
up the physical infrastructure, and running and managing the facilities. The case of Potea 
shows how problems may arise from the delegation of technical responsibilities such as 
construction of a dispensary to local communities that lack the required expertise. This raises 
the question of the technical limits to decentralization. The case of Songambele A is an 
example of where decentralization has contributed to the establishment of a village dispe-
nsary through joint efforts between the LGA and the users. The case also shows the different 
                                                 
15The Medical Stores Department (MSD) is a semi-autonomous department under the MoHSW 
which is responsible for procurement, storage and distribution of drugs (Semali et al., 2005).  
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actors in the management of the facility: the users, the dispensary committee and dispensary 
staff at the lower level, and the district council and central government at the higher level.  
So, to what extent have these interventions contributed to improving the access, 
quality and appropriateness of health services? What are the views of users, men and women, 
on these arrangements? We turn to these questions in the next section as we present and 
discuss the results using a gendered users’ perspective. First, we shall describe the users’ views 
on the availability of health services, distance to the facilities and cost sharing, and, second, 
their perceptions on improvement, appropriateness and satisfaction with the services.  
6.6 Results and discussion 
6.6.1 Availability of health services 
One of the objectives of the on-going reforms in the country is to improve the availability of 
health services “through rehabilitation of existing health facilities and construction of new 
ones” (URT, 2007b:6). The survey findings showed that only 22 percent of the respondents 
used the health facility in their own village, the majority (78%) using facilities in other 
villages. Most users (72%) got health services from dispensaries, 21 percent from the district 
hospital and 7 percent from health centres. District data showed that between 2003 and 
2011, the number of health facilities increased by 35 percent and 89 percent in Kondoa and 
Kongwa, respectively (Table 6.1). This has partly contributed to increasing service coverage by 
about 76 percent and 58 percent of the population living within 5km from the nearest 
facility in Kondoa and Kongwa, respectively. In both districts, the new facilities were mostly 
public dispensaries, implying that dispensaries are the main health facility for the majority of 
users in rural areas. The national health policy recognizes the dispensary as the backbone of 
rural healthcare services, providing reproductive and child health services, diagnostic health 
services and essential drugs (URT, 2003). The increase of dispensaries between 2003 and 
2011 in Kondoa and Kongwa confirms the findings by Lambo and Sambo (2003) who show 
that in many sub-Saharan African countries implementing health sector reforms primary 
health facilities at the base rapidly expanded and, thereby, enhanced access to healthcare.  
 The Primary Health Services Development Programme 2007-2017 that was launched 
in 2007 to “accelerate the provision of primary health care” within the framework of the 
reforms, aims at establishing a dispensary in every village and a health centre in every ward 
(URT, 2007b:5). Despite the fact that the reforms indeed increased the number of health 
facilities, only about 38 and 59 percent of the villages in Kondoa and Kongwa, respectively, 
had dispensaries. This indicates inter-village inequalities in the availability of health facilities. 
The average population served by most dispensaries also exceeded the target of 5,000 (URT, 
2003, 2007b). The majority of dispensaries in Kongwa (86%) and more than half (54%) in 
Kondoa were serving a population of more than 5,000.  The two dispensaries in the study 
area had a catchment area of four villages each, with the one in Kidoka serving a population 
of 7,000 and that in Songambele A 13,800 users. Consequently, these facilities have to serve 
too many people, while they also experience critical shortages of staff, inadequate drugs, 
medical equipment and other supplies (URT, 2007b).  
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Table 6.1: Number of health facilities in Kondoa and Kongwa between 2003 and 2011 
District Health facility   2003 2011 Percentage increase 
Kondoa Hospital  1 1 0.0 
Rural health centres   4 6 50.0 
Dispensaries  53 71 34.0 
Total  58 78 34.5 
     
Kongwa Hospital  1 1 0.0 
Rural health centres   2 4 100.0 
Dispensaries  23 44 91.3 
Total   26 49 88.5 
Sources: Kondoa District Council (2003, 2011); Kongwa District Council (2003, 2011).  
6.6.2 Distance to health facilities  
The distance from the home to the health facility is an important determinant of access to 
health services and health seeking behaviour (Gilson et al., 1994; Hjortsberg and Mwikisa, 
2002). At national level, the commonly used norm is ‘within 5km’ from the nearest facility 
(URT, 2007b, 2009b), although some national surveys use ‘within 10km’ (e.g. URT, 2007a). 
In this study, 62 percent of users were living within 5km, significantly less than the national 
average of 90 percent (URT, 2007b). The mean distance to the nearest health facility was 
5.8km. In Kondoa it was 6.2km and in Kongwa 5.3km (F(1,330)=4.157, p=0.04). Significantly 
(p=0.00) more users (80%) in villages with dispensaries lived within 5km from the nearest 
health facility than in villages without health facilities (58%). Indeed, more than one third 
(35%) of respondents in villages without health facilities identified distance as a major 
problem constraining their access to health services. The mean distance to the health facility 
was significantly (F(1,329)=23.134, p=0.00) lower (3.5km) for users in villages with health 
facilities than in villages without (6.3km). Similarly, the mean distance to a dispensary in the 
village was significantly lower (3.5km) than to a health centre in another village (5.5km) or 
the district hospital (11.7km) (F(4,330)=88.032, p=0.00).  
 Statements in the interviews and FGDs support these observations. Comments like: 
“We are very far from the district hospital where we get health services” (woman interviewee in 
Mulua), “from here to the dispensary is very far” (women FGD participants in Potea), or “when 
one gets sick at night, it is very difficult to get to the dispensary because it is far and we have no 
transport” (man interviewee in Humekwa), were common in villages without health facilities. 
In Mulua, village leaders explained that in the rainy season most people cannot reach the 
district hospital (about 16km away) because the village is almost ‘cut off’ from the 
transportation network by seasonal rivers. Women FGD participants in Potea narrated that 
pregnant women “just have to pray to God for them to deliver safely at home because they cannot 
walk to the nearest dispensary, especially in the rainy season.” One woman recalled: “during my last 
delivery, I was assisted by a traditional birth attendant because it was raining and could not walk the 
six kilometres to Bumbuta dispensary.” FGD participants in this village indeed indicated that 
most pregnant women relied on traditional birth attendants (TBAs) for delivery services.  
Decision making under the tree 
 
104 
 
 TBAs are elderly women who are usually self-taught or informally trained to conduct 
normal deliveries, provide post-natal care, and advise women on preparation for delivery and 
attending antenatal care (Nombo, 2007). In Kondoa, about 48 percent of the home deliveries 
were reportedly handled by TBAs, although the proportion could be higher in villages 
without health facilities. The TBAs are trusted and have good social relations with their 
clients since they are members of the same community. As opposed to the distant health 
facilities, TBAs are geographically, as well as socially and culturally close to their clientele. 
Their payment varies from recognition to in-kind gifts and moderate cash payments. A TBA 
who participated in the women FGD in Potea testified that: “We are given washing soap or other 
small gifts by our clients as a sign of appreciation.” The interviews with the DMOs revealed that 
there were contradictory views at the national level on whether to officially recognise and 
train TBAs. While some argue that training the TBAs could encourage pregnant women not 
to use the health facilities, others see it as unavoidable because of shortage of facilities and 
professional staff, especially in rural areas. As a result, training of TBAs had been suspended 
and whether or not training and supporting TBAs remained the discretion of the DMOs in 
their respective districts. These policy contradictions have negative consequences for 
women’s maternal health because of the many pregnant women who rely on TBAs. They also 
reflect an unresolved debate at the international level on whether governments in developing 
countries should support or obstruct the involvement of TBAs in child delivery and train 
them (Campbell and Graham, 2006; Rasch, 2007).   
 The findings show that access to health services was constrained by geographical 
isolation, poor infrastructures and transportation options. Service users in villages without 
health facilities spent many hours on travelling long distances, mostly on foot, by bicycle or 
motorcycle, to reach the health facilities. Evidence from other studies shows an inverse rela-
tionship between distance or travel time to health facilities and utilization of healthcare 
facilities (Hjortsberg and Mwikisa, 2002; Hjortsberg, 2003; Peters et al., 2008). A study by 
Hjortsberg and Mwikisa (2002) in Zambia reports that 56 percent of households in rural 
areas perceived distance as a major problem in access to health services. Peters et al. (2008) 
demonstrate that remote health facilities entail more travel expenditures. This is inhibiting to 
obtaining care, especially for the poor. More critically, the burden of seeking healthcare from 
these distant facilities falls disproportionally on women because they have specific needs that 
derive from the biological and reproductive health risks. Additionally, since according to the 
normative gendered division of labour in the household women are the primary caregivers, 
placing greater burdens on women’s time results in higher opportunity costs for them 
(Standing, 1997; Nanda, 2002; Sen and Östlin, 2008). Since emergency obstetric care is not 
available at the dispensaries, women must travel long distances to the district hospital in case 
of complications, or go without care altogether (WDP, 2004). Campbell and Graham (2006) 
argue that the location of delivery, attendance at delivery, and how quickly transport to 
referral-level care can be arranged, are crucial factors in intrapartum care. In Kondoa, the 
DMO had set up two ‘waiting wards’ at the district hospital for pregnant women at the end 
of their term, who were referred by health staff of the dispensaries and health centres who 
were required to timely recognize ‘danger signs’ indicating complications. The initiative is 
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intended to ensure timely availability of emergency obstetric care, which is an important stra-
tegy in reducing maternal mortality (Campbell and Graham, 2006; Rasch, 2007).  
6.6.3 Cost sharing arrangements and affordability to pay for health services 
The rationale for introducing cost sharing in the public health sector as part of the reforms 
was to generate additional revenues to improve the availability and quality of health services 
(Munishi, 2003; URT, 2003; Mamdani and Bangser, 2004; Kamuzora and Gilson, 2007). In 
this study, two cost sharing arrangements were identified: user fees per visit to the health 
facility and the community health fund (CHF). Most respondents (73%) were paying user 
fees per visit at the point of service delivery, only 27 percent paid through the CHF (Table 
6.2). CHF is a district-based voluntary health insurance scheme that was introduced in the 
country in 1996 in Igunga district and has subsequently been rolled out to other districts 
including Kondoa and Kongwa. The scheme aims at providing an opportunity for seasonal 
income earners in the informal sector to pay for their health services before they fall sick 
(Munishi, 2003; URT, 2003; Kamuzora and Gilson, 2007; Tidermand et al., 2008). CHF 
members paid an annual fee of Tshs. 10,000 (US$ 6.40) in Kondoa and Tshs. 5,000 (US$ 
3.20) in Kongwa. Membership benefits included basic healthcare services for up to six 
household members. Significantly (p=0.00) more respondents in Kongwa (35%) were CHF 
members than in Kondoa (20%) partly because the annual fee in Kongwa is half of the fee in 
Kondoa. Male-headed households (30%) were significantly (p=0.02) more likely to be CHF 
members than female-headed households (13%).  
 The interviews with the DMOs, dispensary staff and analysis of secondary data 
revealed that CHF membership was generally low. By June 2012, there were 7973 CHF 
members (9% of all households) in Kondoa and 7375 members (15% of all households) in 
Kongwa. Inability to pay the annual fee, low quality of services and discrimination against 
CHF members by service providers in favour of users paying user fees, were the most 
common reasons given for not joining the scheme. These findings confirm earlier studies in 
Tanzania which show that CHF struggles with low membership in the participating districts 
ranging from 3 to 26 percent (Munishi, 2003; Kamuzora and Gilson, 2007; Tidermand et al., 
2008). This situation does not seem to have changed over the past few years.  
 For non-CHF members, healthcare charges entailed paying a consultation fee ranging 
from Tshs. 200 (US$ 0.13) in Kidoka to Tshs. 1000 (US$ 0.64) in Songambele A, and about 
Tshs. 3000 (US$ 1.92) to buy drugs. However, most users complained about the frequent 
shortage of drugs in the facilities, compelling them to buy drugs from private shops. This 
meant additional costs on top of the other costs incurred in terms of time spent on travelling 
and queuing, and transportation. “The amount you pay is not predictable. You pay Tshs. 3000 or 
4000 if you are lucky to find medicine in the dispensary, but in most cases we pay more than that 
because we are told to buy medicine from shops” (women FGD in Potea). In fact, the shortage of 
drugs was the second most cited problem by survey respondents (64%). WDP (2004) found 
that in the long run paying user fees could be a more costly alternative although for the poor 
it is the only option.  
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Table 6.2: Cost sharing arrangements by district and household headship (n=332) 
Criteria Category Pay per visit CHF Chi-square 
values 
District  Kondoa 131(79.9) 33(20.1) χ2=8.651 
p= 0.003*** Kongwa 110(65.5) 58(34.5) 
Both  241(72.6) 91(27.4) 
Household 
headship 
Male-headed households  206(70.5) 86(29.5) χ2=5.081 
p= 0.024** Female-headed households  35(87.5) 5(12.5) 
Both   241(72.6) 91(27.4) 
Figures in brackets are percentages. **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. 
 
 The majority of respondents (71%) could afford the user fees, a significantly (p=0.00) 
higher proportion of male-headed households (74%) than female-headed households (48%). 
The results from the linear regression revealed other factors associated with users’ ability to 
pay (Table 6.3). Farming households were unlikely to be able to pay, presumably because of 
their significantly lower incomes compared to households keeping livestock or running a 
small-scale business. Using a facility in another village meant more costs in terms of transport 
in addition to user fees, thus contributing to the inability to pay. A significantly (p=0.03) 
higher proportion of respondents (68%) in villages without health facilities than in villages 
with facilities (53%) mentioned high costs as a major problem. Membership in village groups, 
mostly income generating groups of women, was positively associated with ability to pay. 
Households with members in such groups had relatively higher incomes than non-members. 
Users’ perceptions of the appropriateness of treatment of common illnesses of women and 
the availability of health staff were also significant factors. This could imply that users could 
be willing to pay if they perceived they would get quality services. In this way, decentralization 
could contribute to motivating users to pay for the services provided their payment would 
enhance quality of care. However, the findings on changes in quality of care as perceived by 
the users demonstrate that the situation on the ground is quite different.   
 The national health policy provides for exemptions from paying user fees for the poor 
and vulnerable in order to increase access of health services to those who cannot afford to 
pay for public services such as maternal and child health (URT, 2003). Interviews with the 
DMOs and dispensary staff revealed that groups exempted from paying the user fees include 
pregnant women, under-five children, the elderly, and people with illnesses such as AIDS and 
tuberculosis. Antenatal care and family planning services are also exempted. However, from 
the FGDs it transpired that in practice, the exemption rules are not consistently applied. 
Groups that are in policy ‘exempted’, could still be required to pay by the service providers. 
In Potea, a male FGD participant indicated that: “We only hear in the media that children, 
pregnant women and the elderly should get free medical services, but in reality everybody pays.” 
Another male FGD participant in Songambele A remarked: “there is nothing like free medical 
services. My wife gave birth at the village dispensary a few days ago and I had to pay Tshs. 5000” 
(US$ 3.20). Mamdani and Bangser (2004) relate this inconsistent implementation of the 
exemption rules to the failure of health service providers to follow the procedures and the 
users’ lack of insistence on their rights. While the users may not insist because they fear that 
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insistence on free services would jeopardize their treatment, for providers there is little 
incentive to exempt people from paying because they need income from user fees (Nanda, 
2002; Nombo, 2007). Evidence from other studies shows that most women do not benefit 
from exemptions rules because they do not know about them. Those who do know, get this 
information through informal contacts (Nanda, 2002; Mamdani and Bangser, 2004; WDP, 
2004; Nombo, 2007).  
Table 6.3: Variables associated with users’ affordability to pay health user fees (n=297) 
Explanatory variable  B coefficient Std. Error p-value 
Household headship (1= male headed) 0.268 0.077 0.001*** 
Occupation (1=farming) -0.184 0.055 0.001*** 
Health facility used by household (1=dispensary in the village) 0.049 0.014 0.000*** 
Membership in groups (1=yes) 0.110 0.052 0.034** 
CHF membership (1=yes) 0.148 0.056 0.009*** 
Appropriateness of treatment of common diseases (1=not 
appropriate) 
 
-0.080 
 
0.028 
 
0.004*** 
Improved availability of health staff (1= no changes) -0.158 0.058 0.007*** 
R2 = 0.173, F (7,297) =8.696, p=0.00, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.  
6.6.4 Users’ perceived changes in quality of health services 
Service users’ perception of quality of care is critical in understanding the relationship 
between quality of care and utilization of health services (Baltussen et al., 2002; Baltussen and 
Ye, 2006). The survey respondents were asked to rank change in the quality of health services 
on a four-point scale (from ‘deteriorated’ to ‘significantly improved’). Most respondents 
indicated either ‘no changes’ or ‘some improvement’ on all indicators. The mean scores for 
all the seven indicators were close to three which could be interpreted as ‘some improveme-
nt’. Most respondents were relatively positive on items relating to the trustworthiness of 
health staff and the quality of the building (mean score of 2.9), but less on the proximity of 
the facilities (mean score of 2.5). On none of the indicators the ranking of men and women 
showed a significant difference (Table 6.4), possibly because both men and women were 
using the same health facilities, and, therefore, were likely to be experiencing similar 
challenges. Significantly (p=0.02) more respondents in Kondoa (52%) than in Kongwa (41%) 
saw ‘no changes’ in the availability of essential facilities. In Kondoa, slightly more than one 
tenth of respondents (13%) were of the opinion that availability of health staff had ‘deterio-
rated’, while in Kongwa this was only one percent (p=0.00). More respondents in Kondoa 
(64%) than in Kongwa (51%) indicated ‘no changes’ on the proximity to the facilities 
(p=0.00) because of the longer average distance to health facilities in the former. This indica-
tes that there were more perceived changes in Kongwa than in Kondoa.  
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Table 6.4: Users’ perceptions on improved quality of health services by sex (n=332) 
Criteria Deteriorated No changes Somewhat 
improved 
Significantly 
improved 
Mean 
score 
Drug availability 22(6.6) 129(39.0) 151(45.6) 29(8.8) 2.6 
Availability of essential facilities 11(3.3) 152(46.1) 141(42.7) 26(7.9) 2.6 
Availability of health staff 22(6.7) 145(43.9) 116(35.2) 47(14.2) 2.6 
Trustworthiness of health staff 5(1.6) 115(34.8) 132(40.0) 78(23.6) 2.9 
Proximity of health facility 3(0.9) 190(57.6) 103(31.2) 34(10.3) 2.5 
Quality of buildings at health 
facility 
 
0(0) 
 
128(39.3) 
 
106(32.5) 
 
92(28.2) 
 
2.9 
Availability of health related 
information 
 
0(0) 
 
153(46.5) 
 
122(37.1) 
 
54(16.4) 
 
2.7 
Figures in brackets are percentages. 
 
 When asked about the problems encountered in accessing services in the nearest 
facility, about two thirds of respondents indicated high treatment costs (65%) and shortage of 
drugs (64%) followed by long waiting times (52%). Other concerns were: few staff (33%), 
shortage of facilities (31%), not enough female staff (28%) and lack of attention by the health 
staff (15%). A less common but serious complaint was corruption (mentioned by 6% of 
respondents). “They (dispensary staff) tell us that there is no medicine, but those who give a bribe get 
the medicines” (men FGD in Songambele A). “It is the poor who suffer; if you are able to go with 
something in your hands to give to the nurse or doctor, you will get the best care” (women FGD in 
Songambele A). Significantly (p=0.00) more women (73%) than men (50%) were concerned 
about high treatment costs. Similarly, a significantly (p=0.00) higher proportion of women 
(56%) than men (43%) complained about the long waiting times. This shows how the 
different roles of men and women influence the assessment of quality of care (cf. van Wijk et 
al., 1996; Standing, 1997). In general, the majority of respondents (83%) across the districts, 
men and women alike, felt that health services were the most important social services that 
needed to be improved in their villages.  
 The in-depth qualitative study generated mixed perspectives. Most users in villages 
with dispensaries saw ‘some changes’ while those in villages without dispensaries saw ‘no 
changes’ or ‘deterioration’. For example, most interviewees and FGD participants in Songa-
mbele A acknowledged that the construction of the dispensary in their village had made it 
“relatively easier to get medical services than in the past when we had to walk 8km to the nearest 
dispensary.” “Even if one falls sick late at night, you can easily rush to the dispensary and knock at the 
doctor or the nurse for help” (man FGD participant). “Many children now get vaccinations compared 
to when we had no dispensary in the village” (woman FGD participant). Kidoka village has a 
dispensary that was built in the 1970s and rehabilitated under the on-going reforms in 2005. 
In this village, most interviewees were of the opinion that “the quality of health services had 
deteriorated” because the capacity of the dispensary was no longer sufficient to meet the 
demands of the increasing population in the catchment area. In Potea, women FGD partici-
pants told us that “availability and quality of health services is very bad because we spend many hours 
travelling to the dispensary and queuing.” According to them, the quality of services in the nearby 
dispensary was “poor because there are only two dispensary staff to attend patients from four villages 
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and the dispensary is often experiencing shortage of drugs.” Village leaders in Humekwa said: “The 
situation has not changed; we still experience the same problems we have encountered for many years.”  
 These findings indicate that the presence of a dispensary in the village is a key factor 
in the users’ perception of quality of health care, although other indicators such as 
availability of drugs, availability of health staff, distance to the facilities, trustworthiness of 
staff and waiting times were also important. These findings are in line with those by Lambo 
and Sambo (2003) who note that despite the reforms, the majority of the people in sub-
Saharan Africa still have limited access to quality services, both in terms of technical quality 
and quality as perceived by users. URT (2007b) shows that despite the remarkable improve-
ments over the years since the advent of HSRs, the quality of health services in most areas is 
still unsatisfactory due to shortage of facilities, inadequate medical equipment, and shortage 
of human resources, medicines, and supplies. As is reflected in the users’ views in our study 
(Table 6.4) and given similar problems reported by studies more than a decade ago just at the 
beginning of the reforms (cf. Mwisongo et al., 2000) and in previous national surveys (e.g. 
URT, 2007a), it can be concluded that progress in improving the quality of services has been 
slow.  
6.6.5 Appropriateness of health services to women  
Most respondents, men and women alike, viewed most of the services offered in the nearest 
facility as ‘appropriate’ to women (Table 6.5). The views of men and women did not differ 
significantly on five out of the seven aspects. Although antenatal and postnatal clinic services 
address specifically women’s health needs, in the study area, they are provided on certain 
dates once per month either by users visiting the health facility or through the outreach 
services provided by health staff in villages without the facilities (see the case of Songambele 
A). The same applies to child immunization services. Both men and women viewed this arra-
ngement as ‘appropriate’ to women because it is not too time consuming. Men and women 
also held similar views on the appropriateness of child health services and on treatment of 
common illnesses, presumably because both are involved through attending health facilities 
as users and in making decisions on whether to seek healthcare and allocate the financial 
resources needed.   
There were, however, significant differences (p=0.00) between the views of men and 
women on two issues: childbirth and family planning. Almost half (47%) of women said that 
delivery services were ‘not appropriate’ compared to 25 percent of men. Women FGDs 
revealed that all dispensaries had inadequate delivery facilities such as beds and other items 
like gloves and syringes. “When you are about to deliver, you just pray that you don’t find other 
women in the same situation at the dispensary, because there is only one bed and one nurse” and that 
“sometimes pregnant women share a bed or even sleep on the floor”, said women in the Potea FGD. 
Other problems were the long distances to the facilities, unfriendly services and lack of 
money to pay for the services or buy some items. “One pregnant woman from this village died on 
her way to the dispensary last year” (women FGD in Potea). In Humekwa, one woman village 
leader insisted that: “I know many cases of women who have delivered on their way to the 
dispensary.” The fact that these problems were mostly identified by women reflects the 
Decision making under the tree 
 
110 
 
argument by van Wijk et al. (1996:708) that “more health care is not always better health care 
from the viewpoint of women.”  
 District data showed that between 2003 and 2011, the proportion of professionally 
assisted deliveries had increased from 27 percent to 73 percent in Kondoa, and from 64 
percent to 82 percent in Kongwa. However, the rate of home deliveries was still high at about 
27 percent in Kondoa and 18 percent in Kongwa. The maternal mortality ratios (MMR) in 
Kondoa and Kongwa were 109 and 120, respectively. These rates are well below the national 
average of 454 per 100,000 live births (URT, 2011b). However, as revealed in the interviews 
with the DMOs, since the figures are based on cases reported by the health facilities and do 
not include the high proportions of home deliveries occurring in remote villages without 
health facilities, they most probably underestimate the level of maternal mortality.    
 With regard to family planning services, significantly (p=0.00) more men (42%) than 
women (7%) saw them as ‘not appropriate’. The proportion of family planning users in both 
districts was higher than the national average of 34 percent (URT, 2010b): 81 and 64 percent 
in Kondoa and Kongwa, respectively. The qualitative in-depth study revealed that most men 
consider family planning services ‘inappropriate’, not in terms of the technical quality of the 
services but in relation to socio-cultural norms. Many husbands do not allow their wives to 
use family planning methods because they want many children. One woman FGD partici-
pant in Potea said: “Men do not care about the difficult experiences we go through; all they want to 
see is more children even if it is every year.” Another added: “men always insist that using family 
planning means bringing poverty into the household.” Among the Gogo and Rangi (the main 
ethnic groups in the study area) having many children is culturally perceived as a sign of 
wealth and prestige. In Potea where majority of the population is Muslim, men FGD parti-
cipants told us that “every child comes with his/her opportunities from God” and, therefore, there 
is no need for family planning. Most men FGD participants dismissed the question on family 
planning arguing that it was “a women’s issue which should be asked to women.”  
Others indicated that men had limited knowledge since most family planning 
programs and interventions focused on women and excluded men. While health facilities 
offer a variety of family planning methods, most women users preferred injectables which can 
be administered secretly at the facilities without their husbands knowing. This shows the 
different perspectives men and women have on family planning. The men did not respond to 
our focus on the ‘appropriateness’ of the services but objected to the idea of family planning 
itself. For women, appropriate family planning services meant the availability of injectables 
and other acceptable methods. However, while the services were available, women’s access 
was obstructed by their husbands who did not want their wives to use contraception. This 
shows the implications of the power differentials between men and women for women’s 
reproductive and sexual health (cf. DeJong, 2000), which are reinforced by ethnicity and 
religion.  
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Table 6.5: Users’ perceptions on the appropriateness of health services by sex (n=332) 
Criteria Sex Not 
appropriate 
Appropriate Very 
appropriate 
Chi-square 
values 
Antenatal clinic 
services for pregnant 
women 
Male 23(20.5) 83(74.1) 6(5.4) χ2=1.580 
p= 0.454 Female 33(15.3) 167(77.7) 15(7.0) 
Both   56(17.1) 250(76.5) 21(6.4) 
Delivery services Male 29(25.4) 78(68.4) 7(6.1) χ2=13.968 
p= 0.001*** Female 101(46.5) 106(48.8) 10(4.6) 
Both  130(39.3) 184(55.6) 17(5.1) 
Postnatal clinic 
services for lactating 
mothers 
Male 18(16.2) 86(77.5) 7(6.3) χ2=3.169 
p= 0.205 Female 21(9.7) 177(81.9) 18(8.3) 
Both   39(11.9) 263(80.4) 25(7.6) 
Family planning 
services 
Male 48(42.1) 63(55.3) 3(2.6) χ2=60. 607 
p= 0.000*** Female 15(6.9) 187(86.2) 15(6.9) 
Both  63(19.0) 250(75.5) 18(5.4) 
Immunization 
services 
Male 9(8.0) 92(82.1) 11(9.8) χ2=3.153 
p= 0.207 Female 16(7.4) 163(75.5) 37(17.1) 
Both  25(7.6) 255(77.7) 48(14.6) 
Child health services Male 18(15.9) 92(81.4) 3(2.7) χ2=3.419 
p= 0.181 Female 23(10.6) 180(83.3) 13(6.0) 
Both 41(2.5) 272(82.7) 16(4.9) 
Treatment of 
common diseases  
Male 20(17.7) 92(81.6) 1(0.9) χ2=2.711 
p= 0.258 Female 37(17.1) 170(78.7) 9(4.2) 
Both  57(17.3) 262(79.6) 10(3.0) 
Figures in brackets are percentages. ***Significant at 1%. 
 
6.6.6 Users’ satisfaction with health services 
Users’ satisfaction is an important indicator of service quality (Gilson et al., 1994; Atkinson 
and Haran, 2005). The findings showed that 59 percent of respondents were either ‘some-
what satisfied’ (52%) or ‘very satisfied’ (7%) with the services. At national level, in 2009, 64 
percent of users were satisfied with services in government facilities (URT, 2012), a slight 
decline from 69 percent in 2007 (URT, 2007a). However, the national figures do not 
distinguish between urban and rural areas. Users in rural areas could be more dissatisfied 
than urban users. Gender is negatively associated with users’ satisfaction (Table 6.6). Women 
were more likely to be dissatisfied than men, possibly because women made more frequent 
visits to health facilities, and therefore, had more first-hand experience with the shortcomings 
of the facilities. The study of Atkinson and Haran (2005) also shows an association between 
gender and users’ satisfaction. The appropriateness of delivery services and treatment of 
common illnesses of women also featured as important variables, pointing to women’s diffe-
rent needs and expectations regarding healthcare (van Wijk et al., 1996; Atkinson and Haran, 
2005). The perceived quality and appropriateness of the services in addressing women’s 
needs is, therefore, a critical issue since it contributes to meeting women’s practical gender 
needs, particularly in their role as caregivers.  
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 In our study, household size is negatively related to users’ satisfaction. Large house-
holds tended to be more dissatisfied than small households, presumably due to the fact that 
in large households demands for health services are likely to be higher, entailing a higher 
frequency of visits to the facilities. The level of trust in the health staff was another important 
determinant of users’ satisfaction. Users who trusted the staff ‘to a large extent’ were signifi-
cantly more likely to be satisfied. This shows the importance of the user-provider interaction 
in mediating access to services for users’ perceptions. A study on community satisfaction with 
primary healthcare services in Morogoro, Tanzania (Gilson et al., 1994) identifies trust in the 
provider as a key factor in users’ selection of the providers and, consequently, users’ satis-
faction. 
As documented in other studies (e.g. Gilson et al., 1994; Baltussen and Ye, 2006) also 
in our study the availability of drugs emerged as a key determinant of users’ satisfaction, 
which has implications for the utilization of health services. About two thirds of our 
respondents reported shortage of drugs as a serious problem. In the FGDs complaints could 
be heard such as: “We have a dispensary, but no medicines” (female participant in Songambele 
A), “the only medicine available every time we go to the dispensary is panadol” (male participant in 
Songambele A), or “they [dispensary staff] always tell us that there is no medicine, go and buy from 
the shops” (female participant in Potea). In policy, the responsibility for the procurement of 
drugs has been delegated to health facilities through the health facility committees with 
technical support from the DMOs (see the case of Songambele A). According to our 
interviews with dispensary staff, however, health facilities experienced frequent and some-
times prolonged shortage of drugs due to delayed delivery of drugs from the MSD. In some 
cases, the facilities received drugs that had expired or were about to expire, drugs with no 
labels, or even drugs that had not been requested. Previous studies in Tanzania have reported 
similar findings. For instance, Munishi (2003:122) shows that shortage of drugs has been a 
“chronic problem which has affected quality of care.” Mamdani and Bangser (2004:11) 
report that most complains from the patients’ perspective “focused on lack of drugs and 
supplies.” COWI and EPOS (2007) found that health facilities experience delays of receiving 
drugs from 3 to 90 days. This situation does not appear to have changed, despite the policy 
changes.  
Table 6.6: Variables associated with users’ satisfaction with health services (n=328) 
Explanatory variable  B coefficient Std. Error p-value 
Sex (1= female) -0.147 0.066 0.027** 
Household size -0.029 0.013 0.025** 
Extent of trust to health staff (1=to a large extent) 0.122 0.051 0.017** 
Appropriateness of delivery services (1=appropriate) 0.206 0.056 0.000*** 
Appropriateness of treatment of common diseases 
(1=appropriate) 
 
0.235 
 
0.076 
 
0.002*** 
Shortage of drugs as a problem (1=yes) 0.163 0.066 0.014*** 
R2 = 0.173, F (6,328)=11.253, p=0.00,**Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.  
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6.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the effects of the decentralization reforms on the access, quality 
and appropriateness of health services using a gendered users’ perspective. In terms of access, 
it is evident from our findings that decentralization reforms have contributed to increasing 
the availability of health facilities, particularly dispensaries, thereby raising the service cove-
rage in both districts. The management and administration of primary healthcare services has 
been decentralized to LGAs, facilities and users, although the centre stills maintains control 
over the ‘technical quality’ of the health infrastructure and services, which sometimes 
conflicts with local initiatives. However, there is still inadequate infrastructure to provide full 
primary healthcare coverage. This is a major obstacle for many users, especially women, who 
travel considerable distances to access healthcare. This limits women in meeting their own 
health needs and their practical gender needs as caregivers. It is especially problematic for 
pregnant women who seek ante-natal and delivery services. As a result, TBAs are still impor-
tant providers of delivery services, particularly in villages without health facilities. Hence, 
adopting the ‘health care model’ where trained TBAs are incorporated within the health 
system and supported to work under close supervision of trained midwives (Rasch, 2007) 
could be beneficial especially in the present context of severe shortage of human resources in 
health facilities.  
 The findings further show that although cost sharing measures in terms of user fees 
and CHF are intended to complement government financing so as to improve the quality of 
services, they also obstruct healthcare access for poor and female-headed households. 
Mamdani and Bangser (2004) argue that the rural poor, who are ‘highly responsive’ to health-
care costs, are at risk of exclusion due to the inability to pay. Others have also shown that 
user fees are regressive and inequitable, and can lead to decreased utilization of health servi-
ces among the poor (Nanda, 2002; Lambo and Sambo, 2003; Tolhurst and Nyonator, 2006; 
Peters et al., 2008). For women it is more difficult to pay for healthcare because they often 
lack the decision-making power and control of financial resources. In some cases, women 
make a ‘trade off’ not to seek healthcare in order to meet other household needs, or they do 
not make use of health services because they have no cash income or because women’s health 
is given low priority (Nanda, 2002; Vlassof and Moreno, 2002; Nombo, 2007; Sen and 
Östlin, 2008).  
Women constitute a significant proportion of potential beneficiaries of exemptions 
and if the rules were properly applied, this could contribute to improving gender equity in 
access to health services. However, in the study area the exemption rules were not effectively 
implemented. Poor and female-headed households were in fact also excluded from the CHF 
insurance scheme because of their inability to pay the annual lump sum. Hence, considering 
the high burden of morbidity in rural areas and particularly among poor households, low-
income households are likely to experience difficulties in accessing the healthcare they need 
(Mehrotra and Jarrett, 2002). Consequently, decentralizing healthcare financing to users can 
have a negative impact on access to health services for groups such as the poor and female 
headed households, thereby reinforcing existing inequalities. UNICEF (2007) also argues 
that decentralization can also lead to unintended consequences such as aggravating existing 
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gender inequalities. This shows how gender intersects with other social inequalities such as 
poverty, thus limiting women’s access to health services. Measures which could have a major 
positive impact on women’s health such as exemptions should, therefore, be considered 
priorities in the reforms.  
 With regard to quality issues as perceived by the users, the findings show that the 
reforms have focused mostly on building and rehabilitation of health facilities but that less 
has been achieved in other respects, such as adequate staffing and availability of drugs and 
other essential supplies. It seems easier to involve users in the physical construction of the 
health infrastructure than in running and managing the facilities. However, users are not 
only concerned about the availability of facilities, but also about the quality of their services, 
for which the district councils and the Ministry of Health are responsible. Among users and 
dispensary staff the consistent shortage of drugs is frequently cited as a serious problem. 
Policy makers should address these inadequacies, particularly the drug purchasing and distri-
bution arrangements, in order to improve quality of services in rural areas.  
Women are particularly concerned about the ‘inappropriateness’ of delivery services. 
They also hold quite different views from men on the ‘appropriateness’ of family planning 
services, in which men were not interested because they mostly reject the idea of family 
planning. Despite the globally voiced recognition of women’s right to autonomy in repro-
ductive health decisions (DeJong, 2000), also our findings show that gender power relations 
still play a critical role in safeguarding women’s reproductive health, and that gender 
intersects with ethnicity and religion to compound their disadvantaged position. Thus, 
decentralization in the healthcare sector should in fact be gender-sensitive healthcare aimed 
at meeting the health needs of both men and women.  
Overall, the use of the gendered users’ perspective has revealed the interplay and 
differences between men’s and women’s perspectives on different aspects of healthcare. 
While men and women hold similar opinions on some aspects, there are also marked 
differences. This confirms the fact that men and women are actually different users and, 
therefore, their views should not be conflated under the umbrella of ‘users’ perspectives’ in 
general. Understanding their similarities and differences should be the entry point for policy 
makers and health planners in making primary healthcare services ‘gender-sensitive’.   
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Chapter 7 
Cooperation and trust in the context of 
decentralization reforms16 
 
This chapter investigates the impact of decentralization reforms on cooperation and trust at 
the village level in Tanzania, using a gender perspective. The chapter draws on survey and 
qualitative data from ten villages in two rural districts. The findings show that the reforms 
have strengthened 'formal’ cooperative efforts and social networks and groups aimed at 
improving public services and poverty reduction. Participation in these arrangements 
depends on the culturally underpinned gender relations. Citizen’s participation in decision-
making processes and users’ satisfaction with water and health services are significantly rela-
ted to social and political trust, in which gender plays a role as well. There is a two-way 
interface between trust and decentralization reforms whereby ‘good’ decentralization out-
comes generate trust while ‘bad’ outcomes decrease trust. The study also shows that political 
trust is a multi-layered concept which should be analysed by considering the different admini-
strative levels at which it occurs.  
                                                 
16An abridged version of this chapter has been published as: Masanyiwa, Z.S., Niehof, A. and 
Termeer, C.J.A.M. (2014) Cooperation and trust in the context of decentralization reforms in Rural 
Tanzania. The International Journal of Social Sciences and Human Studies Volume 6 Issue 1, pp. 139-156.  
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7.1 Introduction 
Decentralization is a dominant theme in policy and literature on local governance and service 
delivery in Tanzania. Among other things, the current decentralization reforms which started 
in the late 1990s aim at changing the power relations and responsibilities between the 
different actors at the central and local levels (URT, 1998, 2009a). The reforms envisage to 
“enable the citizens at all levels to participate in decision-making processes, demand transpa-
rency and accountability in the devolved systems for allocation and use of public resources, 
and in planning and delivery of public services” (URT, 2009a:29). This policy objective 
echoes the consensus of many analysts that increasing citizens’ participation in decision-
making processes through decentralization implies greater accountability and transparency 
among different actors (Evans, 1996; Blair, 2000; Ribot, 2002; Devas and Grant, 2003; 
Francis and James, 2003; Diaz-Serrano and Rodriquez-Pose, 2012). Blair (2000:35), for 
example, argues that participation and accountability are key objectives of decentralization 
reforms aimed at “bringing as many citizens as possible into the political arena and assuring 
that political leaders are responsible to the citizens for their actions.” Francis and James 
(2003:326) state that decentralization is “a cornerstone of good governance both in promo-
ting local accountability and transparency, and enfranchising local populations.”  
 While decentralization reforms aim at altering the social and political structures 
(Mendoza-Botelho, 2013), it is not clear how these reforms penetrate the social structures, 
and affect or are affected by cooperation and trust relations at the local level. In Tanzania, 
there is a dearth of information on the impact of decentralization reforms on cooperation 
and trust, and how this affects decision-making processes and delivery of public services. 
Similarly, the gender dimensions of cooperation and trust have received almost no attention 
in previous studies. The few existing studies show that there is ‘trust-deficit’ between admini-
strators and politicians at the district level (Jacobsen, 1999) and that there is a “strong sense 
of distrust between the citizens and their local leaders, and between the councillors and local 
staff” (Braathen et al., 2005:12). This chapter, therefore, investigates the impact of decentra-
lization reforms on cooperation and trust at the village level in Tanzania using a gender lens. 
The chapter addresses the questions: how does trust between local leaders and citizens affect 
decision-making processes and provision of water and health services, and to what extent 
have decentralization reforms increased cooperation and trust at the village level?  
The central concepts in this chapter are decentralization, cooperation and trust, 
which are all gendered processes. Decentralization is defined as “the transfer of power and 
responsibility to plan, make decisions and manage public functions from a higher level of 
government to a lower one” (Conyers, 1990:19). In simple terms, cooperation relates  to the 
notion of ‘mutual help’ which can be seen as collective action that aims at satisfying collective 
goals or meeting individual needs through pooling resources (Msonganzila, 2013). According 
to Meinzen-Dick et al. (2004), collective action entails involvement of a group of people in 
pursuit of a perceived shared interest within the group. In this chapter, cooperation is identi-
cal to collective action and the two concepts are used synonymously. Trust refers to “a mental 
status of favourable expectations” (Breeman, 2006:20). In other words, a person exhibits trust 
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if he/she believes that another actor (a person, group or institution) is willing and able to act 
in the interest of this person, even if there is no possibility to monitor the other actor’s 
intentions or actions (Jacobsen, 1999). The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. 
The next section presents the theoretical links between decentralization, cooperation and 
trust, viewing them from a gender perspective. We then describe how we have measured the 
key concepts and the methodology used in the study. Subsequently, we present and discuss 
the empirical findings and highlight the main conclusions of the study.   
7.2 Decentralization, cooperation, trust and gender: A theoretical framework 
The literature shows two opposite lines of arguments regarding the linkages between 
decentralization, cooperation and trust. Some scholars see cooperation and trust as prere-
quisites for decentralization while others view them as outcomes of decentralization. The first 
view posits that for participation and accountability to work effectively, a certain degree of 
cooperation and trust among the actors is required (World Bank, 1997; Ribot, 2002; 
Cleaver, 2005; Essau, 2008). In this, cooperation and trust are seen as indicators for 
meaningful decentralization (Fisher, 1999), because they foster collective action, participation 
and people’s belief in community-based structures (Evans, 1996; Narayan and Pritchett, 
1999; Nombo, 2007; Kuenzi, 2008). It is argued that how citizens interact with their leaders 
and participate in decision-making processes, depends on their level of trust in local politi-
cians, political institutions and service providers (Jacobsen, 1999; Essau, 2008). The second 
view treats decentralization as a strategy to empower citizens and build cooperation and trust 
because it promotes partnership between local leaders and citizens by bringing government 
officials and services closer to the people (Crook and Manor, 2000; Blind, 2006; Mendoza-
Botelho, 2013). The combination of trust, cooperation and collective action is seen as contri-
buting to effective service delivery, the main goal of decentralization reforms (Mendoza-
Botelho, 2013). It is argued that the inability of the government to deliver what it should and 
to act in the interest of the people can contribute to distrust between the citizens and the 
government (Essau, 2008). Thus, decentralization reforms which are aimed at increasing 
citizens' participation and improving service delivery may affect cooperation and trust, while 
cooperation and trust can also shape decentralization outcomes. This study looks at both 
mechanisms.  
 In the context of the current reforms in Tanzania, decision-making powers and 
service delivery functions have been decentralized to three administrative levels: district 
councils, wards and villages (URT, 2009a). In practice, this has meant the establishment of 
participation spaces and accountability mechanisms in form of local elections, public meeti-
ngs, participatory planning processes and other initiatives for promoting transparency and 
citizens’ access to information (Venugopal and Yilmaz, 2010; Masanyiwa et al., 2013). In 
theory, these mechanisms are vital in promoting synergetic relations between the government 
and citizens (Evans, 1996), and in increasing citizens’ trust in local government institutions, 
local leaders and service providers (World Bank, 1997; Ribot, 2002). Social capital theory 
suggests that cooperation and trust, and participation in public activities make it more likely 
for people to be active citizens and to engage in government institutions (Andersson, 2004; 
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Cleaver, 2005). Since increased trust between actors can facilitate their cooperation, and such 
cooperation is necessary for effective outcomes, we see a link between decentralization, 
cooperation and trust, that we aim to unravel using a gender perspective.  
 Levi and Stoker (2000) describe trust as a relational concept which involves an 
individual making herself vulnerable to another individual, group or institution that has the 
capacity to do her harm or betray her. Essau (2008) sees trust as an element that results in 
people surrendering their powers to institutions to make decisions on their behalf and to act 
in their interest. According to her, the liberal democratic model presupposes “a trusting 
electorate willing to surrender trust and allow the state to deliver on its mandate” and “a vigi-
lant electorate that takes on its roles and responsibilities as citizens through participating in 
policy-making processes” (Essau, 2008:357). The literature on trust shows two main types: 
political and social trust. Political trust happens when citizens appraise a government and its 
institutions and political leaders as promise-keeping, efficient, fair and honest (Blind, 2006). 
This form of trust is also called ‘institutionalized trust’ since it relates to citizens’ confidence 
in the formal governance institutions including formal procedures, political and judicial 
systems (Groenewald, 2012). This distinction, however, can be subtle as sometimes people 
trust institutions not because of their validity but because they trust the people that represent 
them (Mendoza-Botelho, 2013). An alternative perspective relates to the notions of ‘linking’ 
and ‘vertical’ social capital because political trust connects citizens with the key institutions 
and representatives including service providers (Grootaert et al., 2004:4).  
Social trust, which refers to “citizens’ confidence in each other as members of a social 
community” (Blind, 2006:5), is inseparable from political trust partly because “social 
resources feed into the political processes” (Beall, 2001:359).  Social trust is viewed as an 
essential ‘lubricant’ for cooperation in all aspects of public life since it reinforces expectations 
about collective action and reciprocity (Misztal, 2001) and as the ‘glue’ that holds societies 
together (Molyneux, 2002). Social trust is ‘horizontal’, as embedded in ‘bonding’ social 
capital (ties with closely related people) and ‘bridging’ social capital (ties with ‘other kind’ of 
people) (Grootaert et al., 2004; Bezanson, 2006; Patulny and Svendsen, 2007). Sub-categories 
of social trust are ‘personalized trust’, existing within established relationships and social 
networks, and ‘generalized trust’, when trust is extended to strangers (Patulny and Svendsen, 
2007; Groenewald, 2012). Both political and social trust influence people’s compliance with 
institutional rules and willingness to contribute to collective arrangements. Lack of trust can 
generate low accountability, ‘free-riding’ attitudes or create a situation where people refuse to 
pay taxes and/or to recognise and cooperate with their leaders (Mendoza-Botelho, 2013). 
While many social capital studies treat cooperation and trust as gender-neutral 
concepts (Molyneux, 2002; Bezanson, 2006), in reality social capital is embedded in power 
relations as part of the wider social structures (Evans, 1996). Molyneux (2002) states that 
social capital approaches have an implicit tendency to idealize communities and treat them as 
existing without structured power relations and conflict. Beall (2001) argues that social 
networks and associational life can be constrained by gender dynamics and the stereotypes 
underpinning them. Hence, cooperation and trust have to be understood within their 
cultural and political context in which gender plays an important role (Beall, 2001; 
Molyneux, 2002; Cleaver, 2005; Bezanson, 2006). Thus, this chapter uses a gender perspe-
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ctive in order to understand the role of gender in shaping cooperation and trust among the 
actors in decentralised institutions and service delivery arrangements. Molyneux (2002) 
explains that a gender perspective is essential in unravelling the social divisions and power 
relations at the household and community levels, and whether women deploy their social 
capital to enhance their leverage over political processes and service delivery arrangements. 
Since power relations within societies are reflected and reproduced by social relations, inclu-
ding the intra-household and extra-household gender relations (Molyneux, 2002), employing 
a gender perspective can provide a better understanding on how men and women exercise 
their agency in these processes.  
7.3 Measuring cooperation and trust at village level  
Social capital has been described as a ‘container concept’ with multiple dimensions (Groene-
wald, 2012). Our focus in this chapter is on the notions of cooperation and trust at the 
village level, because these dimensions of social capital are crucial in explaining the outcomes 
of the decentralization reforms, a process that entails political and social transformation 
(Mendoza-Botelho, 2013). In investigating their effects on decision-making processes and the 
provision of public services in the context of decentralization, we incorporate a gender 
perspective.  
Cooperation was measured in terms of people’s participation in formal and informal 
collective action activities and membership in groups and social networks in the villages. 
Social trust was operationalized as the respondents’ level of trust in members of the kin and 
ethnic group, neighbours, friends and strangers (cf. Grootaert et al., 2004). The respondents 
were also asked about their perceptions on the general level of trust in their villages and 
whether it had changed over the past ten years. Political trust was assessed in terms of the 
respondents’ trust in local leaders, service providers and local institutions. Instead of asking 
villagers about their trust in government in general, we focused on specific officials and 
institutions. Villagers have close contacts with these local authorities. Therefore, their respo-
nses reflect concrete experiences rather than abstract principles (cf. Tao et al., 2011). Gender 
is a cross-cutting theme in this study and was operationalized in terms of the gender division 
of labour in collective action activities, differences between men and women in group mem-
bership and social networks and in their trust in different people and local institutions.  
7.4 Methodology 
The data used in this chapter derive from a field research carried out between 2011 and 2012 
in two rural districts in Tanzania, namely Kondoa and Kongwa. The fieldwork was 
undertaken in ten purposively selected villages most of which had been involved in 
construction of water and/or health service infrastructures in recent years as part of the on-
going local government reforms. The survey data were collected from a random sample of 
332 households, involving 115 male and 217 female respondents and using a structured 
questionnaire. The qualitative data were obtained through semi-structured and unstructured 
interviews with district council officials and village leaders, and eight focus group discussions 
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with groups of men, women, village water committees and village health committees. 
Although it was possible to quantify most of the variables, cooperation and trust are essentia-
lly qualitative variables. In this way, a mix of survey and qualitative methods helped to 
capture the respondents’ perspectives (Patulny and Svendsen, 2007) and was useful in inter-
preting the data (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2004).  
 Qualitative data from the interviews and FGDs were analysed by reading through the 
field notes and transcripts to identify key themes and patterns relevant to the research 
questions and concepts (Patton, 2002). Descriptive statistics mainly frequencies and mean 
scores, and correlations were computed for most of the survey variables. Binary logistic 
regression was used to identify the determinants of group membership because the depen-
dent variable is dichotomous. Factor analysis using the Principal Component Analysis was 
performed on 16 trust variables (see Table 7.1) to reduce the multidimensionality of trust 
and identify the underlying common factors across the variables (cf. Narayan and Cassidy, 
2001; Grootaert et al. 2004; Field, 2009). Both the Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin measure of sampling 
adequacy (0.858) and Bartlett’s test of sphericity (p=0.00) confirmed the suitability of the data 
for Principal Component Analysis (Field, 2009). Based on Kaiser’s criterion, four compo-
nents with eigen-values greater than one were considered as separate factors and variables 
with factor loadings higher than 0.5 were considered as making up the factors (Field, 2009).  
Table 7.1: Rotated component matrix for trust variables 
Variable (level of trust in)  Factor loadings*  
Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Component 4 
People in the kin 0.168  0.742 0.214 
Friends and neighbours 0.170 0.175 0.789 -0.212 
People in the ethnic group 0.197 0.110 0.814 -0.202 
Strangers in the village 0.355 0.101 0.321 -0.495 
Hamlet chairperson  0.722 0.191  
Village chairperson 0.189 0.738   
Village executive officer 0.450 0.525  0.234 
Ward executive officer 0.698 0.328 0.124  
Ward councillor 0.753 0.126 0.232 -0.158 
Health staff in nearest health facility  0.300 0.684  -0.169 
Water pump attendant  0.405 0.320 0.302 0.532 
Village water committee    0.826 
Village council  0.550 0.509 0.186 0.121 
Ward development committee 0.779 0.273 0.104 -0.167 
District council staff 0.749 0.109 0.107 -0.261 
Member of parliament  0.689  0.179  
* Factors loadings higher than 0.05 are shown in bold. 
 
Table 7.1 shows that the first factor (component 1) is strongly loaded with trust in the 
ward development committee, ward councillor, district council staff and members of 
parliament. We call this ‘higher level political trust’. The second factor (component 2) has 
high factor loadings for trust in the village chairperson, hamlet chairperson, staff at the 
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nearest health facility, village executive officer and village council. This factor signifies ‘lower 
level political trust’. The third factor (component 3) is related to trust in people in the kin 
and ethnic group, friends, and neighbours, was labelled ‘personalised trust’. The last factor 
(component 4) is loaded highly with trust in the water pump attendants and village water 
committees, and we called it ‘institutionalized trust in water service providers’. This 
categorization conforms to the dimensions of trust discussed earlier. Personalised trust is a 
form of social trust while the other three categories are forms of political or institutionalized 
trust (cf. Grootaert et al., 2004; Blind, 2006; Groenewald, 2012). Since political trust is a 
multi-layered concept, using factor analysis it was differentiated into three categories.  
The next step was to find the determinants of both social and political trust. This was 
done by linear regression analysis with personalized and political trust as the dependent 
variables. The scores for all variables highly loading on one factor were added to create an 
index for each of the four factors. Gender related variables such as sex of respondent and 
household headship, and socio-demographic variables including age, household size, 
ethnicity, religion and duration of stay in the village, were included in the analysis as 
independent variables because many have been found to be related to social capital (Kuenzi, 
2008). Decision-making process indicators such as attendance in public meetings, partici-
pation in preparation of village plans and construction of service infrastructure, and decen-
tralization outcome indicators related to users’ satisfaction with water and health services 
were also included as independent variables. Group membership as a measure of cooperation 
was another independent variable.  
7.5. Results and discussion 
7.5.1 Cooperation in collective action activities  
People’s participation in local development projects through collective action in Tanzanian 
villages has a long history dating back to the Ujamaa villages of the early 1970s and 1980s 
(Jennings, 2003; Cleaver, 2005; Msonganzila, 2013). The on-going reforms have revitalized 
collective action by emphasizing community participation in development projects in order 
to enhance community ownership and sustainability of the service infrastructures (URT, 
2009a). Villagers participate in cooperative activities such as repairing roads, construction of 
schools and dispensaries, and digging boreholes or pipelines. Over three quarters of our 
respondents (77%) reported they had participated in the construction or rehabilitation of 
water facilities and 57 percent in health services infrastructures. Most respondents felt that 
their participation was necessary in order to ensure availability of public services in their 
villages. Significantly (p=0.03) more men than women indicated that ‘more than half’ of villa-
gers contribute their time and money to common development projects in their villages 
(Table 7.2). Men had a significantly (p=0.01) higher mean score than women, which could be 
interpreted as ‘more than half’ while that of women could be interpreted as ‘about half’, 
suggesting that women have a lower estimation of cooperative efforts at the local level.   
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Table 7.2: Perceptions on the proportion of people contributing time and money to common 
projects by sex (n=330) 
Rating  Men Women Both Chi-square value 
Less than half  9(8.0) 29(13.4) 35(11.5)  
χ2=9.045 
p=0.029** 
About half 22(19.5) 59(27.2)   81(24.5) 
More than half  71(62.8) 121(55.8) 192(58.2) 
Everyone  11(9.7) 8(3.7) 19(5.8) 
Mean score  3.74 3.50 3.58  
Figures in brackets are percentages.  **Significant at 5% level.  
 
 Collective labour activities and contributions are organised at hamlet and village 
levels, and local leaders are responsible for coordinating these activities with technical inputs 
from the district council officials. The interviews and FGDs revealed that most people in the 
villages turn up for these collective action activities. For example, village leaders in Sagara A 
estimated that about 90 percent of the adults in the village participate in such activities. 
Women mainly contribute their labour while men mostly contribute in cash. When both 
men and women contribute their labour, the activities they perform differ according to their 
gender roles. Village and ward leaders also fine villagers who do not turn up for these activi-
ties or fail to contribute otherwise. This means that the ‘right ways’ of participating in colle-
ctive action may place heavy burdens on some people, especially the poor, in terms of time 
and financial resources, which reinforces existing power relations of authority within the 
community (Cleaver, 2005). This also reveals the normative gender division of labour and 
the power relations reinforced by cultural norms within households and community. 
Molyneux (2002) notes that women’s involvement in such cooperative activities can be seen 
as a natural extension of their responsibilities within the ‘social reproduction domain’ which 
is taken for granted or assumed cost-free to women.  
Mendoza-Botelho (2013) argues that as part of decentralization reforms community 
participation is not just a formality but a basic condition for local governance. Accordingly, 
in Tanzania community participation in form of labour, cash or material contributions is a 
prerequisite for villages to receive district financial and technical support for development 
projects. This form of collective action is assumed to reduce the costs of development 
projects, enhance efficiency by mobilizing local resources, and to be sustainable because it is 
in the collective interest of the people (Molyneux, 2002). Collective action activities are also 
seen as necessary in ‘linking’ citizens with the government because citizens have particular 
service needs, and feel that their participation can contribute to improving the situation 
(Cleaver, 2005). Despite the importance of local leaders in coordinating collective action 
(Meinzen-Dick et al., 2004), the outcomes depend on the power and trust relations between 
the actors, because citizens want to experience the benefits of their participation through 
improved services (Essau, 2008). Although collective action has the potential to build trust 
(Evans, 1996; Anderson, 2004; Cleaver, 2005), it can also erode citizens’ trust in their leaders 
if the expected benefits are not realized. The case of the village dispensary in the village of 
Potea where citizens had been involved in the construction and were stopped by the district 
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council because they had not used the correct guidelines, illustrates this point. In Potea, 
women FGD participants expressed a high degree of distrust in the local leaders and district 
officials. “We gave our labour and money to pay the masons, the leaders promised us that we only 
needed to construct the walls, and the government [district council] would do the roofing and finishing. 
We did our part, but the government has done nothing for us all these years”, said a woman. Men 
FGD participants added: “This issue is talked about in every village meeting, but we do not see any 
solution. Why should we trust them [local leaders and district council officials] while they have failed to 
solve this problem for more than ten years now? ”  
 Apart from participating in ‘formal’ collective activities, people also cooperate in 
informally organised economic and social activities in the community. These include 
collective labour arrangements in farming, weddings and other festivals, funerals, providing 
assistance to friends and neighbours in cases of illnesses and borrowing money. People with 
oxen-drawn ploughs and carts usually hire them out to other villagers for cash or to be paid 
for after harvest. In all study villages, citizens and leaders stated that people were generally 
very cooperative towards each other. When asked about the likelihood of men versus women 
to cooperate to solve common problems in the village, 66 percent of the respondents indica-
ted both men and women, 27 percent said men only and 7 percent women only. The inter-
views and FGDs, however, revealed that women were generally more ‘cooperative’ than men. 
It was argued that women spend more time together in activities that are culturally seen as 
‘feminine’ such as fetching water, collecting firewood or attending clinics, as opposed to men 
who are mostly involved in ‘public domain’ activities.  
7.5.2 Cooperation through membership in groups and social networks 
Membership and participation in groups and social networks are important aspects of 
collective action because they enhance trust among people who come together to tackle 
common problems (Narayan and Pritchett, 1999; Cleaver, 2005; Nombo, 2007). The survey 
findings showed that 39 percent of households belonged to at least one group. Female-
headed households (47%) were more likely to be members of groups than male-headed 
households (37%). The number of groups households participated in ranged from one to 
seven, and the average was 1.3. Most of the households were members in burial and festival 
groups (44%), followed by savings and credit cooperative societies (32%) and religious groups 
(27%). Other groups were related to income generation (13%), political parties (10%), civil 
society or community based organisations (7%) and traditional dance groups (3%). Compara-
tively, group membership in the study villages is much lower than the 71 percent reported by 
Narayan and Pritchett (1999) or the 74 percent observed in Nombo’s (2007) study. However, 
as others have noted, an individual’s decision to participate in groups entails costs in terms of 
time and resources to contribute to the group (Molyneux, 2002; Cleaver, 2005), and is linked 
to the potential benefits that can be derived from it (Nombo, 2007). Thus, the balance of 
perceived costs and benefits of participating in groups could be barriers for some households. 
In this study, 34 percent of those who belonged to groups said the groups helped them to get 
money to pay for water and/or health services.  
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 The findings showed significant (p=0.00) differences between the villages on group 
membership. The highest proportions of group membership were observed in the villages of 
Manungu (79%), Mlanga (61%) and Sagara A (52%), while Kidoka and Humekwa had the 
lowest proportions (16%). This implies that the village characteristics could have an influence 
on group membership and associational life within the village. Cleaver’s (2005:901) study in 
the Usangu basin in Tanzania showed that “the type of associations predominating varied 
from village to village.” In this study, the qualitative data revealed that the high proportion of 
group membership in some of the villages was partly due to presence of the savings and credit 
societies (SACCOS) and the village community banks (VICOBA). Both SACCOS and 
VICOBA are promoted by the district council and other actors to stimulate individual and 
group savings aimed at achieving the ultimate goal of decentralization reforms, which is 
poverty reduction.  
 From a gender perspective, it is important to understand who (within the household) 
is a member in the groups. The survey revealed that women were significantly more likely to 
be members than men. In fact, most of the social groups such as burial and festival groups, 
religious groups and the income generating groups, were basically women groups. Men were 
mostly involved in political parties and in the purely economic groups like SACCOS and 
VICOBA whereas women were involved in almost all forms of groups. The regression 
analysis results (Table 7.3) confirm that household headship is positively and significantly 
associated with group membership. Through the interviews and FGDs we established that 
women in the study area are more ‘cooperative’ among themselves than men and, therefore, 
more likely to join groups and social networks. A woman village leader in Sagara A said: “We 
have many women income generating groups in this village. We do not see men joining these groups or 
establishing their own, except very few who are now members of the village community bank.” In Potea, 
women FGD participants explained that the village had seven exclusively women groups with 
more than 90 members. Similarly, village leaders in Mulua indicated that most women in the 
village were members of a number of groups, including the informal rotating credit schemes. 
This confirms the social capital perspective that sees “women as inherently social” (Cleaver, 
2005:894), partly because of their social ‘embeddedness’ in family and neighbourhood 
(Molyneux, 2002). The findings reveal women’s economic cooperation, although it is unclear 
whether the intra-household gender relations allow their control over the funds they generate 
(Molyneux, 2002). 
 These groups have created opportunities for women to meet and work together to 
improve their personal and household wellbeing and are also used as informal venues for 
women to discuss different issues, including the availability of public services in their villages. 
In this case, they act as informal organisations for mediating collective action and women’s 
participation in the formal village structures. On the one hand, these groups could be a result 
of the poverty reduction interventions promoted by the district councils as part of decentrali-
zation reforms. On the other hand, they could as well result from the barriers women face in 
participating in the formal decision-making processes, compelling women to resort to infor-
mal mechanisms. “That is where we talk about our things which we are not free to discuss in public 
meetings”, said women FGD participants in Potea. Essau (2008) argues that the specific 
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problems people face in their interactions with the government may contribute to the 
establishment of networks and associations within communities.  
 Significantly (p=0.00) more of the surveyed households in Kongwa (53%) than in 
Kondoa (25%) had membership in groups. In addition to the existence of SACCOS and 
VICOBA interventions in many villages in Kongwa as already shown, other possible reasons 
could be the high population density in the district and the ethnic and religious homo-
geneity. About three quarters (74%) of respondents in Kongwa belong to the Gogo ethnic 
group, and majority of them (96%) is Christian. Kondoa is ethnically and religiously more 
diverse. This explains why both ethnicity and religion came out as significant explanatory 
variables for group membership (Table 7.3). Since social groups and networks are built on 
trust among their participants, it is likely for people of the same ethnic or religious group to 
undertake collective action together. Kuenzi (2008) found that ethnic identity had a signifi-
cant impact on membership in voluntary organisations in Nigeria and Ghana. In this study, 
age does not show a significant relationship with group membership but it has a positive co-
efficient, suggesting that the possibility of joining groups increases with age. This is not 
surprising given the way prestige and social responsibilities in the community increase with 
age (Kuenzi, 2008).   
Table 7.3: Determinants of group membership (n=304) 
Explanatory variable  B-coefficient Standard error p-value 
District (1=Kongwa) 1.539 0.350 0.000*** 
Sex of household head (1=female) 0.843 0.422 0.046** 
Age of household head (years) 0.013 0.009 0.162 
Household size 0.045 0.057 0.432 
Education of household head (1=educated) -0.397 0.338 0.240 
Ethnicity (1=Gogo) 0.639 0.338 0.059* 
Religion (1= Christian) 0.809 0.436 0.064* 
Occupation (1=farming) 0.112 0.291 0.700 
Duration of stay in the village (1=since birth or 
more than 10 years) 
0.252 0.681 0.711 
Estimated annual income 0.000 0.000 0.305 
Constant  -1.398 0.651 0.032** 
Dependent variable: Group membership (1=yes), -2log Likelihood = 362.124, X2 = 42.093, df = 10, 
p=0.00. *Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5% level; ***Significant at 1% level.  
7.5.3 Trust at the village level  
The results on the levels of trust showed that most respondents, men and women alike, have 
high levels of trust in their kin, but low trust in strangers and village water committees (Table 
7.4). This means that people have higher ‘personalised’ than ‘political’ or ‘institutionalised 
trust’. Groenewald (2012:107) found the same in rural Mexico: “Households have higher 
scores on personalised trust than on generalized and institutionalised trust”. As Nombo 
(2007:155) says, “family relations are important in fostering trust.” The low level of trust in 
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the water committees is presumably due to the problems with the availability of water services 
and the lack of transparency about the revenues from water user fees. In most villages, village 
water committees currently are the main local institutions responsible for the management of 
the day-to-day functioning of water facilities. Respondents blamed them for the poor availa-
bility of the services and misappropriating water revenues. Many respondents in the villages 
where village water committees manage water facilities were dissatisfied with their services: 82 
percent in Mulua, followed by Khubunko (47%), Songambele A (46%) and Sagara A (46%). 
Villages with private water operators and little direct involvement of the water committees 
(Chamae and Kidoka), reported only 3 percent dissatisfied users.  
 In theory, the citizens have the mandate to recall committee members but this 
depends on the responsiveness of the village council to convene a village assembly, the formal 
forum where villagers can exercise their agency. In Chamae, reportedly a former water 
committee was dissolved for allegedly misusing water revenues. In many villages, however, 
such a course of action was not possible because meetings were not regularly held as per poli-
cy requirement. Villagers felt that village leaders did not convene the meetings for fear of 
facing negative reactions and resistance from the villagers, which could threaten their 
positions. In the village of Songambele A, men FGD participants revealed that three mem-
bers of the planning and finance committee had resigned because they were suspected of 
embezzling village funds, but no village assembly had been convened for over half a year to 
discuss the matter. Such unresolved issues and grievances may have contributed to citizens’ 
low institutionalised trust in the water committees and other village leaders. The World Bank 
(1997) argues that information exchange and transparency are vital for informed public 
debate, and for increasing trust and confidence in the government. Consequently, “lack of 
trust may lead to a situation where true opinions are hidden because of fear of reactions” 
(Jacobsen, 1999:850).  
To see if there were significant differences between men and women on the trust 
variables, a t-test was done. The findings show that men exhibit significantly (p=0.01) higher 
levels of trust in people in their ethnic group than women. Similarly, although not statisti-
cally significant, men have higher trust in people in kin, friends and neighbours than women. 
The low level of ‘personalised trust’ among women could be a result of living in a patriarchal 
system that is reinforced through family, marriage and kinship. Nombo (2007) shows that 
kinship and ethnicity are sites for reproduction and transmission of patriarchal relations in 
society, which may stifle women’s freedom of speech and participation in decision-making. In 
the study area, where patrilineal kinship prevails, women also have no inheritance rights. 
Therefore, kinship and ethnicity could be sources of distrust as they reinforce women’s 
subordination. However, women expressed higher levels of ‘lower political trust’ than men, 
as their significantly (p=0.00) higher trust scores for hamlet and village chairpersons show. 
Most women attend lower level meetings at hamlet and village levels, and therefore, have 
more frequent interactions with these lower level leaders. It could be observed that most men 
speak out in the meetings, while women just attend and listen. Perhaps because of this, men 
are more likely to be discontented with these leaders, which could lead to distrust. Women 
had significantly (p=0.019) lower trust in water pump attendants than men. Because fetching 
domestic water is women’s work, this could be due to the specific problems women experi-
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ence while fetching water, such as irregular opening hours of domestic water points, frequent 
pump breakdowns, or being unable to pay for the services. Bouckaert and van de Walle 
(2003) show that the frequency of use of the service and the directness of contact with the 
service providers has an influence on users’ satisfaction and trust in service providers. 
Table 7.4: Mean scores for trust levels by sex 
Trust variable  Men Women Both t-value 2-tail p-value 
People in the kin 2.93 2.87 2.89 1.623 0.106 
Friends and neighbours    2.63 2.56 2.58 1.280 0.202 
People in the ethnic group 2.70 2.53 2.59 2.808 0.005*** 
Strangers in the village 2.19 2.15 2.16 0.619 0.536 
Hamlet chairperson 2.61 2.78 2.72 -2.905 0.004*** 
Village chairperson 2.27 2.60 2.48 -4.423 0.000*** 
Village executive officer 2.30 2.34 2.33 -0.458 0.647 
Ward executive officer 2.42 2.39 2.40 0.370 0.711 
Ward councillor 2.43 2.40 2.41 0.335 0.738 
Health staff in nearest health 
facility 
2.44 2.53 2.50 -1.253 0.215 
Water pump attendant   2.63 2.41 2.49 2.370 0.019** 
Village water committee 2.11 2.01 2.05 0.963 0.336 
Village council 2.29 2.38 2.35 -1.178 0.240 
Ward development committee 2.31 2.25 2.27 0.836 0.404 
District council staff 2.35 2.32 2.33 0.396 0.692 
Member of parliament 2.49 2.43 2.45 0.773 0.440 
**Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level.  
 
When asked whether the level of trust in their villages had changed over the last ten 
years, about 70 percent of respondents said it had ‘gotten worse’, 15 percent indicated that it 
had ‘remained the same’ and another 15 percent said it had ‘improved’. The views of men 
and women on this issue showed no significant differences. The main reasons for the decline 
of trust included the lack of transparency of leaders, unresponsiveness of local leaders and 
officials, and the poor availability of public services. Many villagers valued their leaders but 
gave them a low trust rating because they do not see them as ‘promise keeping’ and respon-
sive. The FGD participants complained about the leaders’ unfulfilled promises to improve 
availability of public services and their failure to hold regular meetings. They stated that 
many villagers have low trust in the leaders. Men FGD participants in Songambele A cited an 
example when some discontented villagers had gone to the point of closing the village office 
for some days to pressurize their leaders to convene a village assembly. “How can we trust them 
[leaders] while we have many problems and they seem not to care about them? The last village assembly 
was held last year and even that one did not end up smoothly”, said men FGD participants. In the 
villages of Mulua, Kidoka, Humekwa and Sagara A, land related conflicts were also mention-
ed as causes for the declining level of trust. Although the sources of such conflicts are many 
and not only related to village leaders, villagers blame their leaders for not being fair and just 
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in resolving these conflicts, a situation which gives rise to distrust amongst the villagers them-
selves, and between villagers and leaders. While decentralization reforms aim at enabling 
citizens to “demand transparency and accountability” from their leaders (URT, 2009a:29), 
these findings suggest that poor transparency of village leaders contributes to eroding social 
and political trust.  
7.5.4 Determinants of social and political trust 
Table 7.5 shows the results of the regression analyses in which the four categories of trust 
described in section 7.4 are the dependent variables. In the first model, gender is negatively 
associated with personalised trust implying that women have low personalised trust. This 
confirms our earlier observation on how gender relations which are experienced and repro-
duced by the socio-cultural norms, can contribute to women’s low personalised trust. 
Cleavers (2005:903) observes that women are disadvantaged “through their reliance on patri-
archal systems of family, marriage and local government.” Household size turns out to be 
negatively correlated with personalised trust. It could be that large households entail more 
domestic responsibilities, especially for women, which limits their time for socializing and 
thus contributes to low personalised trust. Ethnicity has a significant impact on personalised 
trust, suggesting that belonging to the largest ethnic group implies high personalised trust. 
Duration of stay in the village is also a significant factor. Most respondents had been living in 
the study area since birth (67%) or for than ten years (28%). Hence, they have strong ties 
with their neighbours and friends. Longer duration of stay in an area provides the oppo-
rtunity for building social capital through interactions and enables people to develop strong 
ties and dense networks and to engage in reciprocal relations (Nombo, 2007). Attendance in 
public meetings is also significantly related to personalised trust, because public meetings 
provide opportunities for interactions and cooperation among villagers. This is an important 
finding considering that statutory public meetings at the village level are instrumental for the 
current reforms to promote people’s participation in decision-making processes and as 
accountability mechanism. We found that both ‘lower level’ and ‘higher level political trust’ 
are positively and significantly related to personalised trust. Kuenzi (2008) also found a signi-
ficant correlation between political and interpersonal trust in Nigeria and Ghana.  
 The factors related to ‘lower level political trust’ are shown in the second model 
(Table 7.5). Again, attendance in public meetings is significantly associated with lower level 
political trust. Apart from being channels for citizens to voice their needs regarding public 
service delivery and other development issues, the meetings are also used for communicating 
policies and directives from higher government levels. Almost half (45%) of respondents 
depended on public meetings as their source of information for district council matters. 
However, this factor has a negative coefficient meaning that citizens who attend public 
meetings are more likely to have low political trust, presumably because they have no 
influence on how decisions are made and whether such decisions are implemented. As expe-
cted, users’ satisfaction with water and health services is positively and significantly related to 
this form of trust. These findings are line with Bouckaert and van de Walle (2003) who show 
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that the functioning of public services is an important criterion most citizens use to judge the 
trustworthiness of their leaders.  
Table 7.5: Determinants of social and political trust 
Explanatory variables Unstandardized B-coefficients  
Model 1 
(personalised 
trust) 
Model 2  
(lower level 
political trust) 
Model 3  
(higher level 
political trust) 
Model 4 
(trust in water 
providers) 
Sex of respondent (1=female) -0.303* 0.121 0.184 -0.071 
Age of respondent (years) 0.000 -0.006 0.010 0.004 
Household size -0.109*** 0.052 0.022 0.026 
Household headship (1=female headed) 0.145 0.390 -0.936* -0.530** 
Education of respondent (1=educated) -0.207 0.242 -0.253 0.060 
Ethnicity (1=Gogo) 0.486** 0.312 -0.100 0.718 
Religion (1=Christian) 0.286 -0.690 0.451 -0.360 
Duration of stay in the village  (1= since 
birth or more than 10 years) 
0.817** 0.443 0.157 -0.620* 
Membership in groups (1=yes) 0.035 0.149 0.573** -0.143 
Attendance in public meetings (1=yes) 0.913*** -0.858* 0.901 -0.212 
Participation in preparation of village plans 
(1=yes) 
-0.099 -0.346 -0.032 0.272* 
Participation in water infrastructure (1=yes) 0.039 -0.005 0.296 0.275 
Participation in health infrastructure 
(1=yes) 
0.127 -0.045 -0.282 -0.138 
Satisfied with water services (1=yes) 0.357* 0.625** 0.160 0.871*** 
Satisfied with health services (1=yes) 0.089 0.735*** 0.275** 0.150 
Personalised trust  0.378*** 0.449*** 0.088 
Lower level political trust 0.144***  0.592*** 0.064 
Higher level political trust 0.129*** 0.448***  0.025 
Institutionalised trust in water providers 0.102 0.194 0.101  
Constant 5.308*** 2.669* -0.593 2.366*** 
R2 0.369 0.501 0.492 0.335 
F-value 6.243 10.720 10.325 5.377 
*Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5% level, ***Significant at 1% level.  
 
 The third model shows that household headship is negatively associated with ‘higher 
level political trust’, possibly because women household heads are rarely involved in higher 
level decision-making. This means that gender is a one of the barriers to women’s partici-
pation in decentralized institutions which contributes to low political trust. The positive 
relationship between group membership and this form of political trust could be a result of 
the district councils’ interventions in promoting the formation of economic groups such as 
SACCOS, VICOBA and other income generating groups. Ward and district community 
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development officers in collaboration with local leaders are responsible for mobilizing, 
registering, training and mentoring these groups. In this case, social capital embodied by 
membership of groups and social networks contributes to political trust. Users’ satisfaction 
with health services is also related to this type of trust, because provision of health services is 
seen as the responsibility of the government, in this case the district council. Thus, citizens 
who are satisfied with health services and live in villages with health facilities, see the govern-
ment as responsive to their needs, hence have a high degree of trust in ward and district 
council officials.  
 The last model in Table 7.5 relates to institutionalised trust in water service providers. 
Gender is an important explanatory variable as shown by the significantly negative coefficient 
on household headship, meaning that female-headed households have low institutionalised 
trust in water providers. This is not surprising because more female headed households 
(40%) than male-headed households (31%) were dissatisfied with water services. Duration of 
stay in the village is also significantly and negatively correlated with trust in water providers 
implying that the longer a respondent has lived in the village, the lower the level of trust in 
water providers. Half of the respondents reported either ‘no improvements’ (39%) or 
‘deterioration’ (11%) in the number of improved water sources in their villages. This means 
that their experience with the new decentralized water providers contributes to eroding trust. 
Participation in preparation of village plans is also a significant variable, implying that 
citizens who had participated in this were likely to have more trust in water providers. Again, 
users’ satisfaction with water services is positively associated with trust in water providers, 
confirming the earlier observations on the same issue.   
 
7.6 Conclusion 
It is evident from the findings that decentralization reforms have invigorated ‘formal’ 
collective action activities aimed at improving availability of public services at the village level. 
These collective action arrangements are characterised by principal-agent interactions 
(Hiskey, 2010) with agents seemingly having more power over their principals than vice versa. 
This has negative consequences for political trust, especially when the expected benefits of 
people’s involvement in the cooperative efforts are not realized. In some cases, there are also 
tensions between the local leaders and district council officials (also a principal-agent 
dynamic). When the central government and district councils do not deliver what they pro-
mised as part of the decentralisation reforms, local leaders cannot meet the expectations of 
their citizens. This causes loss of political trust. 
 Participation in formal and informal collective activities is influenced by the gender 
division of labour and the power relations within the household and society. Gender also 
influences membership in groups and social networks partly because they act as ‘informal’ 
venues for women to participate in decision-making processes. Groups and networks are 
valuable not only because they help women to meet basic needs for their households, but also 
for the role they play in building social and political trust and public connectedness, especi-
ally since women are mostly excluded from the formal political processes. This suggests that 
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women’s mobilization in collective activities is mainly resonating around basic needs provi-
sion to meet the practical needs for their households (Molyneux, 2002). When women do 
participate in political processes their strategic gender needs could be met as well (Moser, 
1993). Cleaver (2005), however, cautions that assuming that individuals, and in particular 
women, can use social networks and participation in informal institutions to move out of 
their disadvantaged position, can lead to individuals being seen as responsible for their own 
marginalisation and exclusion from formal processes. This may preclude the efforts to change 
the socio-cultural constraints limiting effective women’s participation in formal structures.  
Participation in decision-making processes is related to political trust. The direction 
of this relationship can be either positive or negative, depending on the nature of the interac-
tions between the actors and its results. This means that decentralization processes are 
contributing to both building and eroding trust, and this also differs by administrative level 
and gender. For instance, the findings show that citizen’s attendance in public meetings and 
their involvement in preparation of village plans and construction of water and health service 
infrastructure are negatively related to lower level political trust. Villagers perceive their 
leaders as not transparent, accountable and responsive to local needs and are discontented 
with the outcomes of these decision-making processes. At the higher level, attendance in 
public meetings is positively associated with ‘higher level political trust’ because citizens view 
their participation as an opportunity to interact with higher level leaders and officials, to 
voice their service delivery needs and to leverage resources from the government. This form 
of ‘linking social capital’ is crucial in connecting the villagers with the ward and district 
council officials, and helps to build political trust especially for men who are actively involved 
in higher level decision-making. But, it could also decrease women’s political trust because 
they are mostly excluded from such processes.  
 Decentralization outcomes in terms of improved water and health services have 
significant effects on political trust at all levels. Citizens judge the ability of their leaders in 
terms of tangible service delivery outcomes. Poor accessibility of public services is associated 
with poor leadership and can lead to decreased political trust, especially among women who 
are the main users of water and health services. This suggests that decentralization reforms 
could contribute to increasing the level of political trust by improving public services. Our 
findings, however, show that the availability of water and health services shows considerable 
variation across villages. Consequently, political trust continues to dwindle, especially in villa-
ges where citizens see the government as not meeting their needs for improved water and 
health services.  
Overall, this study has demonstrated that decentralization outcomes such as increased 
participation in decision-making processes and improved services have influence on social 
and political trust at the village level where gender relations also play an important role. The 
study has also empirically shown the two-way interface between trust and decentralization 
reforms. On the one hand, trust enhances participation in decentralized institutions and 
decision-making and ‘good’ decentralization outcomes can generate trust. On the other hand, 
‘bad’ decentralization outcomes decrease trust. This study further reveals that political trust is 
a multi-layered concept due to the presence of multiple local institutions, local leaders and 
service providers at different administrative levels. Hence, it is important to consider these 
Decision making under the tree 
 
132 
 
levels in analysing political trust so as to unravel its multi-dimensional character and the 
impact of gender on political trust at different levels.  
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions and synthesis 
 
8.1 Introduction  
This study has investigated the impact of decentralization reforms on service delivery in two 
rural districts in Tanzania using a gender perspective. Decentralization has been a popular 
topic in the development policy and governance literature in Tanzania for many years. 
However, its impact on service delivery has only recently received attention. Many recent 
empirical studies in Tanzania have mainly focused on the fiscal, administrative and political 
dimensions of decentralization. Little attention has been paid to the local socio-cultural 
context in which decentralization is implemented and its impact on service delivery. 
Consequently, less is known about the process and the impact of the reforms on improving 
service delivery, and about the enabling and constraining factors for the expected benefits of 
decentralization at the local level. 
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The study used the cases of domestic rural water supply and primary healthcare 
services because of their importance in improving people’s welfare, their collective provision, 
and their limited accessibility in most rural areas in Tanzania. Domestic water supply and 
primary healthcare services are also among the development interventions intended to meet 
women’s practical gender needs. Although these services are shared by all household 
members, they are often identified as women’s practical gender needs, not only by policy 
makers, but also by women themselves because the services are critical for women to enable 
them to assume their domestic responsibilities that almost universally are assigned to them 
(Moser, 1993; March et al., 1999). Women’s participation in planning, decision-making 
processes and management of these services also contributes to meeting their strategic gender 
needs by challenging the institutionalised forms of subordination and ensuring equality in 
local political processes (Moser, 1993).  
Therefore, this study, used a gender perspective to examine the process and impact of 
decentralization reforms at village and household levels where the expected beneficiaries of 
the reforms live, are expected to participate in the decentralized decision-making structures, 
and to make use of decentralized public services. Throughout the thesis, however, the study 
findings are compared with general figures at district and national levels. In this way, the 
study was positioned within the broader national context, and to draw relevant lessons and 
conclusions that can be applied to other rural districts in the country.  
The main research question in this study was: how does decentralization affect the 
user-provider interactions and delivery of gender-sensitive public services at the local level in 
rural areas in Tanzania? Specifically, the study concentrated on four thematic areas. In 
Chapter 3, the study investigated the institutional arrangements for decentralised public 
services delivery and the power relations between actors at different levels. In Chapter 4, the 
study focused on service user’s participation in decision-making processes and how it contri-
butes to meeting women’s practical and strategic gender needs. Chapters 5 and 6 dealt with 
the impact of the reforms on access to gender-sensitive water and health services, respectively, 
for village- and household-level users. In Chapter 7, the study aimed at gaining insight on the 
impact of the reforms on cooperation and trust at the local level and their effects on decision-
making processes and service delivery.  
 This final chapter presents the overall findings and general conclusions of the study 
as revealed in the preceding chapters. The chapter is divided in four parts. The second part 
revisits and discusses the main findings and conclusions by summarizing and reflecting on 
the answers to the research questions formulated in Chapter 1. This discussion is done in 
light of the theoretical perspectives and in view of the existing scientific knowledge. The third 
part provides a general discussion on the theoretical and methodological concerns emerging 
from the study. The last part offers some policy recommendations and interventions for 
further research.  
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8.2 Answering the research questions   
8.2.1 Institutional arrangements for decentralized water and health services 
Research question 1: What are the main institutional characteristics of the current decentralization 
processes with regard to water and health services delivery in rural districts in Tanzania, and what are 
the factors that constrain the realization of decentralization?  
 Chapter 3 addressed this question using principal-agent theory and broader decentra-
lization frameworks. The study found that decentralization reforms have resulted into signifi-
cant institutional changes in the form of administrative and elected representative structures 
to facilitate delivery and management of public services at the local level. The reforms have 
re-structured the district councils and village councils as the higher and lower levels of 
government, respectively, thereby assigning to these two structures the responsibility for the 
overall planning and coordination of service delivery functions at district and village levels. In 
principle, these institutional changes should have brought ‘government and services closer to 
the people’ (cf. Conyers, 1990; Devas and Grant, 2003; Bergh, 2004; Maharaj and Maharaj, 
2004; World Bank, 2004; Ribot et al., 2006). The effectiveness of these structures in realizing 
their decentralized mandates, however, depends on the central-local relations, their financial 
and technical capacity, the administrative level at which they function and the type of sector 
involved. This has implications for either improving or constraining service delivery, and for 
whether decentralization takes on the form of deconcentration, delegation or devolution, as 
discussed below.  
 The legal and institutional framework has devolved powers and responsibilities to 
district councils (agents) to enact by-laws, raise revenues, prepare development plans and 
budgets, and recruit their own personnel. This has resulted into increased degree of auto-
nomy and financial resources to district councils. However, the scope and autonomy of 
district councils to address local service delivery needs is constrained because the central 
government ministries (principals) still retain significant powers especially with regard to 
financial and human resources allocation, and in determining priority interventions. Crook 
(2003:73) refers to this situation as “the politics of central-local relations” which “explains 
what interests might gain or lose from any set of institutional opportunities, policy initiatives 
and resource allocation.” In our case, the reforms do not seem to have achieved their aim of 
abolishing the previous central-local “command relations” (URT, 1998:15) because district 
councils are still regarded as implementing agents of central government policies and 
priorities at the expense of local development needs and priorities. Similar problems have 
been reported in other sub-Saharan African countries (cf. Andrews and Schroeder, 2003; 
Crook, 2003; Conyers, 2007) and in previous studies in Tanzania (e.g. Kessy and McCourt, 
2010; Venugopal and Yilmaz, 2010). While some of the upward controls are justified as part 
of the balance required between local autonomy and upward accountability (de Visser, 2005; 
Venugopal and Yilmaz, 2010), there is excessive central government interference in the 
functioning of local governments. This contradicts the objectives of creating ‘largely autono-
mous’ local governments as envisioned in the reform policy documents (URT, 1996, 2009a).  
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The reforms did establish sector-specific service boards and committees with 
representatives from the users, administrators, local politicians and service providers (public 
and private) at each administrative level or service delivery point. In the health sector, these 
include the council health service boards, ward and village health committees, and health 
facility committees. In the water sector, they include the district water and sanitation teams, 
and village water committees. This arrangement has provided opportunities for service users 
to get involved in the management and monitoring of service delivery functions. Hence, 
theoretically the service committees have the potential to facilitate service users’ participation 
(Mehrotra, 2006) and to promote bottom-up input into development programmes and 
projects (Manor, 2004; Jayal, 2006). These local institutions can be seen as “consisting of new 
sets of rules that structure the relationship” between village- and district-level actors (Singh, 
2008:929). However, the corresponding central-local relations discussed above and the 
behaviour of district-level administrators have caused most village level service committees to 
in fact function more as ‘delivery systems’. They implement existing and often centrally 
designed development projects (Manor, 2004) because they do not have the autonomy to 
plan and allocate resources.   
At the village level, the study revealed the ambiguity about the power relations 
between village councils and service committees. The village assembly is theoretically the 
supreme decision-making organ at that level. It has the mandates to elect the village council 
and other committees, recall or dissolve the committees. There are some cases where water 
committees have been dissolved by village councils or where the village council decided to 
spend revenues collected from water user fees on other activities than the operation and 
maintenance of water sources for which they are meant. This shows that the formal remit of 
water committees is contributing to reinforcing upward accountability to village councils and 
higher level authorities but less in ensuring downward accountability to service users (Manor, 
2004). Hence, there is confusion about the accountability of village water committees: are 
they answerable to the village council and other higher level administrative structures, or to 
service users? In the health sector, there is lack of clarity about the roles and functions of 
health facility committees and those of village and ward health committees which perform 
more or less similar functions at the same administrative levels.  
An important finding is that the type of the sector plays a role in determining the 
type of institutional arrangements and the power relations between the actors in the 
institutions. The health sector has a more elaborate and clearly defined top-down arrange-
ment from the village and health facility level upwards to the centre, whereas the water sector 
exhibits both top-down and bottom-up models. As a result, village-level service users are more 
involved in the management of water sources than primary healthcare facilities that are more 
centrally controlled by higher level agents at district and national levels. The difference can 
be attributed to the sectoral characteristics, which influence the capacity of actors, principals 
and agents to organise and assert control over each other (Batley, 2004). Different from water 
problems, the scope of primary health problems tends to extend beyond a local area. Health 
interventions are, therefore, more subject to central government involvement especially in 
setting priorities, financing, and human resource allocation and staffing. The case of the 
village dispensary in the village of Potea described in Chapter 6, for example, exemplifies the 
Conclusions and synthesis 
 
137 
 
problems that may arise from delegation of technical responsibilities to villagers who lack the 
technical expertise.  
Viewing these findings in light of the decentralization typology presented in Chapter 1, 
it can be concluded that decentralization for public services delivery in the study area has 
been complex, involving devolution of some responsibilities and functions to district- and 
village-level actors, and retention of some powers by the central government in the form of 
deconcentration or delegation. This endorses the view point that the three types of decentra-
lization can be implemented simultaneously (Rondinelli and Nellis, 1986; Manor, 1999). For 
instance, financial and human resource allocation and management exhibit the form of 
deconcentration because control over ‘implementation decisions’ is decentralized to district 
councils (Conyers, 2006). In policy, district councils have the power for planning and 
budgeting, but district plans and budgets have to be approved by central government. At the 
beginning of the reforms, the central government gave substantial powers to district councils 
to levy local taxes in addition to central government transfers. In 2003, a number of 
‘nuisance taxes’ which were the main sources of district councils’ local revenue were 
abolished (Lund, 2007; Yoshida, 2008). This means that local tax raising authority was 
‘withdrawn’ from district councils, thus creating a degree of accountability to the centre in 
the form of delegation (Rondinelli and Nellis, 1986; Litvack et al., 1998; de Visser, 2005). 
Similarly, decentralization of primary healthcare services is more inclined towards decon-
centration because the allocation of responsibilities is still “within the hierarchy of central 
government” (de Visser, 2005:14), although some responsibilities have been delegated to 
district councils and health facility committees.  
The establishment and functioning of service committees especially in the water sector 
represents a move towards devolution, because they are aimed at strengthening service users’ 
voice and the relationship between service users and service providers (World Bank, 2004, 
2010). The cases documented in Chapter 5 show that decentralization of rural water supply 
has not only devolved responsibilities to village councils and village water committees, but 
also externalised operation and maintenance costs to users. Village councils and water 
committees are in charge of managing water facilities in their villages with technical support 
from the district water departments. Some villages have contracted private operators to run 
their water facilities, suggesting that decentralization can also take the form of privatization. 
There is evidence to show that private operators are doing better in revenue collection for 
sustaining the operation and maintenance costs than village water committees. Despite the 
shortcomings highlighted above, these institutional arrangements in the water sector have 
partly achieved the principle of subsidiarity by bringing service provision closer to the users 
and devolving or delegating political and administrative powers to lower levels (URT, 1998, 
2008a). 
8.2.2 Service users’ participation in decision-making processes  
Research question 2: To what extent have decentralization reforms increased women’s opportunities 
for participation in local decision-making processes with regard to water and health services delivery, and 
how are women’s gender roles and needs reflected in these processes?  
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 The relevance of this question stems from both theoretical and policy arguments. 
Theoretically, decentralization is expected to foster people’s participation in local decision-
making structures including that of women (cf. Litvack et al., 1998; Manor, 1999; Bryld, 
2001; Bergh, 2004; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006; Ribot et al., 2006; Lakwo, 2009). 
Decentralization policy documents in Tanzania view people’s participation in planning and 
decision-making processes as crucial in mediating “the interaction between the LGAs and 
their citizens” (URT, 2009a:66). Chapter 4 focused on this question using the gender 
perspective and the principal-agent theory. This study contends that the impact of 
decentralization on women’s participation in local decision-making processes is of great 
importance, but one that is often overlooked. Many commentators have stressed on the 
importance of community participation as a means of improving service delivery, but little 
attention has been paid to what happens within local communities. In Tanzania, as in other 
sub-Saharan African countries, most studies on gender and decentralization have focused on 
women’s representation in higher level structures (districts and municipalities) but rarely on 
the lower village levels. This study moves this debate down to the village level.  
 The study showed that in order to enhance people’s participation in decision-making 
processes, the reforms have created new institutional spaces for participation. These include 
hamlet and village-level public meetings, consultation meetings during preparation of village 
annual plans, district full council meetings, collective activities in construction of service 
infrastructure, and village councils and committees. Citizens are encouraged to participate 
actively in these spaces, which has increased the overall level of their participation. 
Attendance in lower level hamlet and village public meetings is high for both men and 
women. In most villages, however, the frequency of village assemblies is lower than stipulated 
by policy. Similarly, most villagers have little influence in village meetings because village 
plans are not consistently used as basis for district plans. It was established that less than half 
of those who attended public meetings either spoke up in them or felt they had influence in 
reaching decisions. For women this proportion was only about one third. These observations 
suggest that although most village public meetings are well attended, many citizens, 
particularly women, do not participate effectively and only engage in the ‘passive’ form of 
participation (cf. Agarwal, 2001, 2010). Despite women’s numerical strength in public 
meetings, substantial male presence limits their voice. Thus, the formal institutional changes 
brought about by the reforms have not necessarily expanded women’s influence in local 
decision-making processes due to socio-cultural norms and the power imbalance between 
men and women.  
A key feature of the reforms has been the introduction of quota-based representation 
(known as ‘special women seats’ in Tanzania), which requires that women should account for 
at least one quarter of members in all village-level representative bodies. This initiative has 
contributed to increasing the proportion of women in village decision-making organs. In the 
study area, women account for about one third of the village councillors and up to 50 
percent of members in other village committees. Clearly, without the affirmative action, 
women could not possibly have been elected to these institutions in such numbers. In fact, 
women’s membership and participation in village committees is a move towards the ‘active’ 
form of participation (cf. Agarwal, 2001, 2010). Women committees members had relatively 
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more ‘freedom’ to speak up in committee meetings partly because of the small size of the 
committees. The gender composition of committees differed, with high proportions of 
women in service related committees such as social welfare, water and health that are 
traditionally seen as ‘feminine’. In committees like those for planning and finance or 
security, women were less represented because these domains are seen as ‘masculine’.  
 Despite the efforts to increase women’s presence in village-level decision-making 
spaces, still, decision-making processes continue to be visibly male-dominated. Apart from the 
patriarchal system where women are denied the opportunities by their husbands to vie for 
local leadership positions, their household responsibilities and the complicated election 
procedures are also the main obstacles to effective participation for the majority of women. 
Lack of self-confidence and being less experienced in public affairs also inhibit women’s 
active participation in local structures. In villages with a predominantly Muslim population 
religion is also a limiting factor, whereas age and ethnicity play a role in almost all the study 
villages. This implies that decentralized participation has not challenged the locally existing 
gender power relations, which are reproduced and reinforced through patriarchy and other 
social structures such as ethnicity and religion. Evidence from other studies shows that most 
women representatives cannot influence local decision-making because they lack the 
authority and self-confidence to participate on an equal basis with men (Conyers, 2007), and 
because of the socio-culturally underpinned subordinate position of women (Maharaj and 
Maharaj, 2004; Hicks, 2011). This supports the argument that ensuring effective and gender-
sensitive participation in local decision-making processes requires more than meeting quanti-
tative targets through affirmative action (Hicks, 2011). It also requires fundamental changes 
in men’s attitudes and in patriarchal institutions (Maharaj and Maharaj, 2004).  
Notwithstanding the limitations identified above, it is evident from the findings that 
the extent and quality of women’s participation is gradually improving with increasing female 
presence in local decision-making structures and other public spaces. Thus, these findings 
should not be interpreted as if ‘all women’ were not effectively participating in the local 
decision-making spaces. In fact, three categories of women can be distinguished in the study 
area: those who were not participating at all (mainly the youth), those who participated 
‘passively’ by just attending meetings or contributing their labour and money to construction 
of service infrastructures, and those who were actively involved in village committees and 
other public spaces. Despite the demanding domestic responsibilities, coupled by the political 
and social barriers, women in the third category were attempting to address the challenges of 
the private and public spheres with vitality and could effectively influence decisions in the 
interests of other women in their villages.  
 The implications of these results are two-fold. On the one hand, the findings signify 
increased women’s participation in local decision-making structures as exemplified by the 
cases of successful women leaders. The current reforms have contributed to these improve-
ments by generating new public spaces for interaction, negotiation and contestation between 
citizens and local leaders, and through the quota system for women. On the other hand, they 
indicate that the majority of women participate ‘passively’ and that they rely on the efforts 
and ‘voice’ of few women leaders. Hence, much still needs to be done to bring more women 
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into the public arena of local politics and to make local decision-making processes gender-
sensitive.  
 The second part of the research question addresses the issue of whether women’s 
participation in local structures has enabled them to articulate both their practical and 
strategic gender needs and perhaps even to translate them into locally relevant policy 
outcomes. In other words, the question is ‘how’ do they participate in these structures and 
whether their participation can be considered effective in addressing their gender needs. 
Women’s opportunities to influence decision making in local structures depends on how and 
whether they represent women’s interests, whether they can raise their voices and, when they 
do, whether they are listened to (Cornwall, 2003). Moser’s (1993) framework of practical and 
strategic gender needs was used to investigate this because it “differentiate(s) between ways of 
reasoning about gender relations” (Molyneux, 1998:232). The study also looked at the gender 
division of labour and gender roles by examining the convenience of public meetings to 
women in order to explain how women’s ‘triple roles’ in the reproductive, productive and 
community management domains were reflected in these processes (Moser, 1993; March et 
al., 1999).    
 It was found that women’s reproductive gender roles are considered in organising 
village public meetings especially regarding their timing. Gender roles and needs are also 
reflected in what men and women talk about in the meetings, and in reaching decisions that 
have direct implications for women’s lives. In the meetings, women mainly talked about basic 
services such as water, health or education, which are seen as belonging to the women’s 
domain or as an extension of their reproductive roles (March et al., 1999). Women’s 
participation in consultation processes during the preparation of village plans and in the 
construction of service infrastructures, also contributed to meeting their practical gender 
needs. Membership in village councils and committees, holding leadership positions in the 
committees, and ability to speak up and influence decisions in meetings were the most 
‘effective’ and ‘interactive’ forms of participation that enabled women to address both the 
practical and strategic gender needs. However, few women and mostly leaders were able to 
achieve these higher levels of participation. Thus, women’s participation in the available 
spaces did play a positive role in addressing a range of practical gender needs, but that their 
impact on the strategic gender needs was less remarkable. 
 The study revealed that the reforms have put emphasis on creating formal structures 
but have done little about transforming the informal socio-cultural norms that influence the 
intra- and extra-household gender relations. In most cases, the village level is used as focal 
point for mobilising and organising people’s participation in planning, decision making and 
service delivery. Seemingly, village communities have been treated as homogeneous entities in 
which men and women participate on an equal basis. The existing differences in power 
relations and interests based on gender, age, ethnicity and religion have been taken for 
granted. For instance, it was found that most youth do not participate in the available public 
spaces and when they do, they have little influence. Similarly, most women used their social 
networks and groups as informal mechanisms to discuss different issues including the 
availability of public services in their villages, perhaps because they were excluded from or 
could not participate effectively in the formal structures. While some of these constraints are 
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beyond the scope of the reforms, the reforms have not adequately taken them into account. 
The current reforms have tended to ignore these problems instead of identifying how they 
can be tackled within the current political and administrative frameworks at the village level.  
8.2.3 Impact of decentralization reforms on water and health services delivery 
Research question 3: To what extent has the delivery of gender-sensitive water and health services to 
rural households been improved, after the decentralization reforms?  
 Chapters 5 and 6 focused on this research question. Although partly overlapping, 
Chapter 5 used a users’ and a gender perspective, and Chapter 6 adopted a gendered users’ 
perspective. With regard to both types of services, particular attention was paid to women 
users because of their disadvantaged position and their specific water and health needs 
compared to those of men. This was not intended to marginalize men’s water and health 
needs, but to show the similarities and differences in the views and interests of men and 
women users in the local context.  
The major finding of this study is that the effects of the reforms on the services are 
mixed. Access to the services has improved for some users but has also led to marginalization 
of other users. In the water sector, the reforms have contributed to increasing the number of 
improved water sources, thus raising the proportion of households with access to improved 
domestic water sources. Although water supply coverage in both districts is still below the 
national average of 58 percent, about half of the households in the study area (48%) have 
access to improved domestic water sources within 1km in the dry season. Similarly, the 
number of dispensaries and health centres has increased. Currently, close to two thirds 
(62%) of households in the study area live within 5km from the nearest health facility, 
although this is still below the national average of 90 percent. The proportions of 
professionally assisted deliveries and family planning users have also increased. Most users 
acknowledged ‘some improvements’ in the availability of water and health services over the 
past ten years, but more users (68%) were satisfied with water services than with health 
services (59%), perhaps because there were more tangible changes in the former than in the 
latter. Since there are no non-state service providers of domestic water and primary health 
services in the study villages and given the recent and on-going government interventions to 
construct service infrastructure, these improvements can be largely attributed to the decentra-
lization reforms. 
Men and women had similar views on the perceived improvements, and on the 
appropriateness for women of the water and health services on most aspects. In the water 
sector, both men and women held similar opinions with regard to the perceived changes in 
the number of improved water sources, reduced distance to sources, and on the time spent to 
fetch domestic water. In the health sector, a similar pattern was observed with regard to users’ 
perceived changes in the quality of health services and on a number of aspects about the 
appropriateness for women of the services offered in the nearest health facility. However, the 
level of satisfaction differed significantly between men and women. More women users than 
men were dissatisfied with both services, presumably because women made frequent use of 
these services due to their specific health needs and because they are the main care takers of 
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the sick and providers of water in their households. These similarities and differences result 
from men’s and women’s day-to-day interaction and experience with the services as managers, 
providers and users. Therefore, they could be used as an entry point for policy makers and 
planners in making water and health services actually ‘gender-sensitive’ to the needs of both 
men and women. Our findings corroborate the observation by Bouckaert and van de Walle 
(2003) that frequency of use, homogeneity or heterogeneity of the service and directness of 
contact with the service have influence on users’ satisfaction.   
 Decentralization in both sectors has also involved the introduction of user fees to 
complement government financing in order to improve the quality and sustainability of the 
services. Most users are willing to pay the fees provided that continuous water supply from 
improved sources is guaranteed and that the primary healthcare services are ‘good’. 
Significantly more water service users (92%) could afford user fees than primary healthcare 
service users (71%), partly because health service users incur additional costs like those of 
transport and medication. In both cases, more female-headed than male-headed households 
were unable to pay the users fees. This means that user fees can contribute to unequal access 
to services especially among the poor. Similar findings were reported by other studies on 
water user fees (e.g. Rakodi, 2000; Cleaver and Hamada, 2010; Sultana and Loftus, 2012) 
and on cost sharing in health services (e.g. Tolhurst and Nyonator, 2006; Peters et al., 2008). 
While exemptions are often used as a mechanism to address this problem (WDP, 2004), in 
the study area they were not effectively implemented. In the health sector for instance, user 
fees are officially exempted for children under five, pregnant mothers and the elderly, but 
many of them still ended up paying for drugs, transport and bribes. Many of these costs are 
beyond the reach of the very poor.  
Despite the increased availability of service infrastructures in some villages, the study 
revealed that these improvements have not been shared equitably by all the expected benefi-
ciaries, because of geographical isolation, socio-economic and gender differences. In some 
villages, availability of service infrastructure has not improved substantially because district 
councils cannot support all villages in their jurisdictions with new infrastructures due to 
limited financial and technical capacity. Chapter 5 showed that over half of water users still 
travelled more than a kilometre to the nearest water source and spent more than an hour on 
that activity in the dry season. Chapter 6 revealed that availability of health facilities was even 
more critical since only two of the ten study villages, and about half of all the villages in the 
two districts had health facilities. This poses a big challenge particularly for women users, 
many of whom relied on traditional birth attendants for delivery services or spent many 
hours in accessing healthcare from distant facilities. This implies that the success of the 
reforms in improving service delivery depends largely on the financial and technical capacity 
of district councils. However, as shown in Chapter 3, district councils are highly dependent 
on central government grants, which are insufficient to meet the high demands for service 
infrastructure in their jurisdictions.  
 Gender inequalities in access to water and health services were visible in a number of 
ways. Chapter 5 shows that in addition to their inability to pay user fees, many female-headed 
households lived far away from improved water sources and had no means to transport water. 
In villages where the same water points were used by both domestic users and livestock, 
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competing priorities over water use between men and women arose. This disadvantaged 
women in terms of time spent on accessing domestic water and, sometimes, water quality. 
Chapter 6 reveals that women’s reproductive health needs were not sufficiently addressed by 
the existing health facilities and that gender power relations still played a critical role in 
meeting their reproductive health needs. This indicates that while decentralization reforms 
brought the services and their management closer to the people, accessibility is gendered and 
depends on social dynamics that are underpinned by the gendered power relations at 
household and community levels. Other socio-cultural variables such as age, religion and 
ethnicity intersect with gender and may compound women’s disadvantaged position in access 
to water and health services. 
 Most users regarded the perceived quality of domestic water services (in terms of taste 
and colour) from the improved sources as good. Complaints were only reported in one 
village where the borehole was said to be producing salty (hard) water that could hardly be 
used for drinking or washing. Contrastingly, many users complained about the poor quality 
of primary health services, citing high user fees, shortage of drugs and other essential 
facilities, inadequate health staff, long queuing times, lack of attention by health staff, and 
corruption. Apparently, the reforms put more efforts into building health infrastructure than 
into improving the quality of services in the existing health facilities. Similar problems were 
reported more than a decade ago at the beginning of the reforms (cf. Mwisongo et al., 2000). 
This means that the impact of the reforms on primary health services has been larger on the 
infrastructure than on ‘service delivery’ per se (Conyers, 2007) including improving the 
quality of services.  
Because of the predominantly top-down relations between the central government 
and district councils, and the high demand for health facilities in many villages, district 
councils plan and budget for health infrastructure construction as one of the national 
priorities. This is also in line with the Primary Health Services Development Programme 
which requires districts and communities to construct a dispensary in every village and a 
health centre in every ward (URT, 2007b). However, there were concerns among district 
council officials and village-level service users that if the quality of services in the existing 
health facilities is poor, adding more health facilities without matching measures to improve 
the quality of services could perhaps worsen the situation. Because of limited resources, many 
respondents preferred to see improvements in the existing facilities before constructing new 
ones, especially in areas where most people live within five kilometres from the nearest 
facilities.  
8.2.4 Impact of decentralization reforms on cooperation and trust  
Research question 4: How does trust between local leaders and citizens affect decision-making 
processes and provision of water and health services, and to what extent have the decentralization 
reforms increased cooperation and trust? 
 This question aimed at investigating the two-way interface between cooperation, trust 
and decentralization reforms. In some of the literature, cooperation and trust are theorised as 
preconditions for successful decentralization reforms (e.g. World Bank, 1997; Fisher, 1999; 
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Ribot, 2002; Cleaver, 2005; Essau, 2008), while others see them as outcomes of the reforms 
(e.g. Crook and Manor, 2000; Blind, 2006; Mendoza-Botelho, 2013). This study looked at 
both mechanisms and linked them to a gender perspective, because cooperation, trust and 
decentralization processes operate in a ‘gendered’ socio-cultural and political context. This 
question was addressed in Chapter 7. 
 As the study shows, the reforms have enhanced people’s participation in formal and 
informal cooperative activities by emphasizing local involvement in the construction of 
service infrastructure and membership of groups and representative bodies. Over three 
quarters of our respondents (77%) reported to have had participated in the construction of 
water sources, more than half of them in health infrastructure (57%) and over one third 
(39%) were members of social and economic groups. These initiatives were aimed at 
improving the availability and sustainability of public services at village level, and to 
contribute to poverty reduction which is the ultimate goal of decentralization reforms. 
Hence, this study revealed a positive link between decentralization and increased cooperative 
activities, particularly with regard to labour and cash contributions in the construction of 
service infrastructure, and through people’s involvement in the social and economic groups. 
These participatory initiatives strengthen bonds of trust and reciprocity between society and 
the state (Mendoza-Botelho, 2013).  
Participation in these arrangements was influenced by the culturally constructed 
gender power relations. Whereas more men than women participated in the construction of 
service infrastructure, women were significantly more likely to be members of groups than 
men. This underscores the fact that gender influences the way men and women participate in 
local cooperative efforts because cooperation takes place in a the socio-cultural context in 
which gender is an important variable. Gender also intersected with religion and ethnicity to 
influence cooperation through membership of groups and networks. This finding is 
congruent with other studies that show how gender constrains social networks and associa-
tional life at the community level (e.g. Beall, 2001; Molyneux, 2002; Cleaver, 2005; 
Bezanson, 2006). This means that the formal local institutional structures aimed at enhan-
cing the participation of both men and women in collective action need to be viewed in the 
context of the culturally-embedded structures of social interaction, collective action and trust 
(Groenewald, 2012).    
It was found that most respondents, men and women alike, had higher ‘personalised’ 
than ‘political’ or ‘institutionalised trust’. Similar findings were reported by Nombo (2007) in 
Tanzania and by Groenewald (2012) in rural Mexico. Women had significantly lower levels 
of ‘personalised trust’ than men, partly because the patriarchal system which is reinforced 
through kinship and ethnicity obstructs women’s associational life in the community. 
Women also reported lower trust levels in water pump attendants but higher ‘lower political 
trust’ than men. Hence, like other forms of social capital (Beall, 2001; Molyneux, 2002; 
Cleaver, 2005; Bezanson, 2006), this study confirms that trust is also gendered. The majority 
of respondents (70%) said that the level of trust in their villages had ‘worsened’ over the past 
ten years due to lack of transparency of leaders, unresponsiveness of local leaders and 
officials, and the poor availability of public services. Despite the increased level of citizen’s 
participation in cooperative activities, decentralization was contributing to both building and 
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eroding trust, depending on the perceived outcomes of these activities. ‘Good’ perceived 
outcomes in terms of improved water and health services generated trust and ‘bad’ outcomes 
in terms unfulfilled promises, lack of transparency or unresponsiveness of local officials to 
local needs decreased trust.  
The study found that political trust is a multi-layered variable in which citizens judge 
the trustworthiness of local institutions and political leaders at different administrative levels 
differently. Using factor analysis, political trust was unbundled into three categories: lower 
level political trust which was related to institutions and leaders at hamlet and village levels, 
higher level political trust signifying trust accorded to actors at ward and district levels, and 
institutionalised trust in village-level water service providers. Participation in decision-making 
processes was negatively associated with lower level political trust, but positively related to 
higher level political trust. In theory, citizens’ participation in local structures is viewed to 
“create trust because it identifies and eventually harmonises interests and makes actions 
predictable” (Bouckaert and van de Walle, 2003:335). According to Mendoza-Botelho 
(2013:2), “active participation in community associations provides opportunities for citizens 
to discuss civic affairs, increase their awareness of political issues and argue about whether or 
not the government is doing everything it should to improve their welfare.” Thus, the 
negative association between participation and lower level political trust observed in this 
study could imply that lower level leaders and officials have failed to inspire trust among their 
citizens, especially in villages where the availability of water and primary healthcare services is 
still poor.  
Users’ satisfaction with water and health services was positively correlated with social 
and political trust, suggesting that improved service delivery can contribute to increasing both 
forms of trust. As Bouckaert and van de Walle (2003:339) write: “Good governance is 
supposed to be reflected in satisfied and trusting citizens.” The fact that many citizens 
showed low levels of trust in their local leaders and institutions, and that a good proportion 
were dissatisfied with water and health services suggests that the reforms have not met the 
expectations of most service users. Therefore, this study yields clear evidence that in order to 
realize the potentials of decentralization in increasing social and political trust, local leaders 
and service providers need to be accountable, transparent and responsive to service users’ 
concerns. While this can be seen as of problem of lower level leaders, possibly because of 
their proximity to citizens, it is also important to note the tensions between village leaders 
and district council officials. In some cases, the central government and district councils did 
not deliver what they promised as part of the decentralization reforms. Consequently, village 
plans were not implemented according to expectation, leading to loss of political trust.  
8.3 Theoretical and methodological implications of the research 
8.3.1 Theoretical considerations  
This study used a combination of governance theory and sociological theory, including an 
institutional, principal-agent, an actor, and a gender perspective. These theoretical perspec-
tives are interrelated in a number of ways, hence, their combination was useful in advancing 
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our understanding of both the process and impact of the reforms in a specific political and 
socio-cultural context. An institutional perspective was used to examine the characteristics of 
district and village level institutions that are responsible for delivery of water and health 
services at the local level. This perspective was relevant because decentralization is an 
‘institutional reform’ (Ribot, 2002) designed at the national level to promote citizens or 
service users’ participation in the formal local decision-making structures, and to improve 
equitable delivery of social services. Consequently, implementation of decentralization 
reforms entails creating new or restructuring the existing institutional arrangements at the 
subnational levels (Azfar et al., 2004; Batley, 2004; de Palencia and Pérez-Foguet, 2011). This 
is exactly what has been happening in Tanzania as revealed in this and previous studies.  
However, given the ‘micro-level’ focus of the study, it was not possible to apply the 
institutional perspective in its entirety as conceived by its early proponents (e.g. North, 1989; 
Mitchell and Pigram, 1989). That would have required studying in detail the legislation and 
regulations, policies and guidelines, administrative structures, economic and financial 
arrangements, political structures and processes, historical and traditional customs and 
values, and key participants and actors both at the national and subnational levels (cf. 
Mitchell and Pigram, 1989; Kimaro and Sundeep, 2007). While some of these aspects were 
considered in this study, the main focus was on the design and functioning of district and 
village level institutions. Consequently, the principal-agent theory was used as an analytical 
framework to investigate these relations between actors at the national, district and village 
levels, and how this ‘agency relationship’ was facilitating or constraining the realization of the 
objectives of decentralization. This enabled us to see decentralization as a dynamic and 
evolving process in which the central government is shaping the roles of actors at the district 
and village levels.  
In practice, decentralization reforms are implemented within a political and socio-
cultural context at the district and sub-district levels. The actors in this process operate within 
a formal institutional framework created by decentralization and the informal institutions 
that are part of the local social structure. This ‘interface’ between the formal institutions and 
the informal day-to-day ‘socially embedded’ arrangements influences the behaviour of the 
different actors in these institutions. Because of this ‘embedded’ character of the formal and 
informal processes, this study included an actor orientation with a focus on the users’ 
perspective. This was linked to a gender perspective because gender is an important socio-
cultural variable which mediates the power relations between the actors in both the formal 
and informal structures, with respect to roles, relations and representations of men and 
women in the public and private spaces (Singh, 2008). Gender can shape both the process 
and the outcomes of decentralization because societies are ‘gendered’ in terms of their 
culture, rules and norms (March et al., 1999). Combining the users’ and the gender perspe-
ctive was particularly useful in investigating the impact of the reforms on participation, on 
service delivery outcomes, and on cooperation and trust from the viewpoint of men and 
women. The general users’ perspective represents the individual user, but does not reflect the 
differences between groups of users within their socio-cultural context (van Wijk et al., 1996). 
The resulting gendered analysis revealed the similarities and differences between men’s and 
women’s views on the changes brought about by the reforms.  
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Overall, the main theoretical contribution of this study is that it puts the gender 
perspective at the centre, combined with an institutional and an actor’s perspective, an 
interplay that is often overlooked in many decentralization studies. This has helped to 
position the local arena in a wider perspective taking into account the broader socio-cultural 
and political structures that influence the process and outcomes of decentralization in a 
particular context. Linking the principal-agent theory to gender, for example, revealed that 
decentralization has enabled more men than women to exercise their agency as principals in 
decision-making processes. The study showed that despite the increased proportion of 
women in service committees, the outcomes of these decentralized arrangements differed for 
men and women on a number of aspects. Similarly, the study revealed that cooperation and 
trust are gendered processes, which affects the functioning and effectiveness of decentrali-
zation reforms in a local context.  
8.3.2 Methodological reflections  
One of the methodological limitations of this study is about the complex relationship 
between decentralization and improved service delivery which is often questioned in the 
academic and policy literature. Decentralization has mostly been measured along the poli-
tical, fiscal and administrative dimensions (cf. Bossert, 1998; Eaton and Schroeder, 2010). 
While the impact of decentralization on service delivery has been attempted in various 
sectors, it is probably more developed in the education sector than in others (Eaton and 
Schroeder, 2010). Some analysts argue that the assumed causal relations are difficult to 
demonstrate (Ribot, 2002; Conyers, 2007) or that the benefits of decentralized public services 
do not always materialize (World Bank, 2001). Conyers (2007) suggests that the impact of 
decentralization on service delivery is more indirect as it affects process factors such as access 
to local information, locus of decision-making power, resource availability and administrative 
performance, which in turn affect service delivery. Thus, this study looked at both the process 
and the outcome indicators of decentralization reforms. It revealed that decentralization 
indeed had positive effects on a number of process indicators, such as increased access to 
local information through the bottom-up participatory planning and decision-making proce-
sses, localising the power to implement decisions to district and village level actors, and 
increased availability of resources at the district level. In turn, the changes in these process 
indicators have contributed to improvements in service delivery outcomes especially with 
regard to enlarging the service infrastructure. While attributing the observed changes to de-
centralization reforms remains difficult, by studying the process of the reforms including the 
local historical and socio-cultural context in which the reforms were implemented, and by 
soliciting users’ views on the perceived changes, it was possible to relate these changes to the 
reforms.   
 Measuring the impact of the reforms could also have benefited from a before-after 
comparison set-up or a longitudinal design. The first requires baseline data, the latter setting 
up a panel data set. Such panel data would have provided detailed information on the trends 
at the village and household levels on service users’ participation, access to water and health 
services, and cooperation and trust levels. However, panel data sets are expensive to generate 
Decision making under the tree 
 
148 
 
and take more time than this study had available. While some of the secondary data from 
national surveys and district reports provided a proxy for the lacking baseline data, most of 
the data in these reports were aggregated at national or district levels, not at village or 
household levels. Similarly, such secondary data rarely included a gendered analysis. Thus, 
this study relied on retrospective data collected by analysing secondary data from village and 
district officials, retrospective questions to service users and key informants, and 
documenting case studies and life histories. These methods helped the respondents to recall 
how the situation was ten years ago as well as at present (cf. de Vaus, 2001). In this way, it 
was possible to obtain some indication of the extent to which things have changed over the 
past one decade of implementing the reforms and the factors that have contributed to these 
changes.  
 A second concern relates to generalizability of the study findings. Given the extended 
case study design used in this study, one may question whether evidence from two districts 
can provide convincing support to demonstrate the impact of decentralization reforms on 
service delivery. In fact, scientific generalizability or external validity of study findings is a 
major methodological concern of the case study design (de Vaus, 2001; Yin, 2003; 
Diefenbach, 2009). To address this issue, de Vaus (2001) suggests that a well-designed case 
study should study the case ‘holistically’ and avoid examining just some levels or parts of the 
case. Accordingly, this study investigated the ‘embedded’ levels within the districts including 
villages and households, and the different actors within these levels. The study also collected 
data from multiple sources of evidence and used different methods to investigate the same 
phenomenon. This triangulation of data sources and methods helped to make internal and 
external comparisons, and contributed to validity of research findings (Yin, 2003).  
Yin (2003:10) offers another explanation to this limitation arguing that “case studies, 
like experiments, are generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or 
universes.” The implicit theoretical hypothesis for this study was that decentralization 
increases service users’ participation, service delivery, and trust through cooperation. The 
study wanted to establish if this hypothesis would actually be confirmed at the village and 
household levels from the view point of service users, and if confirmed, whether it affects 
men and women equally. The study findings indeed reveal positive effects in some aspects, 
but negative effects in others. Similarly, the findings show that in some aspects men and 
women benefit equally whereas in others they benefit differently. In other words, the findings 
have helped to expand our ‘analytic generalization’, but not ‘statistical generalization’ (Yin, 
2003:10). Because the impacts of decentralization are context-specific and the opportunities 
and challenges for participation and service delivery differ across districts and villages, the 
lessons learned from this study are, therefore, only applicable to districts and villages that are 
comparable to the study area. Hence, doing a similar study in other districts and villages 
would allow for more general conclusions in other contexts.  
8.4 Policy implications and future research  
The overall conclusion of this study is that decentralization reforms in Tanzania present both 
opportunities and challenges for increasing people’s participation, cooperation and trust, 
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addressing gender equality issues and improving service delivery at the village and household 
levels. Contrary to the earlier reforms of the 1970s and 1980s, the current reforms represent 
a bold and ambitious initiative to transform the local government system and to that end 
contribute to “accelerated and equitable socio-economic development, public service delivery 
and poverty reduction across the country” (URT, 2009a:28). The current reforms have the 
potential to improve the user-provider interactions leading to improved service delivery, but 
these benefits have not always materialized. In order to realize this potential, this thesis 
argues that there are quite a number of design and implementation issues that should be 
improved. This section, therefore, formulates some policy recommendations that require the 
attention of different actors at the national, district and village levels.  
This study has shown that the existing central-local relations limit the autonomy of 
local governments to exercise their decentralized mandates and to address local service 
delivery needs in their areas of jurisdiction. This problem has also been reported in previous 
national reviews (e.g. URT, 2009a), but the situation does not seem to have changed. It is 
widely accepted that successful decentralization is about local governments being autono-
mous to make decisions and be accountable for them (de Visser, 2005; de Palencia and Pérez-
Foguet, 2011). De Visser (2005) refers to this as the ‘principle of autonomy’ which is critical 
for ensuring that local governments fully exploit their potential to respond to local service 
delivery needs. To ensure successful implementation of the reforms in Tanzania, there is a 
need for policy makers at the national level to redefine the relationship, functions and roles 
of central and local governments contrary to the current practice where local governments are 
regarded as subordinate to central government. In particular, the roles and responsibilities of 
each actor especially in contested issues such as those related to financial resources allocation 
and management, human resources management and priority setting in developing plans 
need to be clearly articulated. Giving more autonomy to local governments will mean that 
district councils have the final decision-making power without interference from central 
government actors (de Visser, 2005). This will also require inclusion of gender issues in 
district plans  and the use of gender-disaggregated data in the planning, implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation of development interventions. Similarly, sectoral ministries need 
to clarify which roles should be decentralized to village-level actors, and which ones to 
district- or higher-level actors to avoid conflicts between the bottom-up and top-down plan-
ning processes, and between actors at different levels.  
Within the current decentralization framework in Tanzania, district councils are the 
main administrative and legislative organs responsible for coordinating the implementation 
of service delivery functions in their areas. This study revealed a number of institutional 
problems to be addressed at this level. One of them relates to the conflicting roles and respo-
nsibilities of village-level service committees vis-a-vis those of village councils, and the lack of a 
clear link between village- and district-level service boards and committees. In order to 
increase the autonomy of village service committees in decision-making and planning 
processes, and to create a direct link between service users and providers, district councils 
need to clarify their roles and responsibilities in relation to those of village councils. It would 
be useful to consider how accountability can be created between service committees and 
village councils, and with respect to the service users they serve. Providing regular gender-
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sensitive training to service committee members focusing on skills and confidence building, 
role clarification and gender awareness (World Bank, 2010) can help to improve their 
capacity to manage service delivery functions. Presently, some training is provided to village-
level service committees, but such programmes are limited, gender-neutral, and many service 
committees are not trained yet. In the health sector, there is a need to re-examine the 
necessity of having a separate committee for each health facility while village and ward health 
committees already exist and perform more or less similar functions. This issue was also 
raised in the review by COWI and EPOS (2007), but the practice appears to have not 
changed. One option would be to explore the possibilities of mainstreaming the roles and 
functions of dispensary and health centres’ committees into village and ward health commi-
ttees, to avoid having parallel structures at the same administrative level.  
The study also identified a number of barriers to effective service users’ participation 
in the planning and decision-making processes at the village level. For example, village 
assemblies are important participation spaces and accountability mechanisms for the majority 
of service users, but their frequency in most villages is still low. District councils could 
improve their current enforcement mechanisms to village leaders to ensure that statutory 
village meetings are regularly held. Attention should be paid to holding meetings at times 
and in locations that are convenient for women. The meetings and agenda have to be 
announced in advance, and they should address village financial issues and other village 
concerns adequately and transparently. That would improve accountability and trust. Village 
communities also need to strengthen their capacities to exercise their rights and responsi-
bilities as principals in these fora. Local priorities emerging from village assemblies and 
consultation meetings should be used as the basis for district plans, to strike a better balance 
between local and national priorities. As Cooksey and Kikula (2005:28) observe, “currently 
the balance is tilted upwards.” The existing participatory bottom-up planning process is still 
quite limited in scope and disconnected from district planning and funding mechanisms. 
Therefore, the issue is not about which issues should be accorded higher priority than others, 
but finding the right balance between local needs and national priorities. 
In order to address the existing gender inequalities in decision-making processes and 
in access to domestic water supply and primary healthcare services, it is important that 
women’s agency in village decision-making structures should become a central concern of the 
reforms. Representative structures and other village-level decision-making spaces should 
become more gender-representative and gender-sensitive. Introducing a quota system for 
women leaders in village councils and committees like that in rural India (cf. Bryld, 2001; 
Jayal, 2006; Ban and Rao, 2008; World Bank, 2010) in addition to the current system which 
addresses women membership only, could increase their effectiveness in these structures. 
Effective strategies to transform the socio-cultural norms that underlie women’s subordinate 
position should also be explored. This will require more efforts by women themselves, com-
munity organisations and government agencies to promote women’s empowerment and to 
remove the socio-cultural barriers constraining women’s participation. Presently, there are 
some initiatives by district councils and NGOs to raise gender awareness at village level, but 
as yet such efforts have only reached few villages. Formation of economic women groups also 
contributes to women’s economic and political empowerment because these groups are used 
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as informal institutions for women to meet their practical gender needs, but also gradually 
are addressing their strategic gender needs. Such efforts need scaling up to reach more 
villages and households. Gender inequality issues in access to water and health services 
should be an explicit focus of the reforms. Ensuring that women play a central role in setting 
priorities and in the management of services will enable them to take control and influence 
service provision and management, for the well-being of their own households and that of 
the community.  
A common condition of every institutional set-up concerning service delivery would 
be to respect the right to basic services such as water and primary healthcare for all (de 
Palencia and Pérez-Foguet, 2011; Sultana and Loftus, 2012). Despite being recognized in 
policy documents (e.g. URT, 2002, 2003), universal access to basic services is not sufficiently 
considered in policy implementation including the current reforms. The main focus of the 
current reforms has been to increase service coverage, while other aspects like quality and 
equity in access to services remain largely overlooked. Currently, geographical isolation, 
poverty and gender differences are excluding some users from accessing these services. The 
central government and district councils must ensure that the delivery of basic services 
reaches those in need. National policies and plans need to change from an infrastructure to a 
service delivery approach that includes addressing quality and equity issues. This will also 
require strengthening the existing user-fee exemption mechanisms. Presently, these 
mechanisms are not consistently applied, especially by primary health service providers. 
Similarly, a balance between service users’ participation in the management of services and 
an adequate support from the district councils and higher levels needs to be achieved. 
Further, the capacity and role of district councils to effectively monitor, regulate service 
delivery and provide technical support to villages should be strengthened.  
Finally, because of the wider and diverse nature of Tanzanian rural districts and 
villages, further research on the impact of decentralization reforms on service delivery in 
other districts would help to provide more concrete conclusions and recommendations. One 
potential area for further research would be to use the gender perspective to investigate the 
impact of the reforms in districts with high levels of ethnic, religious and cultural diversity on 
both participation and access to services. This will help to capture the ‘interface’ between the 
formal and informal institutions, and the opportunities for and bottlenecks of gender-
sensitive service delivery. Similarly, comparisons between urban and rural districts, or 
between public and private providers in areas where the latter exist would also be useful. 
Other service sectors which have been decentralized and play a significant role in the 
livelihoods of rural men and women such as agricultural extension services, could also be 
studied. Gender-disaggregated data collection at village and household levels accompanied by 
detailed qualitative case studies can help to provide insights on what is happening at these 
levels. A number of findings of this study will have relevance for other rural districts and 
villages and, therefore, can be used as a starting point for further research.  
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Appendix 1: Household survey questionnaire 
 
District name …………………………….…….....…  Ward name ……………………………………………… 
Village name …………………………………..…… Hamlet …...…………………………………………....... 
Interviewer’s name …………………..……..…… Date of interview …………………………………....... 
 
Part 1: Socio-economic and demographic information 
1. Please classify the household members under the following with household head as No. 1 (mark * 
on the respondent)  
No. Name of 
household 
member 
Sex 
1. Male 
2. Female  
Age(years) 
 
Marital 
Status* 
 
  
Relation to 
household 
head**  
 
 
Highest 
education 
level 
attained*** 
  
Occupation**** 
 
  
1        
2        
3        
4        
5        
        
        
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
*Code: Marital status 
1. Married  
2. Single        
3. Widowed  
4. Separated 
5. Divorced 
6. Not applicable 
 
**Code: Relation to HH head 
1. Head 
2. Spouse 
3. Son/daughter 
4. Grandson/granddaughter 
5. Father/mother 
6. Father/mother-in-law 
7. Son/daughter-in-law 
8. Sibling 
9. Nephew/niece 
10. Uncle/aunt 
11. Child from another family 
12. Other relative 
13. Other non-relative 
 
***Code: Education level  
1. Adult education 
2. Completed primary education 
3. Did not complete primary 
education 
4. Completed secondary 
education 
5. Did not complete secondary 
education 
6. Vocational training 
7. College training 
8. University education 
9. No formal education 
10. Below school age 
****Code: Occupation  
1. Farming  
2. Farming and livestock 
keeping 
3. Business/trade 
4. Wage employment 
5. Manufacturing (artisan) 
6. Pupil/student 
7. Child 
8. Too old   
****Code: Occupation 
1. Farming  
2. Farming and livestock keeping 
3. Business/trade 
4. Wage employment 
5. Manufacturing (artisan) 
6. Pupil/student 
7. Child 
8. Too old   
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2. Religion (denomination) of respondent 
1. Catholic  2. Protestant (specify)…………………………………………………..............… 
3. Muslim  4. Traditional religion 
3. What is your tribe/ethic group? ........................................................................................................ 
4. For how long have you lived in this village? 
1. Since birth  2. Less than 10 years   3. More than 10 years 
5. What is the major source of income for your household?  
1. Farming  2. Non-farm activities  3.  Wage employment  
4. Others (specify) ……………………............................................................................................... 
6. If non-farm activities, what type of activities? 
1. Brewing  2. Food vending    
3. Small scale business (kiosks, selling charcoal, fuel wood) 
4. Artisan (masonry, carpentry, welding, sewing etc) 
5. Causal labour  
6. Others (specify)……………………………………………………...........................…………...............…….. 
7. What is your estimated income from the above activities?  
Major source of income How often do you earn from this activity?   
1. Annually/per season 2. Monthly 
3. Weekly    4. Daily 
Amount (Tshs) 
Farming    
Wage employment    
Brewing    
Food vending    
Small scale business    
Artisan    
Causal labour    
Other activities (specify)   
 
 
Part 2: Access to water services  
8. What is the main source of domestic water for your household during the rainy season? 
1. Traditional unprotected well   2. Seasonal river/stream/river bed  
3. Charcoal dam  4. Unprotected spring   
5. Protected spring    6. Protected well or hand pump  
7. Public standing point or tap   8. Other source (specify)............................. 
9. How far is this source from your household  (….......……. kilometres)? 
10. How long do you spend on a round trip fetching water from this source (......………. minutes)? 
11. How is domestic water ferried from this source to your household? 
1. Carrying containers on the head  2. Bicycle 
3. Hand drawn cart    4. Donkey or ox-drawn cart 
5. Other means (specify)………………………………….................…………………………………………...... 
12. Do you use the same source of domestic water throughout the year?  
1. Yes      2. No 
13. If no, what is your main source of domestic water in the dry season? 
1. Traditional unprotected well   2. Seasonal river/stream/river bed   
3. Charcoal dam    4.  Unprotected spring   
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5. Protected spring    6.  Protected well or hand pump  
7. Public standing point or tap   8. Not applicable  
14. How far is this source from your household (………. kilometres)? 
15. How long do you spent on a round trip fetching water from this source (……… minutes)? 
16. How is domestic water ferried from this source to your household? 
1. Carrying containers on the head  2. Bicycle 
3. Hand drawn cart    4. Donkey or ox-drawn cart 
5. Other means (specify)………………......…… 6. Not applicable 
17. On average, what amount of water for domestic uses does your household fetch per day? 
1. Drinking water……  litres  2. Other domestic uses ……… litres  3. Total …………litres 
18. How frequent do different members of your household fetch water for domestic uses?  
 Everyday Almost always Occasionally Never at all 
Women     
Girls     
Men     
Boys     
 
19. Considering the following aspects, how appropriate is the main source of domestic water to the 
needs of women and girls? 
 Not appropriate Appropriate Very appropriate 
Location of water source    
Type of water source 
(technology) 
   
 
20. Is the main source of domestic water used for other purposes too? 
1. Yes    2. No 
21. If yes, what are the other uses? 
1. Watering livestock  2.  Gardening or small scale irrigation  
3. Brick making   4. Others (specify) ……………..……….........……………............... 
5. Not applicable  
22. Do you experience any problems due to multiple uses of this water source? 
1. Yes    2. No 
23. If yes, what are they? .……………………………………………………………………...............………......……….... 
24. How do you pay for the water services in your village? 
1.   Flat rates on monthly basis (Tshs........... per month)   
2.   Flat rates on annual basis/after harvesting season (Tshs........... per annum)  
3.   Pay as you fetch (Tshs........... per 20-litre bucket of water)    
4.   Water is provided free of charge 
5. Other payment mechanism (explain)…………………………….…..........………………………………… 
25. Who mostly pays for water services in your household?  
1. Husband or older male member of the household 
2. Wife or older female member of the household 
26. Does your household afford to pay for water services? 
1. Yes   2. No 
27. If no, what alternative strategies do you use to get access to domestic water supply? .…................ 
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…………………………….……………………………………................................................................................. 
 
28. Over the last ten years, have you or another member of your household been involved in  
construction or rehabilitation of water sources in your area? 
1. Yes   2. No 
29. If yes, who was involved and in what ways?  
Who (refer to question 1) How was s/he involved?  
  
  
  
  
 
30. Considering the following aspects, has accessibility to domestic water supply in your village 
improved over the last 10 years? 
 Deteriorated No 
improvement   
Somewhat 
improved 
Significantly 
improved    
Increased number of protected 
water sources 
    
Reduced distance to the main 
domestic water source 
    
Reduced time taken to fetch water     
 
31. If there have been any improvements in domestic water supply in your village, to which 
institutions do you attribute these changes? 
1. District council     2. Central government 
3. Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF) 4. NGOs (mention) …………….....................…………. 
5. Community initiatives   6. Others (specify) ………………….....…….….. 
7. No improvement  
32. Overall, how satisfied are you with access to domestic water supply in this village? 
1. Not satisfied at all  2. Somewhat satisfied   3. Very satisfied  
33. If not satisfied, why? …………………………………………………………………………………………............……. 
34. If you are not satisfied, do you ever complain over the situation? 
1. Yes    2. No 
35. If yes, to whom do you complain and how? ………………………………………….......……..….....…………… 
 
Part 3: Access to health services 
36. Where do you normally go for medical services? 
1. Dispensary in your village   2.  Dispensary in another village 
3. Health centre in your village    4.  Health centre in another village 
5. Drug store or pharmacy in the village  6.  District hospital    
7. Traditional healers     8.  Others (mention) ……….………................ 
37. Who owns this health facility? 
1. Government     2. Mission (specify)………....……………..…….… 
3.  BAKWATA     4. Private sector (specify)…………..…....…….… 
38. If using a non-public health facility, why?............................................................................................ 
39. How far is this health facility from your household (............................. kilometres)? 
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40. Considering the following aspects, to what extent are the health services provided in this health 
facility appropriate to the health needs of women? 
 Not 
appropriate 
Appropriate Very 
appropriate 
Antenatal clinic services for pregnant women    
Delivery services     
Postnatal clinic services for lactating mothers     
Family planning services    
Immunization services     
Child health services    
Treatment of common diseases     
 
41. If you indicated ‘not appropriate’ on any of the above, please give reasons to support your 
answer…………….................................................................................................................................... 
42. How do you pay for health services at this health facility? 
1. Pay per visit to the health facility  
2. Member of community health fund (CHF) 
3. Other payment mechanism (specify)……………………………………….............…………................... 
43. Do you afford to pay for medical services? 
1. Yes   2. No 
44. If no, what alternative strategies do you use to get access to medical services……………...........…... 
45. Over the last ten years, have you or another member of your household been involved in constru-
ction or rehabilitation of a dispensary or health centre in your area? 
1. Yes   2. No 
46. If yes, who was involved and in what ways?  
Who (refer to question 1) How was s/he involved?  
  
  
  
 
47. Considering the following aspects, has the quality of health services in your area improved over 
the last 10 years?  
 Deteriorated No 
changes 
Somewhat 
improved 
Significantly 
improved 
Drug availability     
Availability of essential facilities at the 
health facility  
    
Availability of nurses and doctors      
Trustworthiness of nurses and doctors       
Proximity of health facility     
Quality of buildings at the health facility     
Availability of health related information     
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48. If there has been any improvements in health services in your area, to which institutions do you 
attribute these changes? 
1. District council    2.  Central government 
3. Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF)  4.  Community initiatives 
5. NGOs (mention) ……………………………… 6.  Others (specify) ………………………........… 
7. No improvement  
49. What problems do you encounter when accessing health services from the nearest health facility? 
1. Lack of drugs           2.  Lack of essential facilities 
3. Services are too expensive (unable to pay)           4.  Lack of attention from nurses and 
doctors 
5. Long waiting times before getting services 6. Absent doctors/nurses 
7. Lack female health providers         8.  Demand for illegal payments 
9. Other problems (mention)…………………………………...........………………………………….....……..… 
50. Overall, how satisfied are you with health services in this village? 
1. Not satisfied at all  2.  Somewhat satisfied  3. Very satisfied  
51. If not satisfied, why? ………………………………………………………......…………………………......……………… 
   
Part 4: Participation in decision-making processes  
52. Are you or another member of your household a member of any village or ward committee? 
1. Yes    2. No 
53. If yes, who is a member and in which committee? 
Who (refer to question 1)  Which committee does s/he belong to?   
  
  
  
  
54. Over the last one year, have you or other members of your household ever attended any hamlet, 
village, ward or district council meeting? 
1. Yes   2. No 
55. If yes, which meetings and who attended?  
Type of meeting  Who attended the meeting (refer to question1)?  
Kitongoji meetings  
Village assembly  
Village committee meetings  
Full council meetings  
Other meeting (mention)  
 
56. If you have ever attended any of the above meetings, did you speak up at the meeting? 
1. Yes  2. No  3. Not applicable 
57. If you have not attended any of the above meetings, why?.................................................................. 
58. How much influence do you feel you have in making decisions in such meetings? 
1.  No influence  
2.  Influence over some decisions 
3.  Influence over most decisions 
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59. If you feel you have no influence, why?.............................................................................................. 
60. How do you rate the involvement of women in decision-making organs in this village? 
1. Very few women are involved  
2. Many women are involved 
3. Most women are involved 
61. To what extent do women in this village express themselves in public meetings? 
1. Very few women speak out   
2. Many women speak out 
3. Most women speak out 
62. If the answer is (1), why? ..................................................................................................................... 
 
63. Considering the following aspects, how convenient are public meetings to women in this village?  
 Not convenient  Convenient  Very convenient  
Time of meetings    
Place (venue)    
Language used    
64. In your opinion, what are the barriers hindering women’s active involvement in decision-making 
organs in this village? .......................................................................................................................... 
65. What is your main source of information for district council matters? 
1. Public meetings     
2. Kitongoji and village leaders   
3. Announcements on public notice boards (specify)……………...............………………...………..... 
4. Local radio station   
5. Leaflets and posters    
6. Others (specify)……………………………………………………….............…….....…………………………… 
66. Over the last one year, have you seen any of the following information posted in a public place 
such as village, ward or district council offices? 
 Yes No 
Village financial reports   
Taxes and fees collected in your village   
District council budgets   
District council audited financial reports   
Financial allocations to key service sectors    
67. If yes to any of the above items, were they written in a format that you could easily understand? 
1. Yes  2.  No  3. I didn’t read  4. Not applicable  
68. Have you ever seen a suggestion box at your village or ward office? 
1. Yes  2.  No 
69. If yes, have you ever used it to raise your concerns to village or ward leaders? 
1. Yes  2. No  3. Not applicable  
70. If no, why?.......................................................................................................................................... 
......................................................................................................................................................... 
71. Have you or other members of your household been involved in preparation of a village 
development plan? 
1. Yes  2. No 
72. If yes, who was involved? (refer to question 1)  …………………………........………………………….......... 
.............................................................................................................................................................. 
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73. If yes, please tell me the development projects that were identified as priorities for your 
village………………….............................................................................................................................. 
74.  Were the identified development projects implemented as priotized by villagers? 
1. Yes   2. No  
75. If no, why do you think they were not implemented as planned? ……………..………......................... 
76. In your opinion, what are the three most important social services that should addressed in this 
village?  1.………………….……………...  2. ………………...…..……...  3. ……...…....………...................…. 
 
Part 5: Trust and cooperation   
77. Are you aware of the existence of any groups or associations in this village? 
1. Yes    2. No 
78. If yes, are you or another member of your household a member of any group(s) in your village? 
1. Yes    2. No 
79. If yes, which group and who is a member? 
Group Who (refer to question 1) 
Religious group  
Income generating or production group  
Savings and credit cooperative society  
Burial or festival group  
CBO or civic group  
Political party  
Others (mention)  
 
80. Does this group or association help you to get access to any of the following services? 
 Yes   No  
Domestic water supply   
Health services    
Money to pay for water or health services   
Information on village development projects   
Information on district council matters    
 
81. To what extent do you trust the following people? 
 Not at all  To a small 
extent  
Neither small 
nor great extent  
To a great 
extent  
People in your kin     
Friends and neighbours     
People from your ethnic group/tribe     
Strangers in the village     
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82. To what extent do you trust the following leaders and institutions?  
 Not at all  To a small 
extent 
Neither small 
nor great 
extent  
To a great 
extent  
Hamlet (kitongoji) chairperson     
Village chairperson     
Village executive officer      
Ward executive officer      
Elected ward councillor     
Special seats’ councillor     
Nurses and doctors at the nearest 
dispensary or health centre 
    
Water pump attendant      
Village water committee      
Village council      
Ward development committee      
District council staff     
Member of Parliament      
 
83. If you indicated ‘not at all’ or ‘to a small extent’ to any of the above leaders or institutions, please 
explain………………………………………………………………………………….……............................................... 
.…………………………………………………………………………………………………..…........................................ 
84. Generally speaking, to what extent do people in this village trust each other? 
1. Most women trust each other    
2. Most men trust each other 
3. Most women and men trust each other equally   
4. Few women trust each other 
5. Few men trust each other     
6. Few men and women trust each other 
85. To what extent do you think the level of trust in this village has changed over the last ten years?  
1. Gotten worse   2. Remained the same  3. Improved  
86. If it has gotten worse, why?............................................................................................................... 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………........……… 
87. If it has improved, why? ................................................................................................................... 
   …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….......………... 
88. What proportion of people in this village contributes time or money towards common 
development projects? 
1. Everyone   2. More than half  3. About half 
4. Less than half   5. No one 
89. If there is a water supply problem in this village, who are most likely to cooperate to solve the 
problem? 
1. Men    2. Women   3. Men and women equally 
 
 
 
Thanks for Your Cooperation! 
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Appendix 2: Interview checklist for village leaders  
 
1. What have been the major improvements in water and health services over the last ten years in 
this village? What factors have contributed to these changes? How have different community 
groups been involved in improving these services?  
 
2. How often does the village prepare development plans? Who participates in preparing them and 
how, and who facilitates the process? To what extent are village plans integrated in district plans? 
To what extent does the village have discretion over its plans and financial resources?  
 
3. How do people pay for water services in this village? Who sets the tariffs, which criteria are used, 
and who is responsible collecting and managing water funds? Are there any groups exempted 
from paying water tariffs?  
 
4. How often are public village meetings held? How are they organised (time of the day, venue and 
language)? Between men and women, who mostly attends, who speaks; and why? How are 
villagers informed about an upcoming meeting? 
 
5. To what extent are women involved in decision making organs in this village? Which committees 
have women as members and/or as leaders? Do women speak up in village meetings, on what 
matters, and do they have influence in reaching decisions? Have there been changes in the 
proportion of women in decision-making organs over the past ten years? What has contributed to 
these changes?  
 
6. Are village financial reports presented in village assembly meetings or public notice boards, and 
how often? 
 
7. To what extent do you think the level of trust in this village has changed over the last ten years, 
and what could be the causes? Is there a difference on the level of cooperation and trust between 
men and women in this village? 
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Appendix 3: FGD checklist for village water committees 
 
1) Membership in village water committees 
 When was this committee elected? What is its composition?  
 What are the qualifications to become a member of VWC?  
 What is the proportion of young men and women in the VWC? Why are there few young 
men and women in the committee?  
 How does age influence relationships and decision making among VWC members?  
2) Responsibilities of the committee 
 What are the main responsibilities of the VWC? 
 Has the committee been trained on its roles and responsibilities? Who facilitated the 
training, how long did it take, and what were the main topics covered?  
 Do both men and women in the VWC perform the same responsibilities or is there division 
of responsibilities? If so, who does what and why? 
 How do women rate their involvement in the VWC?  
3) Decision making in the VWC 
 How often do women in the VWC attend meetings? How often do they speak up, and do 
they have influence in decision making? 
 How has the presence of women in VWC helped to improve water services? How has they 
helped to address women’s water needs? 
 What barriers are constraining women’s active involvement in VWC?  
4) Patriarch system  
 How do you explain patriarch system? What are the examples of patriarch system? 
 What are factors contributing to the existence of patriarch system? How do religion and 
ethnicity contribute to patriarch system?  
 Is the system changing or not and in what ways? What factors are contributing to the change?   
5) Payment and management of water funds  
 How do people pay for water services in this village?  
 Who sets the tariffs, which criteria are used, and who collects?  
 Are there any households failing to pay, what proportion?  
 Are there any groups that exempted from paying water tariffs?  
 Do you have an active water fund account? How is the money spent? And who decides?    
6) What are the main challenges this village is facing in accessing water services? 
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Appendix 4: FGD checklist for village health committees 
 
1) Membership in village health committees 
 When was this committee elected? What is its composition?  
 What are the qualifications to become a member of VHC?  
 Why religious leaders in the VHC? 
 What is the proportion of young men and women in the VHC? Why are there few young men 
and women in the committee?  
 How does age influence relationships and decision making among VWC members?  
2) Responsibilities of the committee 
 What are the main responsibilities of the VHC? 
 Has the committee been trained on its roles and responsibilities? Who facilitated the 
training, how long did it take, and what were the main topics covered?  
 Do both men and women in the VHC perform the same responsibilities or is there division 
of responsibilities? If so, who does what and why? 
 How do women rate their involvement in the VHC?  
3) Decision making in VHC 
 How often do women in VHC attend meetings? How often do they speak up, and do they 
have influence in decision making? 
 How has the presence of women in VHC helped to improve health services? How has they 
helped to address women’s health needs? 
 What barriers are constraining women’s active involvement in VHC?  
4)  Patriarch system  
 How do you explain patriarch system? What are the examples of patriarch system?  
 What are the factors contributing to the existence of patriarch system? How do religion and 
ethnicity contribute to patriarch system?  
 Is the system changing or not and in what ways? What factors are contributing to the change?   
5) Payment mechanisms for health services 
 How do people pay for health services in this village?  
 Are there any households failing to pay, what proportion and what alternative health services 
do they use?  
 Are there any groups that exempted from paying health tariffs?  
6) Family planning  
 Where do community members get family planning services, and how easily are they 
accessible? 
 Do men and women use family planning services?  
 Which methods are commonly used by men, and why?  
 Which methods are commonly used by women, and why?  
 Is family planning a private or public issue? Who decides on whether to use or not use FPM? 
7) What are the main challenges this village is facing in accessing health services? 
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Appendix 5: FGD checklist for men and women groups 
 
1) Improvements in access to water services 
 What have been the important improvements in access to water (availability, affordability, 
quality) in this area over the past ten years?  
 What factors have contributed to these changes? 
 Who has been involved and in what ways?  
 To what extent are community water priorities reflected in district plans?  
2) Payment mechanisms for water services 
 How do people pay for water services in this village?  
 Who sets the tariffs, which criteria are used, and who collects?  
 Are there any households failing to pay, what proportion?  
 Are there any groups that exempted from paying water tariffs?  
 How is the money spent, who decides, and are you satisfied with water funds expenditures?  
3) Appropriateness of water services to women needs 
 How appropriate are water services to the needs of women in terms of their location, time 
of opening and closing domestic points, type of source technology?  
4) Improvements in access to health services 
 What have been the important improvements in access to health services (availability, 
affordability, quality) in this area over the past ten years?  
 What factors have contributed to these changes? 
 Who has been involved and in what ways?  
 To what extent are community health priorities reflected in district plans?  
5) Payment mechanisms for health services 
 How do people pay for health services in this village?  
 Are there any households failing to pay, what proportion and what alternative health services 
do they use?  
 Are there any groups that exempted from paying health tariffs?  
6) Family planning  
 Where do you get family planning services, and how easily are they accessible? 
 Do men and women use family planning services?  
 Which methods are commonly used by men, and why?  
 Which methods are commonly used by women, and why?  
 Is family planning a private or public issue? Who decides on whether to use or not use FPM? 
7) What are the main challenges this village is facing in accessing water and health services? 
8) Cooperation and trust relations in the community  
 To what extent do people in this village cooperate and trust each other? Are there differences 
on the level of cooperation and trust between men and women and if so, why? 
 To what extent to people cooperate with and trust their leaders such as kitongoji and village 
chairpersons, village executive officer, ward executive officer, councillor and member of 
parliament? Are there differences on the level of trust accorded to each of these leaders, and 
if so why?  
 Has the level of trust in this village improved or deteriorated over the last ten years, and why?
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Summary 
 
In recent decades, decentralization has been upheld by governments, donors and policy 
makers in many developing countries as a means of improving people’s participation and 
public services delivery. In 1996, the government of Tanzania embarked on major local 
government reforms reflecting the global trends and as part of the wider public sector 
reforms. The reforms aim at improving the access, quality and equitable delivery of public 
services through a policy of ‘decentralization by devolution’. Since then, many studies have 
examined the fiscal, administrative, legal and political aspects of the reforms. However, the 
gender dimensions of both the process and outcomes of the reforms have been less 
examined. In Tanzania, like in other sub-Saharan African countries, little is documented 
about decentralization and gender, especially at the village level. This study, therefore, 
examines the impact of decentralization reforms on service delivery in rural Tanzania using a 
gender perspective. The study addresses the question of how decentralization affects the user-
provider interactions and gender-sensitivity of water and health services in the rural villages. 
Specifically, it focuses on the institutional characteristics for decentralized service delivery, 
the impact of the reforms on service users’ participation in decision-making processes, on 
access to gender-sensitive water and health services, and on cooperation and trust at the 
village level.  
To investigate this, the study draws on governance theory and sociological theory,  
including an institutional, principal-agent, an actor and a gender perspective. In this study, 
gender is seen as a cross-cutting perspective taking in account the wider socio-cultural and 
political structures that influence the process and outcomes of decentralization in a specific 
context. The study is based on quantitative and qualitative data obtained at district, village 
and household levels in the districts of Kondoa and Kongwa in the Dodoma Region in 
Tanzania. The fieldwork consisted of three overlapping phases: an exploratory phase, house-
hold survey and in-depth qualitative study. Mixed data collection methods were used because 
they enrich our understanding of the topic and contribute to the validity and reliability of 
findings. A household survey was used to collect quantitative data, whereas semi-structured 
and unstructured interviews, focus group discussions, observations, case studies and life 
histories were used to collect qualitative data. Overall, 513 respondents (236 men and 277 
women) were involved in the study: 332 in the survey (115 men and 227 women), 69 in the 
focus group discussions (44 men and 25 women), 107 in the interviews (77 men and 30 
women) and five women in life histories. In addition, review and analysis of available data at 
district and village levels provided secondary data to complement the primary data.  
The study found that the reforms have resulted in a number of institutional changes 
by restructuring the district and village councils, and by establishing service boards and 
committees at each administrative level or service delivery point. These changes have incre-
ased local governments’ autonomy to plan and implement service delivery functions, and 
service users’ participation in planning and managing public services. However, the existing 
central-local relations limit local governments’ autonomy to fully exercise their decentralized 
mandates and to address local service delivery needs. Local governments have limited 
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financial and technical capacity, and the central government controls their functions through 
intergovernmental transfers, guidelines and national priorities. At the village level, conflicting 
roles and responsibilities of village councils and service committees limit the latter to fun-
ction effectively. Thus, decentralized service delivery in Tanzania takes on different forms 
where the nature of sector is an important factor in the kind of institutional arrangements. 
It was revealed that decentralization reforms have created spaces for service users’ 
participation in planning and decision-making processes. Men and women participate in 
these spaces through attending meetings, contributing labour, cash or both, in construction 
of service infrastructures, membership in committees, speaking up and influencing decisions 
in meetings. The majority of women participate passively by attending meetings, consultation 
or through activity-specific spaces. Although the proportion of women in village councils and 
committees has increased because of the quota-based representation, local decision-making 
processes continue to be largely male dominated. Women’s participation contributes to 
meeting practical gender needs, but to a lesser extent addresses their strategic gender needs 
because of the gendered power relations which have been largely untouched by the reforms. 
The main constraints to effective women’s participation include patriarchy, household respo-
nsibilities, complicated election procedures, lack of self-confidence and less experience in 
public affairs. Gender also intersects with religion, ethnicity, age and marital status, and may 
compound women’s disadvantaged position in local decision-making structures. While dece-
ntralization is expected to address gender inequalities, instead it reproduces them, because it 
does not address the socio-cultural barriers that inhibit women’s effective participation in 
local structures.  
 The study shows that the impact of reforms on water and health services delivery is 
mixed. Access to the services has improved for some users but decentralization has also led to 
marginalization of other users. The number of water and health services infrastructure has 
increased, thereby raising the service coverage. However, there is still inadequate 
infrastructure to provide full service coverage, and the situation is more critical in the health 
sector because most villages do not have their own health facilities. Despite improvements in 
coverage, less has been achieved in other respects, such as adequate staffing and availability of 
drugs and other essential supplies. Comparatively, more users are satisfied with water services 
than with health services. For both services, there are overlaps and differences between the 
users’ and the gender perspectives. Men and women hold similar opinions on some aspects, 
but there are also marked differences. This confirms the fact that men and women are 
actually different users because they have different needs, and are positioned differently 
regarding their access to basic services. Understanding these similarities and differences is, 
thus, an important step in making basic services ‘gender-sensitive’.  
 It was shown that the reforms have strengthened formal cooperation aimed at 
improving public services and the informal mechanisms of social networks and groups. 
Decentralization outcomes in terms of increased citizen’s participation in decision-making 
processes and improved services influence political trust, and also here gender relations 
proved to play an important role. There is a two-way interface between trust and decentra-
lization reforms: trust enhances participation in local institutions and ‘good’ decentralization 
outcomes can generate trust. Conversely, ‘bad’ decentralization outcomes decrease trust. The 
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study further revealed that political trust is a multi-layered concept where citizens judge local 
leaders and service providers at different administrative levels differently. These levels are 
crucial in analysing political trust and the impact of gender on political trust at different 
levels.  
 The general conclusion of this study is that the current decentralization reforms in 
Tanzania present both opportunities and challenges for increasing service users’ 
participation, cooperation and trust, addressing gender equality issues and, for improving 
service delivery. In order to improve the user-provider interactions and service delivery, a 
number of design and implementation issues should be addressed. At the national level, 
policy makers need to address the existing imbalance in central-local relations by redefining 
the relationship, functions and roles of central and local governments. District councils need 
to clarify the roles and responsibilities of service committees in relation to those of village 
councils, provide regular gender-sensitive training to service committees, and integrate local 
needs into district plans. Village leaders should consider holding meetings at times and in 
locations that are convenient for women, announce meetings and agenda in advance, and 
address village concerns adequately and transparently in the meetings. Actors at all levels 
need to explore effective strategies for transforming the socio-cultural norms that underlie 
women’s subordinate position in decision-making processes, and in their access to basic 
services.  
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Samenvatting 
In de afgelopen decennia hebben overheden, donoren en beleidsmakers in ontwikkelings-
landen decentralisatie gezien als een middel bij uitstek om de participatie van mensen in 
ontwikkelingsprocessen en in algemene dienstverlening te vergroten. Deze trend volgende, 
begon de regering van Tanzania in 1996 met een veelomvattend hervormingsprogramma van 
de publieke sector. De hervormingen zijn gericht op het verbeteren van de toegang tot en de 
kwaliteit en gelijkwaardig van overheidsdiensten door een beleid dat ‘decentralisatie door 
devolutie’ kan worden genoemd. Sindsdien is er veel onderzoek gedaan naar de fiscale, 
bestuurskundige, wettelijke en politieke aspecten van de hervormingen. De gender dimensie 
van zowel het proces als de uitkomsten van de hervormingen heeft echter veel minder aan-
dacht gekregen. In Tanzania, zoals in veel andere Afrikaanse landen, is weinig bekend over 
decentralisatie en gender op dorpsniveau. Dit proefschrift gaat over de gevolgen van de her-
vormingen voor de overheidsdienstverlening op het platteland van Tanzania, bezien vanuit 
een gender perspectief, en toegespitst op de terreinen van watervoorziening en de primaire 
gezondheidszorg. Meer specifiek staat centraal hoe decentralisatie de interactie van de 
verleners en de gebruikers van overheidsdiensten beïnvloedt en hoe gender-sensitief de 
watervoorziening en de primaire gezondheidszorg in de dorpen in feite zijn. Hiertoe werden 
de institutionele kenmerken van de dienstverlening op deze terreinen, de participatie van 
gebruikers in de besluitvorming, de toegang tot deze diensten en samenwerking en vertrou-
wen op dorpsniveau onderzocht.  
 Om de vraagstelling te onderzoeken werden theoretische perspectieven uit de socio-
logie en bestuurskunde gebruikt, in het bijzonder een institutioneel perspectief, principal-
agent theorie, een actor perspectief en een gender perspectief. Het gender perspectief werd op 
alle niveaus toegepast, inclusief op de bredere sociaal-culturele en politieke structuren die zo 
bepalend zijn voor het proces en de uitkomsten van decentralisatie in een specifieke context.  
In het onderzoek werden kwantitatieve en kwalitatieve data verzameld op de niveaus van 
district, dorp en huishouden in de districten Kondoa en Kongwa in het Dodoma gebied in 
Tanzania. Het veldwerk werd gedaan in drie elkaar overlappende fasen: een exploratieve fase, 
de survey fase, en de diepgaande kwalitatieve studie. Er werd een combinatie van onderzoeks-
methoden gebruikt om de validiteit en betrouwbaarheid van de gegevens te versterken.  Door 
middel van een huishoudsurvey werden kwantitatieve gegevens verzameld, terwijl kwalitatieve 
gegevens werden verzameld met behulp van half-gestructureerde interviews, focus groep 
discussies, persoonlijke case studies en observatie. In totaal waren 513 respondenten (236 
mannen en 277 vrouwen) in de studie betrokken: 332 in de survey (115 mannen en 227 
vrouwen), 69 in de focus groep discussies (44 mannen en 25 vrouwen), 107 in de diepte in-
terviews (77 mannen en 30 vrouwen), en van vijf vrouwen werd de levensgeschiedenis opge-
tekend. Tevens werden secondaire bronnen op dorps- en districtsniveau geraadpleegd.  
 Uit het onderzoek komt naar voren dat de hervormingen hebben geleid tot 
herstructurering van de districts- en dorpsraden en tot meer bestuurlijke organen, zoals 
commissies, op alle niveaus. Door deze veranderingen is de autonomie van de lokale overheid 
om dienstverlening te plannen en te implementeren toegenomen en is de betrokkenheid van 
de gebruikers van de diensten vergroot. De bestaande centraal-lokale verhoudingen maken 
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echter dat lokale overheden hun mandaat niet volledig kunnen waarmaken en onvoldoende 
tegemoet kunnen komen aan de lokale behoeften aan dienstverlening. Lokale overheden 
hebben beperkte financiële en technische capaciteit en worden door de centrale overheid 
gecontroleerd door geldstromen, richtlijnen en nationale prioriteiten. Op dorpsniveau 
kunnen rolconflicten tussen de dorpsraden en de sectorcommissies (zoals water commissies) 
het goed functioneren van de sectorcommissies beletten. Kortom, decentralisatie leidt tot 
verschillende uitkomsten, waarbij de aard van de sector ook een rol speelt.  
 Het onderzoek wees ook uit dat de hervormingen ruimte hebben geschapen voor de 
participatie van gebruikers in planning en besluitvorming. Mannen en vrouwen worden 
hierin betrokken door het bijwonen van vergaderingen, een bijdrage aan de bouw van 
voorzieningen in de vorm van arbeid of geld, het lidmaatschap van commissies, en het 
spreken tijdens vergaderingen om zo beslissingen te beïnvloeden. In meerderheid 
participeren vrouwen passief, door vergaderingen bij te wonen of door geconsulteerd te 
worden, en hun participatie is meer sector-specifiek. Ofschoon als gevolg van het quota 
beleid het aandeel van vrouwen in dorpsraden en commissies is toegenomen, blijft de lokale 
besluitvorming  gedomineerd door mannen. De vertegenwoordiging van vrouwen heeft effect 
als het gaat om praktische zaken die te maken hebben met hun vrouwelijke rol, maar 
beantwoordt nauwelijks aan de strategische behoefte van vrouwen aan inspraak en macht. De 
belemmeringen hierbij zijn de patriarchale cultuur, het tijdsbeslag van huishoudelijke 
plichten, gebrek aan zelfvertrouwen en het ontbreken van ervaring in het publieke domein. 
De gender verhoudingen worden mede beïnvloed door factoren zoals religie, etniciteit, 
leeftijd en huwelijkse staat, en deze factoren kunnen de belemmeringen voor een effectief 
optreden van vrouwen in het lokale publieke domein versterken. Terwijl decentralisatie 
gender ongelijkheid zou moeten verminderen, wordt deze in feite gereproduceerd omdat de 
sociaal-culturele barrières die effectieve participatie van vrouwen verhinderen onaangetast 
blijven. 
 Het onderzoek laat ook een gemengd beeld zien van de invloed van de hervormingen 
op de dienstverlening in de sectoren van watervoorziening en gezondheidszorg. De toegang 
van gebruikers tot de voorzieningen in deze sectoren verbeterde voor sommigen maar ver-
slechterde voor anderen. Het aantal voorzieningen op beide terreinen nam toe, waarmee een 
groter bereik werd gerealiseerd. De infrastructuur is echter nog steeds niet toereikend voor 
toegang tot de voorzieningen voor iedereen. Dit is zorgwekkend vooral voor wat betreft de 
gezondheidszorg omdat de meeste dorpen geen eigen gezondheidszorgvoorziening hebben. 
Tevens de voorzieningen op dit terrein te maken van onvoldoende staf en gebrek aan medi-
cijnen en andere faciliteiten. De  veranderingen  in de gezondheidszorgvoorzieningen worden  
door de gebruikers dan ook minder positief beoordeeld dan die in de watervoorziening. Ter-
wijl mannen en vrouwen hebben dezelfde mening op sommige punten, verschillen zij van 
mening op andere punten. Dit heeft aantoonbaar te maken met de verschillende behoeften 
en prioriteiten van mannen en vrouwen als het gaat om toegang tot basis voorzieningen. 
Begrip van deze overeenkomsten en verschillen is een belangrijke eerste stap in het meer 
‘gender sensitief’ maken van basis voorzieningen. 
 Het onderzoek wees uit dat de hervormingen de formele samenwerking gericht op 
verbetering van de dienstverlening en informele samenwerkingsverbanden zoals netwerken 
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en groepen hebben versterkt. Positieve uitkomsten zoals grotere betrokkenheid van burgers in 
besluitvorming en verbeteringen in de dienstverlening verstreken op hun beurt het 
vertrouwen in het politieke proces, waarbij ook de gender verhoudingen een rol bleken te 
spelen. Er is dus een wisselwerking tussen vertrouwen en decentralisatie: vertrouwen vergroot 
de participatie in lokale instituties en ‘goede’ uitkomsten van de hervormingen genereren 
vertrouwen, terwijl ‘slechte’ uitkomsten het vertrouwen verminderen. Uit het onderzoek 
bleek ook dat politiek vertrouwen een gelaagd concept is; burgers beoordelen leiders en 
dienstverleners verschillend op de verschillende niveaus. Voor de analyse van politiek 
vertrouwen is het belangrijk om de bestuurlijke niveaus te onderscheiden en er rekening mee 
te houden dat de invloed van gender op politiek vertrouwen per niveau kan verschillen.  
 De algemene conclusie is dat de huidige hervormingen zowel mogelijkheden bieden 
als uitdagingen opleveren voor grotere betrokkenheid van gebruikers bij de dienstverlening, 
meer samenwerking en vertrouwen, het terugdringen van gender ongelijkheid en verbeterde 
dienstverlening. Om daadwerkelijke verbetering te realiseren van de interactie tussen de 
gebruikers en verleners van diensten en van de dienstverlening zelf, moet een aantal zaken 
worden aangepakt. Op nationaal niveau moeten beleidsmakers iets doen aan de scheve 
verhoudingen tussen het centrale en het lokale niveau door de verantwoordelijkheden en 
rollen van de verschillende bestuurslagen tegen het licht te houden en waar nodig te her-
definiëren. Districtsraden dienen duidelijkheid te verschaffen over de rol en verantwoor-
delijkheden van de sector commissies vis-à-vis die van dorpsraden. Tevens moeten zij zorg 
dragen voor regelmatige en gender-sensitieve training van commissieleden en moeten zij de 
lokale behoeften en prioriteiten beter integreren in de planning op districtsniveau. Dorps-
leiders moeten meer rekening houden met vrouwen bij het bepalen van de tijd en plaats van 
vergaderingen, moeten deze vergaderingen en de agenda’s tijdig aankondigen, en moeten er 
voor zorgen dat lokaal belangrijke zaken adequaat en transparant worden behandeld. Op alle 
niveaus moeten de betrokken actoren proberen effectieve strategieën te vinden om iets te 
doen aan de ondergeschikte positie van vrouwen in de besluitvorming en dienen zij de 
toegang van vrouwen tot basisvoorzieningen te verbeteren. 
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